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Abstract
Radio Frequency IDentiﬁcation (RFID) is a wireless identiﬁcation technology that
uses radio waves to identify tagged objects. RFID systems provide low-cost tagging
capabilities for many applications such as access control systems, transportation ticket-
ing, and supply chain management. Providing security and preserving privacy for these
systems is challenging. The tags utilised in such applications are low-cost tags with
limited resources that cannot aﬀord the use of conventional cryptographic primitives.
Thus, low-cost RFID tags might be vulnerable to passive attacks, such as eavesdropping,
and active attacks, such as tag cloning, impersonation, replay, data de-synchronization
attacks, tag data leakage, forward secrecy invasion and location tracking.
There has been considerable research into the mutual authentication of passive RFID
tags to combat passive and active attacks, and in this thesis we present analysis of the
prior art, which led us to make ﬁve academic research contributions.
Security is increasingly important, especially for tagging of important objects, and
there are growing concerns from users about their privacy. To this end, in this thesis, we
studied RFID security and privacy in several schemes, such as in RFID-enabled supply
chains, RFID cloud-based scheme, and multi-tag group reading schemes. We focused
on how to improve and propose RFID mutual authentication protocols in such schemes
that are practical and cost eﬀective, and satisfy the security and privacy requirements.
Lastly, we provide a formal analysis of the proposed protocols using CasperFDR
and Scyther tools, along with the implementation of the proposed protocols with their
performance measures.
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1.1 Motivation
Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation (RFID) is a wireless identiﬁcation technology that uses
radio signals to transmit data. It is used for identifying objects such as products,
animals and people. These objects are embedded with a small token known as an
RFID tag. In this thesis, we focus on passive RFID tags, which can be deﬁned as
wireless transponders that do not have any power of their own and only respond to
the electromagnetic ﬁelds generated by the nearby reader(s). Passive RFID tags are
designed to be resource-limited in order to be used with low-cost items. An RFID tag
stores a unique identiﬁer and may optionally hold additional information about the
object. RFID readers communicate wirelessly with the tags to identify, read, write or
update the tag's data without requiring a line-of-sight and over greater distances than
other identiﬁcation technologies such as barcodes [111].
Currently, the dominant identiﬁcation system is the barcode, although it requires a
line-of-sight scan to identify objects belonging to the same type (homogeneous). RFID
technology oﬀers advantages that surpass barcode technology [111] as follows:
 Unique identiﬁcation: Each tagged object can be identiﬁed uniquely, including
objects from homogeneous types.
 No line-of-sight: Tagged objects can be scanned without any requirement for
a line-of-sight or a physical connection, as RFID relies on radio frequencies to
transmit information rather than light as in the barcode technology.
 Simultaneous scanning: Multiple RFID tags can be presented simultaneously for
reading, whereas barcodes are presented sequentially; one object at a time.
 Rewritable memory: Some RFID tag's memories can be erased and re-written
with new data via the reader.
Although RFID technology provides a promising solution, security is increasingly
important, especially for tagging of important objects, and there are growing concerns
from users about privacy, for the following reasons:
1. The wireless communication channel between the reader and the tag may be sus-
ceptible to eavesdropping and/or manipulation. Moreover, a unique tag's identi-
ﬁcation may be tracked by an intruder, and thus the privacy of the tag's holder
could be compromised.
2. An RFID tag is typically designed to be low-cost for mass distribution. This can
result in tags being designed with limited memory and computing capabilities,
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which do not take advantage of heavy cryptographic techniques such as asymmet-
ric encryption.
A securely designed RFID system should take into account three main attributes,
which are integrity, availability, and conﬁdentiality. The consequences of breaching
an RFID system can be severe. An intruder could eavesdrop on the communication
channel and modify the transmitted data thus aﬀecting the integrity of data. More-
over, an intruder might block the transmitted message from reaching targets, or the
messages might be lost during transmission and this will aﬀect the availability feature.
Also, the data might be compromised or tracked by an intruder, leading to a breach of
conﬁdentiality.
Cryptography seems an inevitable tool in designing a secure RFID system. From a
theoretical point of view, traditional cryptography can be an ideal approach. However,
some common best-practice cryptographic approaches require more memory and/or
processing power than would be feasible for cost-eﬀective RFID tags. Therefore, re-
searchers considered lightweight cryptographic techniques [1].
There is considerable research into the lightweight mutual authentication of RFID
tags to combat passive and active attacks, and in this thesis, we present analysis of the
prior art, and focus on proposing RFID mutual authentication protocols that provide
adequate levels of security and privacy for several RFID schemes. This has led us to
make ﬁve academic research contributions, as shown in the next section.
1.2 Main Contributions
The main contributions of the thesis are as follows:
1. Discovering potential attacks in some of the prior related work and proposing
countermeasures.
2. Proposing an RFID mutual authentication protocol for low-cost RFID tags.
3. Distributing and updating tags' shared secret key between the RFID-enabled
supply chain entities.
4. Protecting and preserving RFID tags' data in the cloud-based RFID systems.
5. Proving that a group of legitimate RFID tags have been scanned simultaneously
in grouping-proof-based systems.
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1.3 Organisation
This thesis is divided into the following chapters:
 Chapter 2 presents the background of RFID technology, and identiﬁes the main
privacy and security features required in secure RFID systems.
 Chapter 3 presents a description of the formal mechanical analysis tools such as
CasperFDR and Scyther that are used to check the secrecy and authenticity of the
proposed protocols. This chapter also presents the lab setup, the implementation
tools, and the techniques used in the performance measurement.
 Chapter 4 shows how design ﬂaws can be exploited to perform a data desynchroni-
sation on one of the widely-cited RFID mutual authentication protocols proposed
by Boyeon Song.
 In chapter 5, we propose a new lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol,
which builds on the strength of existing proposals and overcomes Song's protocol
and other proposals' weaknesses.
 Chapter 6 discusses the use of secret sharing strategies for managing the key distri-
bution and recovery in RFID-enabled supply chains. We point out the weaknesses
found in two of the proposed solutions, and propose our enhanced scheme.
 In chapter 7, we review and enhance a recent proposed protocol regarding the
security and privacy of RFID tag's data that resides in the cloud; assuming that
the cloud is not trusted.
 In chapter 8, we focus on a particular RFID application called a grouping-proof,
where an entity such as a reader generates a proof of simultaneous presence of
two or more tagged items. We propose an oine two rounds RFID grouping-
proof protocol that provides immunity against passive and active attacks on RFID
protocols, and improves the current work performance.
 Chapter 9 oﬀers concluding remarks and discusses future work.
1.4 Publications
Parts of the material presented in this thesis have been previously published in refereed
conferences:
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In this chapter, we provide a brief discussion of the history of RFID technology.
Then, we discuss RFID architecture with regard to the RFID components, the operat-
ing frequencies, the communication methods between a tag and a reader, and the anti-
collision protocols. Subsequently, the regulations and standardisations governing RFID
systems and the main applications of RFID technology are illustrated. The chapter con-
cludes by outlining the concerns associated with the deployment of RFID in terms of
security and privacy, and the common countermeasures.
18
2.1 RFID History
The roots of RFID technology can be traced back to 1901, when Guglielmo Marconi
transmitted radio signals across the Atlantic to send messages. In 1934, Radio De-
tection and Ranging system, otherwise known as Radar was introduced, which uses
radio waves to locate physical objects. Radar was used widely in the Second World
War to detect incoming aircraft by sending pulses of radio energy and capturing the
echoes generated from aircraft [22]. However, identifying the aircraft correctly was the
main issue; they were not able to identify which aircraft belonged to whom. Thus,
the British developed the ﬁrst active Identiﬁcation, Friend or Foe (IFF) system. They
embedded a transmitter in each aircraft that allowed the radar operators and pilots to
automatically distinguish friendly aircraft from enemy aircraft via the radio frequency
(RF) signals [22]. The ﬁrst public description of passive communication used in RFID
technology was published in 1948 by Harry Stockman in Communication by Means of
Reﬂected Power [23].
In 1970, wireless sensors developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory were used
to track nuclear materials and to identify trucks on roads, bridges and tunnels [129].
In the same year, Los Alamos National Laboratory developed the ﬁrst low frequency
passive RFID transponders to track cows. A transponder encapsulated in glass could be
injected under a cow's skin to check the dosages of hormones and medication given to
them [129]. In 1973, passive RFID transponders was deployed to allow users to unlock
a door without a key. The nearby reader powers the card to check the identity sent by
the card to unlock the door. Also, in 1973, a one-dimensional (or linear) barcode design
was invented by encoding the product's and brand's information onto a physical object
that could be scanned by a reader [24].
Over time, IBM developed an ultra high frequency (UHF) RFID tags, which oﬀered a
longer read range, and faster data transfer. IBM used these new inventions in Wal-Mart
but not for a long time. In 1999, UHF RFID tags obtained more attention when the
Uniform Code Council, EAN International, Procter & Gamble and Gillette established
the Auto-ID Center at Massachusetts Institute of Technology to study RFID and invent
new RFID technologies [25]. Adoption of RFID grew steadily over the following years,
and passive UHF tags started to be used in the supply chain to track products through
their life cycle. These tags only store the tag's serial number for identiﬁcation purposes,
and stored in a database [129].
Between 1999 and 2003, the U.S. Department of Defence and 100 RFID global
companies supported the use of RFID technology and funded the Auto-ID Center to
develop this technology. Auto-ID Center opened research labs in Australia, United
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Kingdom, Switzerland, USA, Japan and China to bring together RFID manufacturers,
researchers, and users to develop standards, perform research, and share information
[129]. Together with the EPCglobal community, both are creating the standards and
assembling the building blocks needed to create an Internet of things.
From 2003 till today, RFID technology rapid development is being challenged by
security and privacy issues. Ongoing research is directed towards the security and
privacy of RFID, and the design of tag's supporting cryptography is being developed.
According to [26], in 2015, the RFID market was worth $10.1 billion, compared to
$9.5 billion in 2014 and $8.8 billion in 2013. It is predicted that the RFID market will
be worth $13.2 billion by 2020. This implies that RFID technology will be a promising
technology in the near future.
2.2 RFID Architecture
In this section, a brief background to the architecture of RFID systems is presented
in terms of RFID components, operating frequencies, reader and tag communication
methods, and reader and tag anti-collision schemes.
2.2.1 RFID Components
An RFID system consists of three main components; an RFID tag, an RFID reader,
and a back-end database (server).
1. RFID tag: An RFID tag is an identiﬁcation object that consists of integrated
circuitry (IC) and antenna. The integrated circuit is for computation and storage
purposes, and it is attached to an antenna that provides communication between
the reader and the tag. It is also known as a transponder. An RFID tag can be
classiﬁed based on the source of power into three categories as follows:
 Active tag: An Active tag is a wireless transponder embedded with a battery
and a transmitter enabling the tag to run the chip's circuitry and to broadcast
a signal to a reader. This tag is expensive and can be read from 100 metres
or more.
 Passive tag: A Passive tag is a wireless transponder that does not have any
power of its own and only responds to the electromagnetic ﬁelds generated
by the nearby reader(s). Passive RFID tag is designed to be simple and
resource-limited in order to be used with low-cost items. This type of tag
will be the focus of this thesis.
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 Semi-passive tag: A Semi-passive tag uses a battery to run the chip's cir-
cuitry, but depends on the reader's signals for communication purposes. This
ensures that a semi-passive tag is only active when queried by a reader.
2. RFID reader: An RFID reader has an RF module, a control unit, and a coupling
element (antenna) to sense the presence of RFID tags and communicate with
them (discussed more deeply in Section 2.2.3). It is also known as a transceiver
or interrogator. RFID readers have diﬀerent frequencies, and may oﬀer a wide
range of functionality. Generally, RFID readers have more capabilities than tags
with regard to internal storage and processing power, so complex cryptographic
computations may be carried out by RFID readers. An RFID reader is connected
to a back-end server through a secure communication channel. Currently, many
applications rely on ﬁxed reading devices, but may also be integrated into hand-
held mobile devices [30, 31].
3. Back-end database (server): A server is a database that contains records as-
sociated with the RFID tags it manages. These records may contain product
information, tracking logs, etc. The server has very high storage and computing
capabilities to be able to manage hundreds or thousands of RFID tags.
A typical passive RFID system is shown in Fig. 2.1, and works as follows:
(a) The reader emits an RF signal via its antenna to power the tag.
(b) The tag sends a message to the reader via the RF signal.
(c) The reader forwards the tag's message to the server for further processing.
(d) The server processes the tag's data and sends back a reply to the reader.
(e) The reader forwards the server's reply to the tag. In some scenarios the tag
and the server have to update their values to be used in the next session.
2.2.2 Operating Frequency
The electromagnetic spectrum within which RFID systems typically operate is com-
monly divided into low frequency (LF), high frequency (HF), ultra high frequency
(UHF), and microwave. Diﬀerent frequencies are widely deployed in RFID systems,
ranging from 120 KHz to 5.8 GHz [111]. Table 2.1 lists standard frequencies and their
respective read distances and standards.
 LF RFID tags: LF RFID tags typically operate in the 120-140 KHz range and
have short read-ranges of 10-20 centimetres. LF signals are able to travel through
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Figure 2.1: Typical passive RFID system scenario
water, metals or dirt, so they are often used in pet identiﬁcation or laundry
management tags. They are also used in short read-range applications such as
access control and car immobilization.
 HF RFID tags: HF RFID tags operate in the 13.56 MHz frequency. HF tags oﬀer
a higher data distance up to 1 metre, but in practice the distance is 4-6cm as in
the NFC technology, bankcards, Oyster cards etc. HF RFID tags do not perform
as the LF RFID tags in proximity to metals and liquids. HF tags are mostly used
in smart cards, library books, and transport ticketing systems.
 UHF RFID tags: UHF tags operate in the 868-928 MHz range. UHF tags are
most commonly used for item tracking and supply-chain management applications
due to the long read distance they oﬀer and for their low-cost. These tags are
more sensitive to metals and liquids. This thesis focusses on this type of tags.
 Microwave: Microwave tags operate at 2.45-5.8 GHz and has a read range of up
to approximately 30 metres. Applications of microwave tags are highway toll
collection and vehicle ﬂeet identiﬁcation. This type of tag consumes more energy
and is more costly than the lower frequency tags.
2.2.3 RFID Communication Methods
Passive RFID tags obtain their power by harvesting energy from the electromagnetic
ﬁeld of the reader's signal. RFID tags communicate with the reader in two methods;
inductive coupling or passive backscatter as follows [29]:
 Inductive coupling: LF and HF tags use inductive coupling. The reader generates
a current magnetic ﬁeld. Then, when the tag is placed close enough to the reader,
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Table 2.1: RFID tag's frequency, reading distance and supported standards
Frequency Range Frequency Read Distance Standard
Low Frequency (LF) 120-140 KHz 10-20 cm ISO 18000-2 [27]
High Frequency (HF) 13.56 MHz up to 1 meters ISO 18000-3 [27]
ISO 14443 [32]
ISO 15693 [34]
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) 868-928 MHz < 10 meters ISO 18000-6 [27]
EPCGlobal [35]
EPCGlobal [28]
Microwave 2.45 - 5.8 GHz > 10 meters ISO 18000-4 [27]
the ﬁeld from the reader coil will couple to the coil of the tag, charge the on-
tag capacitor and generate a voltage that powers the tag circuitry. The reader
modulates its magnetic ﬁeld amplitude according to the data to be sent to the
tag. A tag on the other hand, transmits its ID by turning on and oﬀ its load
resistor in accordance with the digital data to be sent; this is known as load
modulation. The reader detects these amplitude variations, and demodulates the
transmitted message. The reading distance between the reader's antenna and the
tag's antenna should be fairly small because of the limited range of the magnetic
ﬁeld as shown in Table 2.1. This method is shown in Fig. 2.2
Figure 2.2: Inductive coupling
 Passive backscatter: This method is shown in Fig. 2.3. UHF and microwave tags
use passive backscatter. A reader's antenna generates continuous electromagnetic
waves, and this will develop a potential diﬀerence at the tag's antenna and en-
ergises the tag circuit. The tag's antenna is tuned to receive these waves and
demodulates it into patterns of ones and zeros that form the commands for the
operations to be performed. Then, the tag changes the amplitude of the elec-
tromagnetic waves reﬂected by the tag's antenna in accordance with the tag's
messages, and this is called backscattering. Because the tag does not have power
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Figure 2.3: Passive backscatter
to transmit the data, it uses variable impedance with a transistor to send a wave
back [33].
2.2.4 Anti-collision
Since a shared wireless channel is used between the reader and the tag, signal collision
may occur. Collision in RFID is divided into tag collision and reader collision. Anti-
collision protocols for the tag and reader are presented below:
 Tag anti-collision: When multiple tags are energised by the RFID reader simul-
taneously, tag collision may occur as the tags reﬂect their respective signals back
to the reader at the same time. Such issue arises in some applications where
multiple tags need to be read within the same RF ﬁeld. As a result, the reader is
unable to diﬀerentiate these signals. To minimize collisions, RFID tags must use
an anti-collision protocol. The most widely used anti-collision protocol in RFID
systems is the Aloha scheme [111, 29].
In basic Aloha scheme, after the tag is energised, it sends its ID to the reader and
waits for an acknowledgement (ACK) from the reader. If it receives a negative
acknowledgement (NACK), meaning a collision has occurred, it resets and re-
sends its ID again. Systems based on the basic Aloha scheme still suﬀer from
the collision problem as all the tags send their ID randomly (no time allocation).
Subsequently, several enhanced Aloha protocols have been proposed including
Slotted Aloha and Framed Slotted Aloha.
In a Slotted Aloha scheme, the tags transmit their messages at deﬁned, syn-
chronous time slots, which are controlled by the reader. A slot is a discrete time
interval suﬃciently long to allow the tag to transmit its ID. In this scheme, a tag
must choose one of the slots randomly and transmit data within a single slot. If
there is a collision and the tag does not receive an acknowledgement, it retrans-
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mits after a random delay. This means the collisions only occur at the start of
each slot.
To further improve the Slotted Aloha, a Framed Slotted Aloha has been intro-
duced. The time slots are grouped in a frame; in each read cycle there are multiple
frames with the same number of slots. Each tag chooses a slot in a frame and
sends its data once within a frame. If the tag does not receive an acknowledge-
ment, it waits for the next read cycle and selects a slot in the new frame. The
read cycle is repeated until no collision occurs. Framed Slotted Aloha can be clas-
siﬁed into Basic Framed Slotted Aloha for ﬁxed frame size and Dynamic Framed
Slotted Aloha for variable frame size, where the number of tags increases during
the protocol execution.
An Aloha scheme is a probabilistic algorithm, where the tags respond at randomly
generated times, or within a slotted/framed time interval. Another scheme uses a
deterministic algorithm in which the reader sorts through the tags based on their
unique ID in a tree-based data structure. The reader searches the tree nodes
of all possible ID numbers, and the presence of a response gives the reader an
indication as to where to search next [36]. Tree-based structure may have longer
identiﬁcation delays but lower tag starvation problems, where a tag might wait
for unlimited periods of time time to be identiﬁed [19].
 Reader anti-collision: Reader collision happens when two or more readers com-
municate on the same frequency at the same time (reader-to-reader frequency
interference), or when a nearby reader attempts to query the same tag simulta-
neously (multiple reader-to-tag interference) [19]. Because the readers have more
memory space and higher computing capabilities than tags, they can detect col-
lision easily. A commonly used anti-collision protocol proposed in [37] allocates
diﬀerent frequency bands or times to neighbouring readers.
2.3 UHF RFID Standards
RFID standards describe the physical and the link layers, and the requirements for the
air interface, anti-collision mechanisms, communication protocols and security func-
tions. The two most relevant UHF RFID standards are the ISO 18000-6 standard [27]
and the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard [35], hereinafter denoted as (EPCC1Gen2).
ISO 18000-6 speciﬁes the standard for the following tags:
 LF RFID tags
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 HF RFID tags
 UHF RFID tags
 Microwave RFID tags
Two other ISO standards, ISO/IEC 14443 [32] and ISO/IEC 15693 [34] are related
to smart card and proximity card interfaces operating in the HF range.
In November, 2013, a new version of the EPCC1Gen2 standard was released [28].
The new standard added new cryptographic functions that can be optionally performed.
The additional security commands are Authenticate, AuthComm, SecureComm, KeyUp-
date, TagPrivilege. The tag shall generate a 16-bit random number as in [35], and has
the same probabilities of the random number generator (RNG) in the EPCC1Gen2
standard as discussed in the next section.
Some of the related work, and the implementation tools used in this thesis support
the EPCC1Gen2 standard [35], hence, the next section will discuss some of the main
speciﬁcations of the EPCC1Gen2 standard.
2.3.1 EPCglobal Standard EPC Class-1 Gen-2 Speciﬁcations
The EPCC1Gen2 standard aims to standardise and promote UHF RFID tags. In EPC
Class-0, the tags are read-only devices, while in EPC Class-1, the tags' data are one-
time programmable, but in practice, commercially available UHF tags can be erased
and re-written numerous times. The standard speciﬁes the following:
 Physical layer: The tags do not have any power source, they can respond only
when they are powered by the reader. The communication between the reader
and tag is half duplex, which means that the reader talks and the tag waits and
listens for any incoming data, or vice versa, but not simultaneously.
 Tag memory Tag memory is logically divided into four banks as follows [35]:
1. Reserved memory : Reserved memory stores a 32-bit kill password and a 32-
bit access password. Once a tag receives the kill password, it is permanently
disabled. Tags with a non-zero access password have to receive the correct
access password before transitioning to the secured state.
2. EPC memory: This area of memory contains a 96-bit unique identity of the
tag, known as Electronic Product Code (EPC) value, a 16-bit cyclic redun-
dancy check (CRC) value, and a protocol control (PC), where PC contains
physical layer information.
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3. TID memory: This memory bank contains an 8-bit ISO/IEC 15693 class
identiﬁer, and additional information that identiﬁes the custom commands
and/or optional features that a tag supports.
4. User memory: This memory bank is for user-speciﬁc data storage.
 Cryptographic operations
The EPCC1Gen2 standard supports a 16-bit CRC to detect any modiﬁcation of
the backscattered messages [35]. The tag computes its 16-bit CRC over the values
of PC and EPC, and maps the computed CRC-16 into the EPC memory.
Moreover, tags generate 16-bit random number (RN-16) to be included in the
transmitted messages and in handling password commands [35]. The designed
RNG should meet the following probabilities: the probability that any two or more
tags simultaneously generate the same sequence of RN-16 shall be less than 0.1%,
and the generated random number shall not be predictable with a probability
greater than 0.025%.
 Tag identiﬁcation layer: For the reader to communicate with the tags, it performs
three basic operations [35]:
1. Select: This process is for selecting the tags the reader wants to communicate
with; it is similar to selecting records from a database.
2. Inventory. This process is performed in one session at a time to identify the
tag. The tag responds with a 16-CRC value and its unique EPC value.
3. Access: This operation is for interacting with the tag by reading and writing
data in the tag's memory. Tags have to be identiﬁed before access.
 Slot counter: The EPCC1Gen2 is based on the Framed Slotted Aloha discussed
in section 2.2.4. The number of time slots is set by the reader as Q, where Q is an
integer ranging from 0 to 15, and is sent via the Query or QueryAdjust command.
When the tag receives such a command, it extracts a value x between 0 and 2Q-1
from its RNG, and loads x into its slot counter. If the number in the slot counter
is zero, the tag is transferred into the reply state, otherwise to the arbitrate state.
 Tag states: RFID tags transit into diﬀerent states during a session as follows [35]:
 Ready state: The tag remains in the ready state after being energised. When
it receives a Query command from the reader, it extracts a value x between
0 and 2Q-1 from its RNG, and loads x into its slot counter. If the result is
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non-zero it transits to the arbitrary state, or to the reply state if the number
is zero.
 Arbitrate state. A tag in an arbitrate state decrements its slot counter every
time it receives a QueryRep command. When the slot counter reaches zero, it
transits to the reply state and backscatters a 16-bit random number (RN16).
 Reply state: A tag sends an RN16, once it enters the reply state. If the
tag receives a valid acknowledgement (ACK), it transits to the acknowledge
state and sends the EPC value. Otherwise, the tag transits to the arbitrate
state if it receives NACK.
 Acknowledge state. A tag in this state can transit to any state except the
killed state. If the access password is non-zero the tag transits to the open
state, otherwise it transits to the secured state.
 Open state: After receiving a Req_RN command, the tag backscatters a
new RN16 that both reader and tag use in subsequence messages. If the
tag receives the correct access password from the reader, it transits to the
secured state.
 Secured state. Upon receiving a Req_RN command, the tag backscatters
a new RN16 that both reader and tag use in future messages. Tags in a
secured state may transit to any state except the open or the acknowledge
states.
 Killed state: If the tag receives the correct kill password in either the open
state or secured state, it will be disabled permanently.
2.4 RFID Applications
RFID systems are being adopted in a wide variety of ﬁelds including [38, 39, 24]:
1. Tracking and identiﬁcation:
 Pets with implanted tags
 Product life cycles in supply-chain management
 Checkout in retail shops
 Asset tracking
 Tagged tickets in public transport
 Smart appliances in homes
28
 Smart posters
 E-passports
2. Access control:
 Car ignition keys
 Building/premises contactless proximity cards
3. Anti-Counterfeiting:
 Casino tokens
 Banknotes
 Luxury goods
4. Automated payment
 Contactless bank cards
 Automotive toll payment
 Electronic fare management systems
2.5 RFID Privacy and Security
Although RFID technology has several advantages over other identiﬁcation technologies,
security and privacy are among the main concerns that need to be tackled [12]. Because
the tag sends its data to any nearby readers without alerting the tag's owner, the tag's
data could be disclosed and/or tracked. Furthermore, the wireless channel between the
reader and tag is vulnerable to two kinds of attacks; passive and active. A passive
attack occurs when an adversary eavesdrops on the communication session between an
authorised reader and tag. An active attack occurs when the adversary can impersonate,
replay, modify, inject and/or block the messages between the reader and tag. In this
thesis, passive and active attacks are referred as active attacks for simplicity.
In this section, we illustrate the main attributes that a secure RFID system requires,
along with the associated attacks and threats.
2.5.1 RFID Privacy and Security Attributes
The main attributes that secure systems including RFID should take into account are
[40]:
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 Integrity/Authentication: The system should provide a mutual entity authentica-
tion, where the communication should take place between legitimate entities, and
provide assurance to the reader or server about the identity of the tag and vice
versa. This attribute forms a subset of the integrity attribute as both attributes'
goals are to ensure that the data cannot be modiﬁed in transit by any malicious
entity.
 Conﬁdentiality/Privacy: Privacy ﬁts into the conﬁdentiality dimension. Privacy
involves protecting the tag's data from being revealed to any malicious entity, and
preventing the tag's location from being tracked.
 Availability: When requested, all entities should be present to provide other au-
thorised parties with the information they need.
2.5.2 Attacks on RFID Systems
The nature of the wireless communication between the reader and tag enables an in-
truder to interfere and accomplish a variety of active attacks as shown in Fig. 2.4 and
highlighted below [19, 17]:
1. The main attacks aﬀecting authentication are:
 Impersonation attacks: The attacker impersonates a legitimate entity by
using the leaked sensitive data, or performing a replay/spooﬁng attack.
 Replay/Spooﬁng attacks: The attacker eavesdrops on the communication
between the reader and tag, then maintains the transmitted messages in
order to impersonate a legitimate entity in the next session and replay these
messages.
2. The main attacks aﬀecting privacy are:
 Tag data leakage: An RFID tag is associated to one unique identity, and
this could lead to serious privacy concerns. Thus, the tag's sensitive data
should not be revealed when transmitting in order to preserve the privacy of
the tag's holder and to prevent tag impersonation attacks.
 Traceability: Traceability is referred to as the ability of the adversary to
decide with probability if messages from diﬀerent sessions belong to the same
tag or not. This can be done without knowing the tag's data; for example,
the adversary might observe the level of signals, using the same tag's re-
sponses, or by linking the responses. To prevent attackers from tracking the
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Figure 2.4: RFID attacks and threats
tag's location, the tag's replies should not be static or linkable to previous
messages. Moreover, given that the attacker has eavesdropped on the session
between the reader and tag and all the information stored in the involved
tags has been revealed at time t', the attacker should not be able to correlate
any readings of the same tag at a time t ≤ t'.
3. The main attack aﬀecting availability is:
 Denial-of Service attacks (DoS): The attacker might block the tag's or
reader's messages from reaching the target, causing the tag or the reader to
assume a state in which it can no longer be valid. Hence, the attacker's goal
is to prevent the system from operating as intended, either temporarily or
permanently. Another technique that the attacker can exploit, is to send a
stream of messages to the RFID tags or the reader, ﬂooding it with invalid
messages.
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2.5.3 RFID Main Threats
In this section, the principal threats that RFID systems might encounter are classiﬁed
according to the authentication, privacy and availability attributes mentioned above,
each of which is discussed below:
(1) RFID authentication threats: The main attacks related to hindering the authentica-
tion process are impersonation, and replay attacks. Such attacks share the following
threats:
 Dishonest tag: An intruder can impersonate a legitimate tag to claim to be
in the neighbourhood of the reader, cause the reader/server to authenticate
the intruder instead of a legitimate tag, and/or to cause the server to update
its value, causing a desynchronisation in the next session(s).
 Dishonest reader/server: Similarly, an intruder might impersonate a reader
to claim to be in the neighbourhood of the tag, cause the tag to authenticate
the intruder instead of a legitimate reader/server, or cause the tag to update
its value causing a desynchronisation in the next session(s).
(2) RFID privacy threats: Privacy is a signiﬁcant concern when using RFID technol-
ogy. The wireless communications channel between a tag and a reader can disclose
information about a tag, including its unique identity. In fact, the tag's unique ID
(EPC) remains ﬁxed most of the time, which would allow an attacker to establish
an association between the tag's current response and its previous response(s). The
two attacks associated to privacy are tag data leakage and traceability.
There are two possible threats related to tag data leakage:
 Tag cloning: An RFID system may be vulnerable to tag cloning, where the
attacker uses a compromised tag's data to clone a tag and use it as if it was
legitimate; for example, by removing the legitimate tag and replace it with a
cloned tag, hence, an attacker can fool the system into believing the cloned
tag is legitimate and present [110].
 Dishonest tag: An attacker may use a compromised tag's data to imper-
sonate the tag, which could lead to unwanted results such as data desynchro-
nisation, impersonating the reader/server in future sessions, or breaching the
privacy of the tag's holder in terms of location and his/her past behaviour [19].
There are two possible threats related to traceability :
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 Forward secrecy invasion: An RFID tag is generally not a tamper/attack-
resistant device, so it can be physically compromised to reveal secret infor-
mation stored in the memory of the tag. Forward secrecy guarantees that all
the previous transactions that happened before the tag's secret was revealed
remain unlinkable. In other words, in forward secrecy invasion, given all the
stored data of a compromised tag at time t, the attacker is able to identify the
tag at time t0 ≤ t. The past transactions of a tag may allow tracking of the
tag owner's past locations and behaviour.
 Tag location tracking: If the data being sent from the tag to the reader is
static or linked to data sent previously, the tag holder's location can be tracked
without his/her knowledge.
(3) RFID availability threat: Availability is crucial since the core function of a se-
cure RFID system is to mutually authenticate the tags and server/reader instantly;
therefore, every entity should be available for authentication purposes. If a reader/server
is no longer available, the tags will not be able to authenticate themselves, and hence
abort the session and vice versa.
The main threat aﬀecting availability is:
 Data desynchronisation: Data desynchronisation between the tag and reader
may happen if both entities need to update their data after each successful
identiﬁcation, and can also occur in some protocols that provide countermea-
sures against replay attacks for example. If the data in the tag and in the
server are desynchronised, the tag will not be able to authenticate the server
and abort the session; hence, the availability feature will not be achieved.
Data desynchronisation can either occur unintentionally when messages are
lost during transmission due to system malfunction or communication errors,
or can be implemented deliberately by an adversary on an RFID communica-
tion channel.
2.6 Common Countermeasures
In this section, we present some of the countermeasures for the attacks and threats
mentioned in the previous section. Then, we discuss brieﬂy the design of some of the
cryptographic functions that can ﬁt the RFID tags limited resources.
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2.6.1 PUFs-Based Approach
One of the proposed solutions to combat tag cloning and replay attacks is the de-
ployment of tamper-proof and unclonable functions on hardware; this refers to Physical
Unclonable Functions (PUFs). PUFs can uniquely identify and authenticate each silicon
chip by exploiting the physical characteristics of the silicon and the IC manufacturing
process variations with a low cost mechanism [41]. PUFs are designed to be easy to
evaluate but diﬃcult to clone [42]. Therefore, PUFs has have become attractive for
RFID ICs.
PUFs map a set of challenges to a set of unique responses based on the unique
characteristics of a particular chip, or on a user-deﬁned input; for example, the varia-
tion of delays in wires and gates in the chip. These delays in turn depend on highly
unpredictable factors, such as manufacturing variations and noise [43].
In [42], the authors proposed using a PUF as a secure key derivation mechanism.
Moreover, the authors proposed applying elliptic curve cryptography to the PUFs to
authenticate a tag oine. Multiple challenges are given to the PUFs to generate several
ﬁngerprints with some auxiliary data. Then, the issuer signs the challenges, ﬁngerprints
and auxiliary data with his/her secret key, and embeds the signed data on the tag's
chip. In the authentication step, the reader receives challenges and auxiliary data
from the tag, and it challenges the tag's PUF with one of the challenges. When the
reader receives the tag's ﬁngerprint it checks its authenticity from the signed data. The
authors in [42] claimed that the attacker needs to embed a fake physical structure on
the product in order to produce correct ﬁngerprints to the challenges. Also, the attacker
cannot forge the challenges, ﬁngerprints and auxiliary data as he/she does not know
the issuer's secret key used in the signature. However, according to [43], this scheme is
still expensive for low-cost RFID tags as it uses a public-key cryptography.
The authors in [43] proposed a privacy-preserving RFID protocol based on PUFs.
Simply, when a reader interrogates a tag, the tag responds with its ID and updates
its ID using PUFs (p(ID)). The database stores the sequence ID, p(ID),p(2)(ID), ... ,
p(k)(ID) for each tag, and sends a tuple of all possible tag IDs to the reader to ﬁnd a
match with the received tag's identity. This implies that the reader has to eliminate all
the previous values within the tuple to prevent replay attacks. However, in this scheme,
the tag can only be authenticated k times, which enables an attacker to perform a DoS
attack [44]. Several other cryptographic primitives based on PUFs to achieve a mutual
authentication between tag and server have been proposed; for example as in [9, 10, 46].
PUFs have also been used to solve server scalability issues in RFIDs [47, 48, 10, 49].
In these schemes, the reader stores the tag's ID, which is updated in each session using
PUFs; thus the attacker cannot guess or clone the tag's ID in future sessions, and the
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reader/server can retrieve the tag's record in O(1).
In real-world applications, Devadas et al. [41] fabricated a PUF-enabled unclonable
RFID tag and showed that a PUF circuit can be integrated into a passive RFID tag
for authentication purposes. Furthermore, Holcomb et al. [11], proposed SRAM-PUFs,
which use SRAM cells in RFID chips as a PUF mechanism.
2.6.2 Human-Computer (HB) Protocols
In 2005, Juels et al. [7] adapted the concept of human-to-computer authentication
protocols proposed by Hopper and Blum (HB protocol) [8] for use on low-cost RFID
tags. This type of protocol is based on the computational hardness of the Learning
Parity with Noise Problem (LPNP), and uses dot products of binary vectors and a
random noise bit. The HB-style protocols do not depend on common cryptographic
methods but on the correctness of the tag's replies in several rounds.
In the HB protocol [8], in q rounds, the reader sends a challenge a to the tag, and
the tag sends the binary product of a.x xored with noise (v), where x is a secret key
shared between the tag and reader. This protocol can resist passive attacks but not
active attacks. As a result, Juels et al. [7] proposed an enhanced version of the HB
protocol (called HB+) by including a new secret value y, which serves as another secret
between the tag and reader. The tag calculates z=rA.x ⊕ rB.y ⊕ v, and sends z to the
reader, where rA and rB are binary vectors generated by the tag and reader respectively.
However, Gilbert et al.[6] showed that this protocol is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle
attacks.
In response to Gilbert et al.'s [6] attack on HB+, Bringer et al. [50] proposed an
HB++ protocol to avoid man-in-the-middle-attacks. The protocol involves renewing
the secrets in each session and correlating the tag's and reader's challenges. However,
according to Piramuthu [51], HB++ is still not immune to attacks from an adversary
that pretends to be an authentic reader. Piramuthu [51] suggested updating the value
of ρ every time z is computed, instead of updating it at the beginning of each round
to prevent an attacker from revealing the secret data. Also, to make the protocol more
lightweight, Piramuthu suggested omitting z, x, y, v for the protocol execution.
Munilla et al. [52] proposed another HP protocol called the HP-MP protocol. In
this protocol, the reader sends a challenge a to the tag, and the tag then computes z=
a.x ⊕ v. The tag then looks for a binary vector b, where b.x=z, and sends b to the
reader. The reader checks whether b.x = a.x and authenticates the tag. This protocol
has been shown to be insecure against passive attacks [5], and is also vulnerable to
replay attacks [13]. Since then a range of HB proposals closely related to HB-MP have
been proposed to overcome the attacks discussed in [6, 51].
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A new area, where distance bounding protocols and HB family protocols can be
integrated to thwart relay and replay attacks, has been proposed in [53]. Pagnin et al.
[53], suggested combating man-in-the-middle attacks on HB protocols by modifying the
communication channel of the receiver architecture using a distance bounding protocol.
This scheme is known as a hybrid HB+DB protocol. In HB+DB, the reader and tag
share three secret values, namely (x, y, z). The protocol is divided into three phases.
The ﬁrst phase is the initialisation of the HB protocol; the tag exchanges a challenge s
with the reader, and computes ci=(b.y) ⊕ v, where b=PRNGz(s) is computed by both
entities. In the second phase, the distance bounding protocol is initiated by the reader,
which starts a timer and sends a challenge a to the tag. On the tag, the message ri=a.x
⊕ ci is computed and sent to the reader. When the reader receives the tag's response it
stops the clock and veriﬁes that the tag's response is correct, and that the tag is close
enough to the reader.
2.6.3 Lightweight Cryptographic Functions
RFID tags are deployed in many applications that require security and privacy. In
order to satisfy these needs, cryptographic algorithms such as block ciphers can be an
ideal solution. However, the problem in providing some of the commonly used cryp-
tographic techniques on these devices is the extremely constrained environment. The
cryptographic primitives have to be of low memory, have minimal power consumption,
and operate at suﬃcient speed. Hence, researchers have attempted to design lightweight
functions that suit RFID tags resource constraints.
Starting with a block cipher scheme to calculate message digests, Yoshida et al.
[54], proposed a compression function called the MAME block cipher, speciﬁcally for
limited-resources hardware. The function takes a 256-bit message block, produces a
256-bit output and requires 8100 gate equivalent (GE). However, according to [55], the
work in [54] is still demanding for RFID tags.
Another well-known block cipher scheme called PRESENT has been proposed [56].
The original form of PRESENT is a block cipher that accepts 64-bit input and 80-bit
or 128-bit keys, with 1570 GE. Several PRESENT block cipher improvements have
been proposed to minimise the required GE for RFID tags, including work by [57, 58].
KATAN [59] is another example of a block cipher that can be ﬁtted into constrained
devices and consumes less GE than PRESENT. KATAN is composed of three block
ciphers of 32, 48, or 64-bit block size, requiring 802 GE, 927 GE and 1054 GE re-
spectively. The key size for all variations is 80-bit and the number of rounds is 254.
A smaller GE block cipher has been proposed in [60]. The authors in [60] designed
Piccolo, an ultra-lightweight block cipher, which is suitable for extremely constrained
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environments such as RFID tags. Piccolo is composed of a 64-bit block cipher, 80 or
128-bit keys, and requires 683 or 758 GE respectively. The authors claimed that Piccolo
is the smallest of the current lightweight block ciphers discussed in the literature.
Bertoni et al. designed a sponge-construction hash function. Since then several hash
functions have been proposed. O'Neill [61] designed an 8-bit low-cost-SHA-1 function
requiring 5527 GE, which saves 1200 GE as compared to other SHA-1 hash functions.
According to [55], this hash function [61, 54] is still demanding for RFID tags. The au-
thors in [55] proposed a QUARK lightweight hash function for 64 and 112 bit security,
needing 1379 GE and 2296 GE respectively. Their work was inspired by the ultra-
lightweight block cipher PRESENT [56]. Two other lightweight hash functions based
on QUARK have been proposed: SPONGENT [62] and PHOTON [63]. Regarding
SHA-3, Keccak is a family of hash functions that are based on the sponge construction,
which can perform nearly all symmetric cryptographic functions and can ﬁt constrained
devices [4]. It uses one of seven permutations named Keccak-f [b], where b ∈ {25, 50,
100, 200, 400, 800 or 1600} is the width of the permutation. The sponge construction
state's width is also determined by the width of the speciﬁed permutation [4]. The
largest permutation is Keccak-f [1600]. In 2013, Kavun et al. presented a lightweight
implementation of the SHA-3 hash function [157] with 20790 GE and a 64-bit output for
Keccak-f [1600]. However, Pessl and Hutter [64], showed that Kavun et al.'s implemen-
tation of Keccak-f [1600] does not fulﬁl RFID tag demands. They designed a hardware
implementation of SHA-3 Keccak-f [1600] that is smaller than Keccak-f [1600], SHA-1
and SHA-2 GE, provides 128-bit security and requires 5500 GE.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we provided a background information about RFID technology, start-
ing from its origins, then illustrating the main RFID architecture with regard to the
RFID components, the operating frequencies, the communication methods, and the
anti-collision protocols. This was followed by a description of the standards supported
by other related work. Then, we outlined the current deployments of RFID technol-
ogy. Finally, we discussed the main security and privacy requirements of RFID systems
and associated attacks and threats, and concluded with some common countermeasures
to such attacks. The next chapter presents a description of the tools used in formal
analysis and performance measurement.
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In this chapter, we present the tools used in the formal analysis of the proposed pro-
tocols and in the implementation process. We provide a description of CasperFDR and
Scyhter formal analysis tools. Then, we highlight the tools used in the implementation
of the proposed protocols, and the performance measurement techniques.
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3.1 Introduction
A considerable number of RFID security protocols have appeared in the academic liter-
ature, claiming to be secure in the presence of a malicious agent, called an intruder, who
is assumed to have complete control over the communications network. Unfortunately, a
large proportion of the RFID protocols fail to meet security and privacy requirements as
they have been shown to be vulnerable to attacks [65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 112, 71, 72, 73, 74].
Therefore, for the sake of completeness, we subjected our proposed protocols to
formal analysis tools such as CasperFDR [104] and Scyther[75].
In addition, to measure the performance of the proposed protocols in a restricted
embedded device, such as the RFID tag, we implemented the protocols in Chapter 5,
6, 7, and 8. After the execution of the protocol, we measured the used memory space,
the protocol's computing time, the power consumption, and the time required to send
and receive messages between the tag and the reader (communication time cost).
3.2 Formal Analysis Tools
Cryptographic protocols are widely adopted as signiﬁcant components in meeting secu-
rity requirements. To implement a system, it must be demonstrated that the protocol
satisﬁes the fundamental security requirements. Formal veriﬁcation tools provide a
good way to validate this challenge, and considerable developments have been made in
their development over the last 30 years [103]. CasperFDR and Scyther analyse proto-
cols under the assumption of perfect cryptography. Perfect cryptography means using
cryptographic functions in the encryption process, where the adversary learns nothing
from the encrypted messages unless he/she knows the decryption key.
These tools check that the communication channel between the sender and receiver
achieves secrecy and authentication based on the protocol's speciﬁcations [76], which
meet the objectives of our protocols. Secrecy means that the exchanged secret data
cannot be accessed by an intruder. Authentication means that every party can authen-
ticate the party with whom they are executing the protocol. We chose these tools to
add more value to our protocols. Also, they have proved their capabilities in ﬁnding
vulnerabilities in many protocols, such as in [77, 78, 15, 3, 79, 80, 81]. In addition,
Scyther, for example, assists in protocol analysis by providing classes of attacks, in an
unbounded number of sessions, as opposed to the single attack traces provided by other
formal analysis tools.
In this section, we provide a description of the tools used to formally analyse the
proposed protocols in Chapter 5, 6, 7, and 8.
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3.2.1 CasperFDR
Security protocols were analysed using process algebras communicating sequential pro-
cesses (CSP) [20] and its model checker failures-divergence reﬁnement (FDR) [21].
Brieﬂy, they work as follows:
 Each agent taking part in the protocol is modelled as a CSP process, including
the intruder.
 The compiled protocol speciﬁcation is tested against the speciﬁed security proper-
ties, such as correctly achieves authentication, or ensures secrecy; FDR searches
the state space to investigate whether any insecure traces can occur.
 If FDR ﬁnds that the security properties are not achieved, then it returns a trace
of the system that does not satisfy the security properties; this trace corresponds
to an attack upon the protocol.
Although CSP and FDR have proved successful in ﬁnding attacks in a number of
protocols [2, 14], the task of producing a CSP description of a system is very time-
consuming and error-prone. As a result, Lowe proposed CasperFDR a tool for sim-
plifying this process [104]. The CasperFDR tool takes an abstract description of the
protocol, together with its security requirements, and produces a CSP code checked and
veriﬁed by FDR. The protocol is analysed in the context of the Dolev-Yao model [67],
where the intruder has full control over the communication such that the intruder may
intercept, analyse, modify messages, and/or send any message he/she composes to other
agents, pretending to come from a legitimate agent. CasperFDR speciﬁes the crypto-
graphic primitives as a black-box approach, which means CasperFDR does not know
which mathematical objects are used, only their properties. It supports symmetric and
asymmetric encryption including hash functions.
CasperFDR checks the authenticity of the transmitted data by examining the as-
sociated events, namely Running and Commit. The Running and Commit events are
attached to security and authentication speciﬁcations [82]. When the sender sends a
message to the receiver, the receiver performs the Running event, which means that it
starts running the protocol apparently with the sender. The sender performs the Com-
mit event when it receives the receiver's reply, which means that the sender has ﬁnished
a run of the protocol with the receiver. Regarding checking the security requirements,
CasperFDR checks the secrecy speciﬁcations via an event called Claim_Secret, which is
performed by both parties. When the sender receives the receiver's message, it performs
Claim_Secret to ensure that the data are kept secret.
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The input ﬁle in CasperFDR includes the following sections, which are divided into
protocol deﬁnition and system deﬁnition:
1. Protocol deﬁnition: This part deﬁnes the generic operation of the protocol. It con-
sists of:
 Protocol description: This part deﬁnes the sequence of sending the data, and the
contents of the exchanged messages. For encryption, for example, the expression
is A → B: {m}{k}, where agent A sends a message m encrypted with a secret
key k to agent B.
 Free variables: The types of variables and functions that are used in the protocol
are deﬁned in this section. Some of the predeﬁned types used in our analysis
are (Agent, Server, Data, Nonce, TimeStamp, and HashFunction). We also use
InversKeys, which returns keys that are inverses of each other.
 Processes: Each agent running in the system is represented by a CSP process
parametrised by some arguments, and the parameters following the keyword
knows deﬁne the knowledge that the agent is expected to have at the beginning
of the protocol run. For example: INITIATOR(A,na) knows SK(A), PK(A),
PK, means that agent A has one nonce na as an argument and he/she knows
its secret key SK(A), public key PK(A) and the other communication partner's
public key PK.
 Speciﬁcations: This section deﬁnes the protocol's goals, such as Secret and
Agreement. Secret implies that the data should be kept secret between two
partners, for example, Secret(A, na, [B]) can be paraphrased as: agent A thinks
that (na) is a secret that can be known to only itself and agent B. Agreement
speciﬁes the authentication requirement, for example, Agreement(A,B,[na,nb])
speciﬁes that agent A is correctly authenticated to agent B , and the two agents
agree on the data values na and nb.
2. System deﬁnition: The system deﬁnition includes the components required to be
checked by the analyser FDR. It consists of:
 Type deﬁnition (actual variables): During the analysis of the protocol using
FDR, it uses the variables deﬁned in this section. It deﬁnes the variables of
the actual system and they are the same as the variables deﬁned in the Free
variables section. An intruder is also deﬁned here as an agent that participates
during the protocol execution.
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 Functions: Deﬁnes the functions used by the agent(s). They are of type sym-
bolic, which means that CasperFDR produces its own values as the result of
this function.
 System deﬁnition: This section illustrates which agent should be present and
checked by FDR, and it should match the speciﬁcations in the Processes section.
 Intruder: The identity of the intruder and the values he/she knows during the
protocol execution are deﬁned here. For example:
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Alice, Bob, Mallory, nm, PK, SK(Mallory)}, means the
intruder Mallory knows the agents Alice and Bob, his/her nonce nm, his public
key and Alice and Bob's public keys PK, and his secret key SK(Mallory).
3.2.2 Scyther
Scyther [75] is a formal analysis tool that analyses protocols under the assumption of
perfect cryptography. Scyther checks the secrecy and authenticity of the transmitted
data. Unlike other formal tools, Scyther can verify protocols for an unbounded number
of sessions; it establishes that the security properties hold for all possible behaviours of
a protocol in the presence of a Dolev-Yao style intruder. In case that Scyther cannot
not establish unbounded veriﬁcation, it establishes a form of bounded veriﬁcation [83].
Scyther accepts the protocol description as an input, outputs a summary report, and
displays a graph if there is an attack on the protocol. The domain analysis is as follows
[83]:
 Protocol speciﬁcation: Scyther speciﬁes the security protocol as an abstract syn-
tax, where the protocol run is speciﬁed as a sequence list of send and receive
events. Initial knowledge such as variables, constants and functions are declared
at the beginning of the protocol speciﬁcation.
 Agent model: Any entity that participates in the protocol execution is speciﬁed
as a role in a closed world assumption, which means that only honest role (agent)
who shows no behaviour other than the behaviour described in the protocol spec-
iﬁcation participate in the protocol execution. A role can execute multiple runs
of the protocol.
 Threat model: Scyther uses a Dolev-Yao adversary model [67].
 Cryptographic primitives: Scyther deploys a perfect cryptography assumption.
Also, similar to CasperFDR, Scyther speciﬁes the cryptographic primitives as
a black-box approach.
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 Intruder initial knowledge: In Scyther the intruder initial knowledge is the names
of roles, their public keys, global variables, nonces and the intruder's secret keys.
For a Dolev-Yao model (network model), the intruder rules are deﬁned as {de-
ﬂect; inject}, where in wireless communication the intruder's rules are deﬁned as
{eavesdrop;jam;inject}.
 Role terms: There are four basic terms in Scyther: Var, denoting variables that are
used to store received messages; Fresh, denoting values that are freshly generated
for each role; and Role, denoting roles (agents).
 Events: In Scyther, there are two events send and recv. For example, send (R, T
, rt) denotes the sending of a message rt by the role R, intended for the role T.
Likewise, recv (R, T , rt) denotes the receipt of message rt by T, apparently sent
by R.
 Predeﬁned types: The predeﬁned types are agent, Function, Nonce, TimeStamp
and Ticket. Ticket is used to substitute any unknown terms. It is also possible
to deﬁne a new user type by using the usertype command.
 Security requirements: Scyther deﬁnes the objectives of the security protocol as
secrecy and two forms of authentication; data authentication and entity authenti-
cation. Secrecy means the secret data should remain secret even if the communi-
cation channel is compromised. Secrecy is speciﬁed as Claim(R,secret,rt), which
means the data rt should remain secret for the role R. Authentication is achieved
in Scyther using three forms, including Aliveness, Synchronisation (Nisynch) and
Agreement (Niagree), which are deﬁned below:
1. Aliveness: If B runs a protocol with A and it is successfully completed by
role B, then role A has previously been running the protocol. Aliveness is
speciﬁed as claim(A, Alive), where A is the role executing this event.
2. Nisynch (non-injective synchronisation): Means the two events (send and
recv) must be executed in the expected order as speciﬁed in the speciﬁca-
tion. Synchronisation combines aliveness and entity authentication. In other
words, synchronisation conﬁrms that all the received messages were indeed
sent by the partner agent, the sent messages have indeed been received by
the receiver, and the actual message occurred exactly as speciﬁed by the
protocol description. Synchronisation is speciﬁed as claim(A, Nisynch).
3. Niagree (non-injective agreement): While synchronisation focuses on the be-
haviour of the exchanged messages, agreement focuses on the contents of the
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exchanged messages. It means that A and B agree that both roles are alive
and agree to the values of the variables after the execution of the protocol.
Agreement is speciﬁed as claim(A, Niagree).
3.3 Implementation Tools and Performance Measurement
Techniques
In this section, we outline the tools used in the implementation of the protocols discussed
in Chapters 5 , 6, 7, and 8. Then, we discuss the procedures we followed in programming
the tag's ﬁrmware and the main issues associated with the implementation. Finally, we
list the performance measurement techniques.
3.3.1 Lab Set-up
The implementation of our proposed protocols involved an EPCC1Gen2-compliant
RFID tag [84], an EPCC1Gen2-compliant RFID reader [85], an AVR ICE JTAG pro-
grammer as shown in Fig. 3.1, and one laptop (host computer). The used tools support
the EPCC1Gen2 standard discussed in Section 2.3.1.
Figure 3.1: The CAEN Slate reader, the AVR JTAG ICE programmer, and the RFID
UHF DemoTag
For the tag side, we used a programmable, semi-passive battery-powered RFID tag
called DemoTag developed by IAIK TU Graz [84] shown in Fig. 3.2. The DemoTag is
used to emulate a real RFID EPCC1Gen2 tag and is designed to add some custom com-
mands to the EPCC1Gen2 standard. The tag's PCB board consists of a UHF antenna,
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Figure 3.2: DemoTag structure [84]
a power supply, a USB port to communicate with the host computer, a JTAG con-
nector, an analogue front end and a programmable Atmel ATMega128 microcontroller
(F_CPU = 16 MHz).
The original DemoTag ﬁrmware provides an implementation of the EPCC1Gen2
protocol, which is implemented as a ﬁrmware library. The ﬁrmware running on the
DemoTag is written in C code using Crossworks for AVR IDE from Rowley Associates
[86]. The DemoTag has 128 KB of ﬂash memory, 4 KB of RAM, and 4 KB of non-
volatile EEPROM memory. The ﬁrmware is stored in the ﬂash memory, while data
such as the tag's ID and messages are stored in the EEPROM. The tag stores one word
(16-bit) per memory bank.
We modiﬁed the original tag's ﬁrmware by adding more functions to conform with
our protocol, including functions for calculating the hash on the tag's data. The updated
ﬁrmware was debugged then uploaded to the ﬂash memory of the microcontroller in the
form of .hex via the AVR ICE JTAG programmer.
For the reader side, we used the Slate (model R1260I) desktop reader developed by
CAEN [85]; it is the reader supported by the DemoTag. Slate desktop reader is an
UHF RFID EPCC1Gen2-compliant reader with integrated antenna. It is embedded
with an EPCC1Gen2 reader ﬁrmware, which is controlled by the host computer via a
USB link. For programming the reader to read and write data into the tag's memory,
and the generation of the reader's random number and messages, we used Microsoft
Visual Studio C#.
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3.3.2 Implementation Process
The tag is programmed using C language. The tag computes the required messages, and
stores them in the user memory bank discussed in Section 2.3.1 within the EEPROM
memory. The tag stores the data using the tag's ﬁrmware command syscall_writeWord
to be read on demand. Finally, it updates the data if required.
To generate a random number in the tag, we used the existing PRNG function that
is included in the original ﬁrmware. For the hash function, we used an SHA-2 (SHA-
256) included in Crypto-avr-lib SHA 256 library [87]. This library provides special
implementations of cryptographic functions in C, which respect the microcontroller's
limited resources.
We used C# to program the reader application. The reader's library CAENR-
FIDLib is imported for communicating with the tag, reading the tag's memory and
writing data into the tag's memory. The two commands used in our protocols were the
WriteTagData_EPC_C1G2 method to write data in the speciﬁed memory bank, and
the ReadTagData_EPC_C1G2 method to read data from the tag's speciﬁed memory
bank.
The CAENRFIDLib library does not provide methods for generating random num-
bers and calculating hash functions. Therefore, to generate random numbers, we used
a .NET Framework method called rngCsp for this purpose. To calculate the hash on
the tag's data we imported the Crypto-avr-lib SHA-256 library. The Crypto-avr-lib
SHA-256 is the same hash function used in the tag.
We faced a communication overhead between the reader and the tag during the
implementation process. The reader could not write messages in the tag's memory in
a single write command, as the EPCC1Gen2-compliant tag is programmed to write
only one word (16-bit) of data in a single write command. As a result, in some of the
protocols' implementations we had to send more than 40 write commands to transmit
the reader's messages, and this sometimes led to communication loss between the reader
and the tag, and also aﬀected the performance dramatically.
3.3.3 Performance Measurement Techniques
The aim of this section, is to discuss the techniques we deployed in measuring the
performance of the proposed protocols on a resource-restricted device such as an RFID
tag. The main measurements are:
1. The tag's memory space: The cost of storing the tag's data, the reader's messages,
the tag's messages and the tag's ﬁrmware.
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2. The communication cost between the reader and the tag: Communication cost
refers to the time cost for a tag to read/write data in its memory and the time
cost for a reader to read/write data in the tag's memory.
3. The tag's computing time cost: The cost of computing each message indepen-
dently, and the total cost of running the whole protocol on the tag.
4. The tag's power consumption.
To measure memory cost, after debugging the ﬁrmware, Crossworks for AVR IDE
provided us with the total cost of storing the tag's data, random numbers and tag/reader
exchanged messages in the EEPROM and ﬂash memory.
Moreover, since the SHA-2 code runs on Atmel ATMega128 microcontroller, there
are no real GE, the amount of RAM and ﬂash memory, which are used by software
implementations take the place of GE. Crossworks for AVR IDE shows that the size of
the deployed SHA-2 functions within the ﬂash memory is 1.4 KB.
To measure the communication costs in the tag, the Atmega128 microcontroller
inside the DemoTag is embedded with a Timer1/counter. The Timer1 is a 16-bit
register that is capable of counting from 0 to 65535 transitions. We used TCCR1B
as a timer control register, and a counter TCNT1, which counts the internal System
Clock ticks. In the reader side, to measure the communication cost, the .NET Frame-
work stopwatch function was deployed at the beginning and the end of reading and
writing functions, then we calculated the elapsed time using a timing function stop-
watch.ElapsedMilliseconds.
To measure the execution time for computing each message (computing time cost)
and/or to measure the time to read/write data (communication cost) in the tag's mem-
ory, we started the timer TCCR1B and the counter TCNT1 as (TCCR1B |= ((1  CS10
) | (0  CS11 ))) with no Prescaler (Timer Clock = System Clock), and TCNT1=0
respectively. Then, at the end of the message's function execution we stopped the timer
by using the following command (TCCR1B |= ((0  CS10 ) | (0  CS11 ))) and printed
the counter value. Each value in the counter represents a transition (one clock pulse),
so to calculate the time period in milliseconds (ms) for an F_CPU = 16 MHz, we used
the following equation:
Time = 1/Frequency = 1/16MHz = 0, 0000000625sec (3.1)
Thus each transition only took 0.0000000625 sec. For example, if the counter value
is 65535, the time is 0,0000000625 * 65535 = 0,0040959375 sec ≡ 4 ms.
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Finally, for measuring the power consumption of the DemoTag, we used a digital
multimeter [88] to measure the Direct Current (DC) Voltage, DC Current, and Resis-
tance. The DemoTag power supply is provided by a USB port, which provides an 5V
DC voltage. The resistance provided in the DemoTag is 1470 Ohms. The average power
consumption in all the proposed protocols is about 17 mW @ 1 MHz clock frequency.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we provided a background information about the tools used in the
formal analysis of our protocols. CasperFDR and Scyther are deployed to conﬁrm that
secret data remains private and the participating entities are mutually authenticated.
The tools deployed in the performance measurement and the techniques for measuring
the tag's memory, communication, computing costs and power consumption were also
demonstrated in this chapter. In the next chapter, we will study one of the widely-
cited RFID protocols, demonstrate its vulnerability to DoS attacks, and provide some
recommendations for combating such attacks.
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Data Desynchronisation on the
Song RFID Mutual Authentication
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This chapter reviews how protocol's design ﬂaws can be exploited to perform a data
desynchronisation on one of the widely cited RFID mutual authentication protocols pro-
posed by Boyeon Song. We ﬁrstly give a general description of the data desynchro-
nisation that might occur in RFID mutual authentication protocols. Subsequently, we
explain in detail the Song protocol, and demonstrate how data in the Song protocol can
be desynchronised. Finally, we propose a countermeasure that overcomes the Song's
protocol vulnerability.
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4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we highlight weaknesses in an existing lightweight RFID mutual au-
thentication protocol proposed by Song et al. in [89] (referred to hereafter as Song
protocol). In [39], Song proposed an enhanced version of her protocol presented in [89].
In both versions, we discovered that the tag's and server's data can be desynchronised
although they provide a synchronisation process.
Insecure communication between reader and tag is inherently vulnerable to inter-
ception, modiﬁcation, fabrication and replay attacks as described in Section 2.5.2. In
addition to these attacks is data desynchronisation, which is one of the major prob-
lems encountered in designing a secure RFID system. If data has to be updated syn-
chronously after authentication is achieved between tag and server, an attacker can
cause a data desynchronisation by blocking the exchanged message(s) from reaching
the target, meaning that the receiver will not update the data, and hence, authentica-
tion will not be achieved in subsequent transaction(s).
Song proposed an RFID mutual authentication protocol that aims to achieve privacy
and security as follows:
 The protocol achieves privacy by using a challenge-response scheme. The tag
generates a cryptographic nonce to send a diﬀerent response for every reader
query, so the tag's transmitted message(s) cannot be traced or linked. Moreover,
the tag and server update their values after each successful session.
 The tag calculates a keyed-hash function (Message Authentication Code (MAC))
on the tag's secret data to meet the integrity attribute.
 To combat data desynchronisation, the server database stores both the most recent
previous data (old) and the current data (new) for each tag, hence achieving the
availability feature.
 The tag's hashed identiﬁer is a result of applying the hash function on its unique
ID, assigned and calculated by the server, hence achieving the conﬁdentiality
feature.
Song claimed that the proposed protocol resists data desynchronisation by storing
the old and new values of the tag's data in the server, thus when an attacker blocks
the transmitted message(s), the server still can use the most recent old values to resyn-
chronise with the tag in the next transaction. However, in this chapter, we will show
how an attacker may apply data desynchronisation on the Song protocol, without com-
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promising the internal data stored in the tag. In section 4.2, we will explain how data
transfer between tag and server can be desynchronised in general.
4.2 Data Desynchronisation Description
Data desynchronisation between a tag and a server may occur unintentionally when
messages are lost during transmission due to system malfunction or communication
error. In addition, according to [17], data desynchronisation can be implemented delib-
erately on RFID communication channels via, for example, using one of the following
options:
 Blocking the messages from reaching the targets. The attacker may use a blocker
tags [16] or an RFID Guardian [90] to perform a deliberate DoS. These two
schemes were potentially designed to achieve privacy for RFID tags.
 Active jamming, by transmitting a continuous signal to the tag to prevent the tag
from communicating with the reader.
 An adversary may take advantage of the tag's limited resources and send a stream
of random messages to it, so it will be ﬂooded with random messages, and will
abort the session without updating the data.
Storing and updating the (new) value to represent the current value, and the (old)
value to represent the previous value can partially prevent data desynchronisation. In
other words, even if the server updates tag's data after a successful authentication,
and stores the recent old value, an adversary can easily cause synchronisation failure
by intercepting and blocking messages between the server and the tag in two or more
consecutive sessions, resulting in mismatched values. In Section 4.4, we demonstrate
how this attack can be applied on the Song protocol.
4.3 Review of the Song Protocol
This section presents the Song protocol in detail. Notation used in this paper is deﬁned
in Table 4.1. The Song protocol consists of two processes: the initialisation process,
and the authentication process, which are summarised below:
 Initialisation Process:
This stage only occurs during manufacturing when the manufacturer assigns the
initial values in the server and tag. The initialisation process is summarised below:
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Table 4.1: A summary of notation
Notation Description
h A hash function, h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}L, where L is a bit-length of a tag
identiﬁer
fk A keyed hash function, fk : {0, 1}∗× {0, 1}L→ {0, 1}L
N The number of tags
Ti The ith tag (1 ≤ i ≤ N)
Di The detailed information associated with tag Ti
si A string of L bits assigned to ith tag Ti
ti Ti's identiﬁer of L bits, which equals h(si)
xnew The new (refreshed) value of x
xold The most recent value of x
r A random string of L bits
ε Error message
⊕ An XoR operator
‖ A concatenation operator
← A substitution operator
x  k A Right circular shift operator, which rotates all bits of x to the right
by k bits, as if the right and left ends of x were joined
x  k A Left circular shift operator, which rotates all bits of x to the left by k
bits, as if the left and right ends of x were joined
∈R The random choice operator, which randomly selects an element from a
ﬁnite set using a uniform probability distribution
 An initiator (e.g. the tag manufacturer) assigns a string si of L bits to each
tag Ti, computes ti = h(si), and stores ti in the tag, where L should be
large enough so that an exhaustive search to ﬁnd the L-bit values ti and si
is computationally infeasible.
 The initiator stores the entries [(si, ti)new, (si, ti)old] for every tag that it
manages in the server. Initially (si, ti)new is assigned with the initial values
of si and ti, and (si, ti)old is set to null.
 Authentication Process:
The authentication process is shown in Fig. 4.1 as presented in [39], and sum-
marised below:
1. Reader: A reader generates a random bit-string r1 ∈R {0, 1}L, and sends it
to the tag Ti.
2. Tag: The tag Ti generates a random bit-string r2 ∈R {0, 1}L as a temporary
secret for the session, and computes M1 = ti ⊕ r2 and M2 = fti(r1 ‖ r2),
then sends M1 and M2 to the reader.
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Server Reader Ti
1−r1−−−−→
2-Generates r2
Computes:
M1 = ti ⊕ r2
M2 = fti (r1 ‖ r2)
2−r1,M1,M2←−−−−−−−−−
3−r1,M1,M2←−−−−−−−−−
4-Re-computes M1 and M2
Computes:
M3 = si ⊕ fti (r2 ‖ r1)
4−M3−−−−→ 5−M3−−−−→
Updates:
si(old)← si(new)
si(new)←(si  L/4)⊕(tiL/4)⊕r1⊕r2
ti(old)←ti(new)
ti(new)←h(si(new))
6-Re-computes M3
Updates:
ti←h((siL/4)⊕(tiL/4)⊕r1⊕ r2)
Figure 4.1: The authentication process of the Song protocol
3. Reader: The reader transmits r1, M1, and M2 to the server.
4. Server:
(a) The server searches its database using M1, M2 and r1 as follows.
i. It chooses ti from amongst the values ti(new) or ti(old) stored in the
database.
ii. It computes M2'=fti(r1 ‖ (M1 ⊕ ti)).
iii. If M2'== M2, then it has identiﬁed and authenticated Ti. It then
goes to step (b). Otherwise, it returns to step (i). If no match is
found, the server sends ε to the reader and stops the session.
(b) The server computes r2 = M1 ⊕ ti, and M3 = si⊕ fti (r2 ‖ r1), and
sends M3 to the reader.
(c) If the server found the tag's record in the new or old values, it updates:
si(old ) ← si(new)
si(new) ← (si  L/4) ⊕ (ti  L/4) ⊕ r1 ⊕ r2
ti(old) ← ti(new)
ti(new) ← h(si(new))
5. Reader: The reader forwards M3 to the tag Ti.
6. Tag: The tag Ti computes si = M3 ⊕ fti(r2 ‖ r1) and checks that h(si) =
ti. If the check fails, the tag keeps the current value of ti unchanged. If the
check succeeds, the tag authenticates the server, and sets:
53
ti ← h((si  L/4) ⊕ (ti  L/4) ⊕ r1 ⊕ r2)
In the next section 4.4, we will analyse the Song protocol in terms of security.
4.4 Security Analysis of the Song Protocol
Although in the Song protocol, the server stores the new and old value of the tag's data
and they are updated after each authenticated session, data desynchronisation can be
performed without compromising the internal data stored in the tag. The Song protocol
will fail if an attacker intercepts the communication in two consecutive sessions. If the
server's message (M3) is blocked in sequential sessions, the server database will have
no matching data to complete the authentication, causing the data between the server
and tag to be desynchronised. To elaborate, for example, in the ﬁrst access to the
tag, the server's values (sold, told) are set to null, while (snew, tnew) values are set to
speciﬁc values assigned by the server, where (tnew) is equal to the tag's value (ti). If
the authentication succeeds, then (tnew) and (ti) will be updated to the same value
and (sold, told) will take the previous values of (snew, tnew). As shown in Table 4.2, if
the attacker blocks M3 from reaching the tag, the server has updated the tag's data,
while the tag will not update (ti). In this situation, the value (ti) in the tag will match
the value (told) in the server and mutual authentication can still be achieved. Then,
we suppose that the attacker blocks M3 in the consecutive session; then the tag will
also not update (ti), while (sold, told) in the database have been updated with values
not associated with the tag's data (ti). As a result, the tag's data will not match the
server's data, causing data desynchronisation and authentication failure.
4.5 Revised Protocol
We propose an improvement to the Song protocol by changing the updating process
discussed in Section 4.4. In the Song protocol, if authentication is achieved, the server's
data will be updated even if the matching record is found in (sold) and (told). In the
revised protocol, we propose that in the event of an authentication failure, whether it is
due to communication error or intentional interference by an adversary, both the server
and the tag should not update their values. Also, if the data is found in (sold) and
(told), the server's values should remain ﬁxed.
Not updating the data does not aﬀect location tracking, as the tag's messages and
server's message include fresh random numbers.
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Table 4.2: Data desynchronisation on the Song protocol
Server Tag
In the ﬁrst session:
If the server authenticates the tag
successfully, the server updates its
data
s2i (old ) ← s1i (new)
s2i (new)←(s1iL/4)⊕(t1iL/4)⊕r1⊕r2
t2i (old) ← t1i (new)
t2i (new) ← h(s1i (new))
M3{blocked}−−−−−−−−→
the tag will not update
t1i
In the next session:
The tag uses the current
value of t1i in calculating
M1 and M2
M1,M2,R1←−−−−−−−
The tag's data t1i will match the old
server's data t2i (old) and authentica-
tion is still achieved, then the server
updates its data
s3i (old ) ← s2i (new)
s3i (new)←(s2iL/4)⊕(t2iL/4)⊕r1⊕r2
t3i (old) ← t2i (new)
t3i (new) ← h(s2i (new))
M3{blocked}−−−−−−−−→
The tag will not update
t1i
In the next session:
The tag uses the current
value of t1i in calculating
M1 and M2
M1,M2,R1←−−−−−−−
The tags data t1i will not match the
old server data t3i (old) and authenti-
cation will not be achieved
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4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have highlighted a design ﬂaw in the Song protocol. We found
that this protocol is vulnerable to data desynchronisation only if an attacker blocks the
transmitted message from reaching the tag in consecutive sessions. This attack aﬀects
the availability of the tag in the next transaction. We proposed a revised protocol,
which combats the desynchronisation incident possible in the Song protocol by changing
the data update mechanism. In the next chapter, we propose our own RFID mutual
authentication protocol which withstands the Song protocol desynchronisation attack
and other well-known RFID active attacks.
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In this chapter we propose a new lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol,
which builds on the strengths of existing schemes and overcomes their weaknesses. We
then carry out a security analysis of our proposed protocol in terms of informal and
formal analysis using CasperFDR and Scyther tools. Subsequently, we implement the
proposed protocol and present the performance measurement.
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5.1 Introduction
RFID is being used in many applications that require security and privacy, such as access
control systems, and authentication of products in the supply chains [111]. Therefore,
there is a need for improved security measures to protect against active attacks, such
as those discussed in Section 2.5.2. Wireless communication between tag and reader
may allow an attacker to eavesdrop on a session, modify the transmitted messages,
and prevent some messages from reaching their target. Moreover, a malicious entity
may obtain the tag's data and/or track the tag's holder or the tag's location [111].
As shown in the previous chapter 4, the Song protocol takes into account the data
desynchronisation issues but it is still vulnerable to such incidents. Hence, in this
chapter we attempt to overcome active RFID attacks, including vulnerability in the
Song protocol.
Another area that aﬀects the adoption of RFID systems is performance. A low-cost
RFID tags cannot perform computationally intensive security cryptographic functions,
as it oﬀers tightly constrained computational power and storage capacity [64].
The protocol proposed in this chapter can ﬁt into systems that require user privacy
and security. The protocol uses lightweight functions, such as PRNG and hash func-
tions that can be implemented into constrained devices, such as low-cost RFID tags.
For example, the proposed protocol, can be used in access control to authorise people
holding RFID tokens to access a building. Moreover, other system, such as in sup-
ply chains, where tagged products need to be identiﬁed and authenticated by nearby
reader(s). Such systems require security to conﬁrm that only authorised people and
products are being authenticated, and at the same time preserve their privacy.
5.2 Related Work
In this section, we present the mutual authentication protocols proposed so far for
solving the security and privacy concerns associated with the use of RFID systems.
Some common best-practice cryptographic approaches require more memory and/or
processing power than would be feasible for cost-eﬀective RFIDs. Hence, lightweight
cryptographic primitives have gained more attention. For example, using optimised
PRNG and cryptographic hash functions would suﬃce, assuming that it requires sig-
niﬁcantly fewer resources than the public key and symmetric key approaches [36]. In
the following section, some of the proposed lightweight solutions are explained more
thoroughly.
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5.2.1 Hash Function-Based Protocols
Considering hash function-based authentication protocols for RFID, in 2003, Weis et
al. [93] (referred to hereafter as WP) introduced the ﬁrst lightweight protocol based
on one-way hash functions; their scheme is called hash-based access control. The main
idea of this scheme is to lock the tag from oﬀering any functionality until it receives the
correct secret key. The tag stores the hash of the secret key as a meta-ID ; i.e. meta-
ID=hash(Key). When the tag receives the correct secret key, it calculates the hash of
the received secret key, and compares it with meta-ID, if a match is found, it unlocks
itself. Since then, attacks on this protocol have received a large amount of attention,
and hundreds of papers have been published indicating ways to combat such attacks.
In [94], (referred to hereafter as W2) the authors pointed out that Weis et al.'s
protocol [93] is prone to location tracking, as the attacker can simply eavesdrop the
previous session, track the tag since the value of meta-ID is ﬁxed, and replay the tag's
message in the next session. Hence, they proposed the ﬁrst randomised access control
scheme, which is based on pseudo-random functions (PRFs). The tag uses a PRF to
generate a random number (R) and calculates the hash on its ID and R in order to
obtain diﬀerent responses, preventing attackers from tracking the tag's location. A
server then identiﬁes the tag by performing an exhaustive search of all the stored tags
IDs, until it ﬁnds a match to the value received from the tag. To unlock a tag, the server
sends the matched tag's ID to the tag. However, the tag's response can be intercepted,
thus allowing the attacker to perform replay and tag impersonation attacks.
Forward secrecy was introduced by Ohkubo et al. [96] (referred to hereafter as OP).
The Ohkubo et al. protocol involves updating the tag's data whenever a tag is queried
using a cryptographic hash function, which is presumably one-way. Hence, forward
secrecy is guaranteed as the tag stores the new value of the data that are not used in
the computation of previous messages, and the attacker cannot obtain the old values
from the curent stored data. The ith tag Ti and the server store a secret (s). Ti updates
(s) in every session by using a hash function (h). Then in the next transaction, Ti uses a
second hash function (g) and sends g(h(si+1) to the server, where (si+1) is the updated
secret to be used in the next transaction. However, according to [97], this scheme is
still vulnerable to replay attacks, and they proposed an extended protocol by adding
random numbers to the exchanged messages to avoid replay attacks.
Another approach is called a challenge-response scheme. In this scheme, the reader
sends a challenge to the tag, which can be a cryptographic nonce, and the tag sends a
response to the reader's challenge. The use of a challenge-response scheme was moti-
vated by Molnar et al. [115] (referred to hereafter as MP). Molnar et al. proposed using
cryptographic nonces generated by the reader and tag to protect the privacy of the tag's
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data. The tag and the server share a key (k). The server sends a random number (r1)
as a challenge to the tag. The tag generates a random number (r2), and sends M1=ID
⊕ fk(0‖ r1 ‖ r2), where (f) is a PRF, to the server in order to be authenticated. Once
the server successfully authenticates the tag, it sends M2=ID ⊕ fk(1 ‖ r1 ‖ r2) to be
authenticated by the tag. However, according to [39], this proposal is vulnerable to
forward secrecy invasion, as the value of the secret key is ﬁxed.
Dimitriou [110] (referred to hereafter as DP) suggested similar approach to the
protocol proposed in [115] but with more features, such as updating tag's data after
each successful run of the protocol. Dimitriou proposed an RFID mutual authentication
protocol to enforce user privacy. This approach uses a challenge-response protocol, a
hash function, and a keyed hash function. The tag only stores the tag's identiﬁer (ID),
which serves as a key to calculate the keyed hash function. The server stores the tag
identiﬁer (ID) and the hash of the tag identiﬁer (HID), which is used as an index to
retrieve the tag's data. When the server successfully authenticates the tag, it updates
(ID) to g(ID), where (g) is a hash function, and sends M3 = fIDi(r2 ‖ r1) to the tag
using the updated IDi, where r2 and r1 are random numbers generated by the tag and
reader respectively. The tag checks the received value of M3. If the check is successful,
the tag updates (ID) to g(ID). Nevertheless, this protocol is still vulnerable to DoS
attacks [39]; if the third message (M3) sent by the server is blocked, then the server will
update the identiﬁer (ID) while the tag keeps the old value of the identiﬁer, resulting
in a desynchronisation between the server and tag.
In [103] (referred to hereafter as HP), the authors proposed an RFID lightweight
protocol that uses PRNG and three hash functions. The detail of this proposal is shown
in Fig. 5.1. The server and the tag shares the tag's ID, the secret key (SKID,i), and
a counter (i). The server and the tag generate random number (X and a) respectively.
As shown in Fig. 5.1, if the attacker blocks the tag's messages in consecutive sessions,
the tag will not be authenticated by the server and data desynchronisation between the
tag and the server occurs.
5.2.2 Lightweight Function-Based Protocols
Lightweight algorithms were used in RFID protocols, taking into account the limitation
of the RFID tags. Motivated for this reason, several proposals suggested using the
PRNG, the CRC and simple triangular operations, such as XoR, And and OR.
Duc et al. [114] presented an RFID mutual authentication protocol conforming to
the EPCCIG2 standard (referred to hereafter as DP2). This scheme uses simple cryp-
tographic primitives, such as PRNG and CRC functions, as they are supported in the
EPCC1G2 standard. The PRNG is used to update the secret key while the CRC detects
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Server Reader Tag
X ←{0,1}t
X−→ X−→
a ←{0,1}t
B= H0(SKID,i, ID, i, X, a)
a,B←−−− a,B←−−−
Re-computes B′ ,
If there is a match: set dY =1
else computes:
Bi−1= H0(SKID,i−1, ID, i-1, X, a)
If there is a match: set dY =1
Otherwise set dY =0
If dY =1, and B
′=B
Computes Z=H1(SKID,i, ID, i, X,a)
If dY =1, and B
′
i−1=B
Computes Z=H1(SKID,i−1,ID,i-1,X,a)
if dY =0, rnd ←{0,1}∗
Computes Z=H1(rnd)
Key update:
If B′=B
Compute s=H2(SKID,i, ID, i)
Sets SKID,i = s
Sets SKID,i−1 = SKID,i
Sets i=i+1
else, no update
Z−→ Z−→
Computes Z′=H1(SKID,i, ID, i, X, a)
If Z′=Z
Sets dZ=1, otherwise,
sets dZ=0
If dZ=1
Compute s=H2(SKID,i, ID, i)
Sets SKID,i = s
Sets i=i+1
else, no update
Figure 5.1: Hanatanil et al.'s RFID authentication protocol
any errors occurring during the transmission of the messages. The server and tag store a
secret key, which is updated after a successful authentication. However, this scheme still
has some weaknesses, including vulnerability to data desynchronisation, replay attacks
before the next successful authentication, and forward secrecy invasion[95].
Chien et al. [95] introduced an improved version of Duc et al.'s RFID mutual au-
thentication protocol [114] (referred to hereafter as CP). The proposed protocol requires
the server and tag to generate random numbers to prevent replay attack. The tag keeps
a static EPC, which represents the unique identity of the tag, and an access key (K) and
authentication key (P), which are updated after each successful authentication. The
server also maintains the same values as well as the old and new access and authenti-
cation keys to avoid DoS attacks. The protocol uses simple cryptographic primitives,
such as a PRNG and a CRC. After the server authenticates the tag, it updates the data
except for the EPC identiﬁer which is static. However, according to Peris-Lopez et al.
[98], this proposal permits location tracking, tag impersonation, server impersonation,
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and backward traceability, because of the linear properties of the CRC.
Another improved version of Chien et al.'s protocol was proposed by Yi et al. [99].
However, again due to the use of the CRC function, [101] found that this proposal is also
vulnerable to data desynchronisation, tag and reader impersonation, and traceability
attacks.
A lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol was proposed in [102] using a
Shrinking Algorithm (referred to hereafter as SG). In this protocol a shrinking algorithm
generates diﬀerent random keys. The tag generates an encryption key (CSGK1) using
the shrinking algorithm that takes a shared secret between the tag and the database
(K1) as an input, and computes M=CSGK1 ⊕ (ID ‖ S), where (ID) is the tag's ID, and
(S) is a random number generated by the reader. Once the database authenticates the
tag, it generates another encryption key (CSGK2) using the shrinking algorithm, and
computes ID′=CSGK2 ⊕ ID. Finally, the tag and database will update their values.
The authors claim that their protocol reaches the synchronization between the tag
and database by maintaining a list of current and previous tag's data in the database.
However, we found that this protocol is vulnerable to a desynchronisation attack, as if
the attacker blocks the database's message from reaching the tag in consecutive sessions.
Song et al. [89] proposed an RFID authentication protocol for low-cost tags (re-
ferred to hereafter as SP). This protocol uses MAC and PRNG. Each tag stores the
hash of a secret (s) namely (t), and the server stores the old and new values of the secret
(snew, sold), the hashed secret (tnew, told) and the tag's information (D). This scheme
uses a challenge-response protocol and supports updating data when the mutual au-
thentication is achieved. Cai et al. [113] demonstrated that Song et al.'s protocol does
not provide protection against tag impersonation attacks. Moreover, Rizomiliotis et al.
[73] found that an attacker can impersonate the server without accessing the internal
data of a tag and launch DoS attacks. Also, in Chapter 4, we pointed out that the new
version of this protocol in [39] is prone to data desynchronisation.
Yeh et al. [105] proposed an improved version of Chien et al.'s RFID authentication
protocol conforming to the EPCC1G2 standard (referred to hereafter as YP). The data
kept in the server and tag is the same as in Chien et al.'s protocol, except that their
protocol uses an index (C) to avoid DoS attacks and database overloading. The ini-
tialisation and authentication phases do not use CRC functions. Only PNRG functions
are used, thus blocking the bad linear properties of the CRC function. Although this
protocol prevents DoS attacks, it is still vulnerable to forward secrecy invasion, tag
impersonation attacks, and server impersonation attacks as pointed out by [117].
An improved version of Yeh et al.'s protocol was proposed by Yoon in [117] (referred
to hereafter as YoonP). Their protocols' data and the initialisation process are identical
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to Yeh et al.'s protocol, but the authentication phase adds a secret session random
number (r2) to the exchanged massage (M1) generated by the tag. Yoon claimed that
the proposed protocol provides more security than that of Yeh et al.'s protocol; however,
[118] demonstrated that eavesdropping on only one session of the protocol and O(216)
PRNG function evaluation can reveal the tag's secret data, as the length of the data
generated from PRNG is only 16-bit strings, which makes it easier for the attacker to
do an exhaustive search to reveal the data; it is thus easy to launch traceability attacks,
DoS attacks, tag impersonation and server impersonation attacks.
As shown above, many RFID protocols have attempted to protect against a wide
range of attacks, including DoS attacks, impersonation attacks, location tracking, replay
attacks and forward secrecy invasion; however, cryptanalysis on proposed protocols is
still ongoing. Designing a secure RFID protocol is still a challenging task, and this may
be due to the following reasons:
 EPCC1G2-compliant RFID authentication protocols: Designing an EPCC1G2-
compliant protocol is challenging because the only security operations available
in this standard are a 16-bit PRNG and a 16-bit CRC. These functions do not
provide irreversibility as in the hash function [112, 74].
 Updating data: Some of the protocols require the tag and the server to update
internal data after each successful session in order to prevent location tracking,
replay attacks and forward secrecy invasion. However, they do not take into
account that the attacker might block certain messages more than once in two
consecutive sessions causing a desynchronisation of data [66, 105].
 The deployment of inexpensive operators: The use of bitwise, and/or bit shifts
operators is compatible with the tag's computational capabilities but it can lead
to various security vulnerabilities [119, 120, 70, 112, 72, 73, 74].
Hence, we propose a new lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol discussed
in the next section, which overcomes the weaknesses highlighted in this section and
builds on their strengths to provide a secure RFID system.
5.3 A New Lightweight RFID Authentication Protocol
In this section, we explain the proposed protocol in detail.
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5.3.1 Design Goals
When designing a lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol, consideration
should be given to the following:
 Mutual authentication: The protocol should provide a mutual entity authentica-
tion. The communication should take place between legitimate entities, such as
a tag, a reader and a server, and provide assurance to the receiver (server) about
the identity of the sender (tag) and vice versa.
 Privacy: The tag's data should remain secret and not be revealed to any malicious
entity, thus providing anonymity to the tag. Another notion related to privacy is
untraceability; if the data being sent from the tag to the reader is static or linked
to data sent previously, the tag holder's location can be tracked without his/her
knowledge. Finally, if the tag's memory is compromised, the attacker should
not be able to trace past transactions. Therefore, the protocol should provide a
mechanism to achieve forward secrecy.
 Security: Due to the wireless communication between the tag and reader, an
active attacker can observe and manipulate the communication channel between
reader and tags. In this study, we focus on three common techniques to violate
the secrecy of the system, namely replay attacks, data desynchronisation incidents
and tag/server impersonation attacks. To elaborate, the designed protocol should
provide:
1. Resistance to replay attacks: The adversary can eavesdrop on the communi-
cation between reader and tag, obtain the exchanged message(s), and resend
it repeatedly. Therefore, the generated messages should be fresh to the pro-
tocol session to protect against replay attacks.
2. Resistance to desynchronisation incidents: Messages can be lost or the ad-
versary can modify the ﬂow of messages and block messages from reaching
their target, causing a desynchronisation between the two legitimate parties.
Therefore, the server should store the old and new values of the tag in order
to authenticate the desynchronised tag and reach synchronisation.
3. Resistance to tag/server impersonation attacks: In this attack, the attacker
sends a message to the server that claims to come from a legitimate tag, and
this message fabrication enables the attacker to masquerade as a legitimate
tag and vice versa. Hence, the responses should not be sent in clear.
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 Performance: The tag's memory storage space, and the computing cost should be
appropriate for the tag's limited computing capability, and the amount of data
communicated should be minimised.
5.3.2 Assumptions
We present a lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol, which operates under
the following assumptions:
 The reader contacts the tag through a wireless channel, which is susceptible to
active attacks.
 The communication channel between the reader and server is secure.
 The tag's data are stored in non-volatile memory, such as EEPROM or Flash
memory, where they can be updated.
 All the operations in the tag are atomic i.e. either all of the operations or none
are processed. If the attacker kills the electromagnetic ﬁeld between the reader
and tag or the tag simply walks away from the reader's signal, the tag will execute
all the computations simultaneously or not at all.
 The proposed protocol supports a multiple readers scenario, all connected to a
central server, so that a tag can be read in many diﬀerent locations.
5.3.3 Protocol Design
The proposed protocol has the following main features:
 Tags are capable of computing XoR operation, generating a pseudo-random num-
ber and calculating hash functions.
 The proposed protocol uses random numbers in an attempt to prevent location
tracking and replay attacks.
 The server stores both the old and the new values of the data in order to prevent
desynchronisation incidents.
 After a successful authentication between the server and tag, both parties update
their values to be used in the next transaction.
 The reader does not store or update any data related to the tags.
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5.3.4 Threat Model
From an information security standpoint, RFID is a challenging platform. The limited
computational power in RFID tags makes it infeasible to perform common best-practice
cryptographic approaches, such as public key cryptography schemes.
Accordingly, we used a popular adversary model called the Dolev-Yao model [67],
where the adversary has powerful resources to control the communication channel via
performing the following:
 Eavesdropping
 Modifying messages
 Blocking messages from reaching targets
 Replaying previous messages
 Injecting new messages (forgery)
 Impersonating any entity
Defences against relay attacks, physical attacks, side channel attacks, and power
analysis attacks are not within the scope of this thesis.
5.3.5 Notation
The notation used in the proposed protocol are presented in Table 5.1:
5.3.6 Protocol Description
The scheme consists of two processes: initialisation, and authentication.
 Initialisation Process: This stage only occurs during manufacturing when the
manufacturer assigns the initial values in the server, and in the tag. The initiali-
sation process is summarised below:
 The server assigns random values for each tag it manages to (IDnew, Knew)
in the server, and (IDi, Ki) in the tag.
 Initially, (IDold, Kold) in the server is set to null.
 Authentication Process: The authentication process is shown in Fig. 5.2.
1. Reader: The reader generates a random number R1 of L bits and sends it to
the tag.
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Table 5.1: A summary of notation
Notation Description
Ti The ith tag of the RFID system, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n
IDold The ith tag old ID
IDnew The ith tag new ID
Kold The ith tag old secret key
Knew The ith tag new secret key
IDi The ith tag ID
Ki The ith tag secret key
x The value kept as either new or old to show whether the tag uses the
old or new values of IDi and Ki
R1 A pseudo-random number generated by the reader
R2 A pseudo-random number generated by the tag
H A hash function, h:{0,1}∗←{0,1}L
A ← B The value of A is updated to that of B
⊕ An XoR operation
‖ A concatenation operation
j The transaction number
i The number of the tag in the system
n The number of tags managed by the server
2. Tag: The tag generates a random number R2 of L bits, and computes two
messages as follows:
M1= H(Ki ‖ R1 ‖ R2)
M2= H(IDi ⊕ R2)
3. Tag: The tag sends R2, M1 and M2 to the reader.
4. Reader: The reader sends R1, R2, M1, and M2 to the server.
5. Server: For all the stored IDs, the server computes H(IDi ⊕ R2) until it ﬁnds
a match with the received value of M2:
 If there is a match in IDnew, then the server marks x=new. The server
retrieves data (IDnew, Knew), and re-computes M1, i.e., M′1=H(Knew ‖
R1 ‖ R2) to authenticate the tag.
 If there is a match in IDold, then the server marks x=old, retrieves
the data (IDold, Kold), and re-calculates M′1=H(Kold ‖ R1 ‖ R2) to
authenticate the tag.
6. Server: The server computes M3=H(IDx ‖ Kx ‖ R1 ‖ R2), and transmits it
to the reader.
7. Server: The server updates the data as follows:
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Server Reader Ti
1- Generates R1
1−R1−−−−→
2- Generates R2
Computes
M1=H(Ki‖R1‖R2)
M2= H(IDi ⊕ R2)
3−R2,M1,M2←−−−−−−−−−−
4−R1,R2,M1,M2←−−−−−−−−−−−−
5- Searches for IDi
Marks x=new or old
Re-computes
M′1=H(Kx‖R1‖R2)
6- Computes
M3=H(IDx‖Kx‖R1‖R2)
6−M3−−−−→
7-Updates:
If x=new:
IDj+1new ← H(IDjnew)
IDj+1old ← IDjnew
Kj+1new←H(Kjnew⊕IDj+1new)
Kj+1old ← Kjnew
Else if x=old:
No update
8−M3−−−−→ 9- Re-computes:
H(IDi ‖ Ki ‖ R1 ‖ R2)
Updates:
IDj+1i ←H(IDji )
Kj+1i ←H(Kji⊕ IDj+1i )
Figure 5.2: The proposed lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol
If x=new, where IDi is found in IDnew
IDj+1new ← H(IDjnew)
IDj+1old ← IDjnew
Kj+1new ← H(Kjnew ⊕ IDj+1new)
Kj+1old ← Kjnew
Else if x=old, where ID is found in IDold: No update
If there is no match in IDnew and IDold or M′1 6= M1, then the server keeps
the tag's data the same, and sends an end session message to the reader to
terminate the session.
8. Reader: The reader sends M3 to the tag.
9. Tag: The tag checks whether the received value of M3 is equal to
H(IDi ‖ Ki ‖ R1 ‖ R2). If there is a match, the tag authenticates the server
and updates its values to:
IDj+1i ← H(IDji )
Kj+1i ← H(Kji ⊕ IDj+1i )
If the check fails or M3 is not received, the tag keeps the current values
unchanged.
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5.4 Protocol Analysis
In this section, we present the analysis of the proposed protocol in terms of informal,
and formal analysis using CasperFDR and Scyther.
5.4.1 Informal Protocol Analysis
Our proposed protocol meets the following goals:
 Tag anonymity: The ith tag stores two 128-bit values, namely IDi and Ki that
are supposed to be secret and not revealed to any entity except the legitimate
server. The values of IDi and Ki are protected during transmission using a secure
one-way hash function. Moreover, it will take up to 2128 attempts to guess the
value of IDi or Ki.
 Tag location privacy (untraceability): In the proposed protocol, the tag's re-
sponses are changed with new updated values and fresh random numbers; thus
an attacker will obtain new responses every time he/she eavesdrops on a session.
Moreover, if the previous authentication session failed, and the tag's data remain
unchanged, M1 and M2 messages will change due to the existence of random
numbers (R1 and R2) generated by the reader and tag respectively.
 Forward secrecy: The values of IDi and Ki are updated after each run in order
to prevent forward secrecy invasion, using a hash function that is irreversible.
If an adversary compromises the tag's memory, he/she will not be able to trace
the previous communications of the tag, as the obtained messages involve the
use of previous secret values IDi and Ki, which are not stored in the tag. The
stored updated values are used in the calculation of the next session and cannot
be irreversible as a result of using a hash function.
 Resistance to replay attack: Our protocol utilises a challenge-response scheme. In
messages M1 and M2, the tag sends the responses in which the reader's challenge
(R1), and tag's random number R2 are included. The server must therefore
include the tag's challenge R2 and R1 in its response (M3). Therefore, only
legitimate parties (server+tag) can send valid answers, since random numbers are
sent with secret values only known to the server and tag.
 Resistance to desynchronisation incidents: The communication session between
the reader and tag may be accidentally or intentionally interrupted. Therefore,
to avoid this sort of incidents, each time the server ﬁnds a match with the new
values (IDnew, Knew), it updates the tag's data, and the old previous values of
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Table 5.2: Comparison between the related work and our proposed protocol
WP
[93]
W2
[121]
OP
[96]
MP
[115]
DP
[110]
DP2
[114]
CP
[95]
SG
[102]
PP
[122]
SP
[89]
YP
[105]
YoP
[117]
HP
[103]
Our
pro-
tocol
5.3
Tag
anonymity
× √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Location pri-
vacy
× √ × √ × √ × √ √ √ × × √ √
Replay
attacks
× × × √ √ × √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Denial of ser-
vice attacks
√ √ √ √ × × × × × × √ √ × √
Tag imper-
sonation
attacks
× × √ √ √ √ × √ √ × × × √ √
Server im-
personation
attacks
× × × × × × × √ × × × × √ √
×: Means does not provide protection √: Means resists such an attack
IDi and Ki are maintained. Moreover, the server will not update its data either
when there is no match, or if there is a match in (IDold, Kold); it keeps the stored
data the same. Thus, when the attacker blocks M3 more than once in consecutive
order, the tag's data (IDi, Ki) will still match the server's data (IDold, Kold).
 Resistance to tag/server impersonation attacks: This is when an attacker attempts
to impersonate a legitimate server to obtain information from a tag. This kind
of attack is not feasible because the transmitted message (M3) includes secret
values shared only by the tag and the server, and sent within a secure one-way
hash function that is irreversible. The same applies to the tag impersonation.
 Mutual Authentication: All the exchanged messages include secret values (IDi,
Ki) sent using the hash function, so only a legitimate server and tag can calculate
such messages, preventing any other from recovering and creating valid messages.
The size of the data is 128-bit length, which means that the attacker needs to
make 2128 attempts to recover the secret data.
In Table 5.2, we compare our protocol with the related research work in terms of
the main requirements shown in Section 5.3.1. The result shows that our protocol is
immune to the identiﬁed attacks, and provides better protection than the related work.
5.4.2 Formal Protocol Analysis
To formally analyse the proposed protocol and conﬁrm that secrecy and authenticity
between the server and tag are achieved, we used CasperFDR [104] and Scyther [75]
tools.
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CasperFDR Analysis of the Proposed Protocol
We prepared the CasperFDR script to obtain some indicative results if there is an at-
tack on the protocol. The script is shown in Appendix A. We identiﬁed the following
data in the #Free variables section:
T : Agent
S : Server
R1, R2 : Nonce
ID, K : Data
h: HashFunction
InverseKeys= (h,h)
The section #Speciﬁcation, speciﬁes the security and authentication requirements
of the protocol, in which the Secret goals are:
Secret (T, K, [S])
Secret (T, ID, [S])
These goals indicate that the values of K and ID should only be known by the tag
(T) and legitimate server (S).
The lines starting with Agreement are for providing authentication for instance:
Agreement (T, S, [ID, K])
This goal means that the tag is authenticated to the server using the data values
(ID, K).
In addition, in the #Intruder information section, the intruder is deﬁned to be Mal-
lory, who can take full control of the session; impersonate any entity in the protocol,
generate a random number (R3), read the messages transmitted in the network, inter-
cept, analyse, and/or modify messages. The intruder is depicted as:
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge ={Tag, ServerDB, Mallory, R1, R2, R3}
CasperFDR did not ﬁnd any feasible attacks on the proposed protocol.
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Scyther Analysis of the Proposed Protocol
Scyther performs a formal analysis of security protocols using a Dolev-Yao model [67]
for an unbounded number of instances. It is mainly used to verify the authenticity of
the exchanged messages between entities as in the proposed protocol considered here.
We conducted the analysis of our protocol with respect to three goals, namely secret,
aliveness and agreement. The script is shown in Appendix A.2. Three roles are deﬁned,
namely a server (S), a reader (R), and a tag (Ti). The random numbers R1 and R2 are
deﬁned as Nonce; and IDi (tag identiﬁer), and Ki (tag key) are deﬁned as Data. The
XoR and hash functions are deﬁned as global functions.
Both roles, server and tag, share the secret goal over the two secret values IDi and
Ki as follows:
claim_S1(S, Secret, IDi);
claim_S2(S, Secret, Ki);
claim_Ti1(Ti, Secret, IDi);
claim_Ti2(Ti, Secret, Ki);
Also both roles claim to be alive and share the agreement and synchronisation goals
as follows:
claim_S3(S, Alive);
claim_S4(S, Niagree);
claim_Ti3(Ti, Alive);
claim_Ti4(Ti, Niagree);
claim_Ti5(Ti, Nisynch);
After compiling the Scyther script, it did not ﬁnd any feasible attacks within bound.
5.5 Protocol Implementation and Performance Measure-
ment
For our experiment, we implemented the proposed protocol using the tools discussed in
Chapter 3. We present the performance measurements after running the protocol for
100 runs on the DemoTag.
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5.5.1 Implementation Process
The tag is provided with two 128-bit secret values: IDi and Ki, which are stored in the
tag's EEPROM. Because we did not implement the protocol on the server, we assume
that the reader knows IDi and Ki.
The reader starts by generating a 128-bit (16-byte) random number (R1) using the
.NET Framework rngCsp method. Then, it sends R1 to the tag by sending eight Write-
TagData_EPC_C1G2 commands; each command writes 2 bytes of data. When the
tag receives the reader's random number, it generates a random number R2 (128-bit)
using the built-in PRNG, computes the two messages, namely M1 and M2 , each of
which is 128-bit length. Subsequently, the tag writes the messages (R2, M1 and M2) in
its memory using the syscall_writeWord commands ready to be read on demand. The
reader later sends three ReadTagData_EPC_C1G2 commands to read R2, M1 and M2,
and re-computes M1. If there is a match with the received M1, it calculates M3 and up-
dates the values of IDi and Ki. Finally, the reader sends 8 WriteTagData_EPC_C1G2
commands to the tag representing M3. The tag re-computes M3 to authenticate the
reader. If successful, the tag updates IDi and Ki.
5.5.2 Performance Measurement
The performance measurements are as follows:
1. DemoTag memory cost: In the proposed protocol, the memory cost is:
 348 bytes are used from the 4 KB EEPROM memory for storing tag's data,
messages (responses), and random numbers.
 33 KB used from the 128 KB Flash memory to store the tag's ﬁrmware.
Table 5.3: Data exchange time cost (milliseconds)
Tag Reader
Read - 240
Write 1.28 985.74
2. Communication cost is shown in Table 5.3: For the tag to write R2, M1 and M2
into its memory to be read by the reader, the average timer counter after running
the protocol 100 times is 20484.48, so the time cost, based on equation 3.1, is:
20484.48 ∗ 0.0000000625 = 0.00128sec ≡ 1.28ms (5.1)
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Regarding the reader, after 100 runs, the average communication cost is: around
985.74 ms to write R1 and M3 into the tag's memory, and 240 ms to read the
whole tag's response.
3. DemoTag computing cost: In a successful run of the proposed protocol, the tag
generates R2, computes three messages (M1, M2, and M3), updates two values
and write its messages in the memory. Table 5.4 demonstrates that the time
cost of running the whole protocol on the DemoTag is around 9.31 ms, which
means that the tag can respond to reader's query in less than a second, and this
demonstrates the relatively low computing cost of the protocol on the tag.
Table 5.4: Computing operations time cost (milliseconds)
R2 M1 M2 M3 Update Write
Computing cost 0.11 1.61 1.52 1.66 3.13 1.28
Total 9.31
The protocols discussed in this chapter did not provide any performance measure-
ments, thus we could not present a performance comparison between our protocol and
other related work.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed our own RFID mutual authentication protocol that at-
tempted to meet the identiﬁed goals and avoid the weaknesses found in related works
and in the Song protocol. The proposed protocol has been informally and formally anal-
ysed, and the results demonstrated that our proposal can resist active RFID attacks.
Moreover, the performance measurement demonstrated that the protocol execution time
on the tag requires only 9.31 ms. So far we have ignored one vital security aspect of
secure RFID systems; the secret key distribution problem. The following chapter aims
to address this aspect in RFID-enabled supply chains.
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Chapter 6
Enhancing the Key Distribution
Model in the RFID-Enabled Supply
Chains
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This chapter discusses the use of secret-sharing strategies as a promising solution
for managing key distribution and recovery in the RFID-enabled supply chains. Firstly,
we provide an overview of how RFID technology can be used in RFID-enabled supply
chain systems. Existing approaches for distributing secret keys among tagged products
in supply chains are discussed. Then, we point out the weaknesses found in the related
work, and propose our enhanced scheme. We also present the analysis of our proposal,
and ﬁnally illustrate the implementation of the proposed protocol.
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6.1 Introduction
As already discussed in Chapter 2, RFID technology is extensively used in various
applications. One of these applications is supply chain systems, where millions of in-
bound and outbound products move from manufacturers to customers [107]. These
products should be correctly identiﬁed, veriﬁed and sorted at diﬀerent points in the
supply chain. In an RFID-enabled supply chain, the product information is embedded
inside the RFID tag's memory, and this information can be eﬃciently collected, tracked,
shared, and managed remotely via a nearby reader(s).
Shi et al. [123] classiﬁed the nodes in an RFID-enabled supply chain into ﬁve
categories as follows:
1. Entry node, where the supply chain starts; for example in a manufacturing plant.
2. Aggregation node, where a number of cases are grouped into a larger unit; for
example, in a distributor centre (DC).
3. Disaggregation node, where large units of products are disaggregated into smaller
units, such as in a DC.
4. Normal node, where the cases are transported via land, air or sea logistics systems.
5. End node, where the supply chain ends; for example, in a retail shop.
As shown in Fig. 6.1, a manufacturer creates the products, embeds them with RFID
tags that store unique data, stores these data in the server for further processing, then
groups the products in cases, and ships them to the DC by land, air and/or sea. After
that, the DC decomposes cases, then recomposes them into larger or smaller cases based
on the next regional DCs, and ships them to the next regional DCs. Finally, the cases
in the regional DCs are distributed to retailers. Typically, the number of cases starts
oﬀ in large units (such as pallets) and these are reduced to smaller units as they make
their way from the manufacturer to the retailers [107].
It is assumed that the manufacturers and distributor centres have physically secure
environments, whereas areas outside these environments are prone to attacks as they
are open to adversaries. Hence, protocols emerged to protect tags' data and preserve
tags' anonymity in the retail and consumer environments [38, 70, 107, 137, 125]. In this
chapter, we propose a protocol for protecting tags' data in an RFID-enabled supply
chain, and secondly, we present a key update protocol incorporating a resynchronisa-
tion capability to counter the disruptive eﬀects of location tracking, replay attacks and
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Figure 6.1: Supply chain parties [137]
desynchronisation attacks [126]. In the next section 6.2, we discuss the current prob-
lem in adopting RFID technology in RFID-enabled supply chain, and introduce our
proposed solution.
6.2 Secret-Sharing Approach
RFID has captured the attention of many leading supply chain companies that want
to make this technology feasible [137]. RFID technology enables a supply chain to
identify, track and verify products remotely. To use this technology, all parties have to
store the product data in their databases, and these data should be protected during
transmission.
One way to secure the transmission of data between the reader and tags, is to
encrypt the exchanged data with a secret key. Basically, secret key distribution must
rely on secure channels established through pre-existing trust relationships. However,
in supply chain practice, especially for ad-hoc supply chain structures, there is a lack of
trust between the parties involved as the products' manufacturer may not know the next
owner (distributor and/or retailer) [137]. So, the question remains of how to distribute
the secret key safely. Proposals have been made for distributing the secret key securely
in the RFID-enabled supply chain using the secret-sharing approach proposed by Adi
Shamir [127]. Shamir [127] proposed a secret-sharing approach, where a secret can be
divided into n parts (shadows) that, individually, do not provide any useful information
about the secret. To reconstruct the secret, not all the parts are needed; any k of the
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Table 6.1: A summary of notation
Notation Description
R Reader
Ti The ith tag of the RFID system, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n
K A symmetric secret key
IDi The ith tag ID
EPCi The ith tag Electronic Secret Code value
Si The ith tag share of a secret key K
EK{M} A symmetric key encryption on a message M
h A hash function, h:{0,1}∗←{0,1}L, where L is equal to the length of
the data
n The number of tags
⊕ An XoR operation
‖ A concatenation operator
A ← B The value of A is updated to that of B
parts are suﬃcient to reconstruct the original secret. This scheme is called a (k, n)
threshold scheme. The generation of the shares is brieﬂy shown below.
6.2.1 LaGrange Interpolating Polynomial Scheme
Adi Shamir uses polynomial equations in a ﬁnite ﬁeld to construct a threshold scheme
[127].
Let p be a prime, which is larger than the number of possible shadows and larger
than the secret. For a given secret M, generate an arbitrary polynomial of degree M-1,
i.e.:
F(x) = (axk−1 + bxk−2 + ... + cx + M) mod p
The coeﬃcients (a, b, c) are chosen randomly, and kept secret. The shadows are
obtained by evaluating the polynomial at n diﬀerent points:
ki = F(xi)
6.3 Related Work
In this section, we present proposals based on secret-sharing approach in RFID-enabled
supply chains. For the rest of this section, we will use the notation summarised in Table
6.1.
Langheinrich et al. [108] proposed a Shamir tag, which was the ﬁrst proposal based
on dividing the secret tag's ID into shares in the RFID systems. This approach splits
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the ID of a tag into multiple shares based on Shamir's secret-sharing scheme [127], and
stores all the shares on the tag itself. These shares are concatenated to form the new
ID of the tag. Following a reader's inquiry, an initial set of random bits from the new
ID is released, followed by subsequent throttled single-bit releases. Once the entire new
ID is released, the reader can compute the original ID. In this scheme, an RFID reader
requires several minutes to recover the ID, which is not practical in a supply chain,
where a large number of tags need to be processed in an eﬃcient manner [70].
Li et al. [137] proposed another secret-sharing scheme called Resilient Secret-
Sharing (RSS). They designed a secure and practical key distribution system between
three parties (A, B, C) in the supply chain. Each tag stores two shares; one share
belongs to the secret key K1 between A and B, and the other share is intended for the
secret keyK2 between A and C. The secret key K1 is divided into multiple shares that
are stored in n tags, and the remaining shares (r-k-n) are stored in the database, where
r is the number of shares, and k is the number of shares required to reconstruct the
secret key. The same process is done on the secret key K2.
In [107], Juels et al. proposed a secret key-sharing approach to be used within
RFID-enabled supply chains to protect the transmission of the tags' EPC values. Their
proposal complies with the predominant RFID standard EPCC1Gen2 discussed in Sec-
tion 2.3.1. This approach does not require any computations on the tag side; the tag
just stores two values and sends them to the reader.
The authors suggested the following:
 The manufacturer generates a secret key K and splits it into shares using the
Reed-Solomon ECC-based secret-sharing scheme [109].
 Using a threshold scheme (k, n) where k ≤ n, the secret key is divided into n
shares, but only k shares are needed to reconstruct the secret key.
 The ith tag Ti stores two values: share (Si) and symmetrically encrypted infor-
mation (EK{EPCi}).
 Each Ti sends (Si, EK{EPCi}) to any distributor/retailer reader who queries it.
 When the reader receives k shares from the products' tags, it recovers the secret
key, and obtains the EPC value for each tag by decrypting (EK{EPCi}).
Juels et al. claimed that their protocol provides the following features:
1. This scheme provides an eﬃcient solution for tag ownership transfer, as there is
no need to distribute the keys in multiple supply chain databases.
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2. An adversary will not be able to recover the secret key when he/she obtains the
two values (Si , EK{EPCi}) from a customer's tag or from the tags in the retail
shop, as he/she needs to collect k shares to recover the secret key and decrypt
(EK{EPCi}).
3. This scheme assumes that the manufacturer and distributor centres are secure
areas, where the adversary does not have access, only legitimate parties can collect
the shares.
However, Li et al. [137] claimed that Juels et al.'s proposal renders the system
impractical, because it is diﬃcult for any intermediate party in the supply chain to
change the threshold of the shares, since the manufacturer pre-assigned all the shares
to the tags according to a ﬁxed secret-sharing scheme. In other words, if a group
of products is aggregated or disaggregated into larger or smaller group, the threshold
should be changed according to the new number of groups. Thus, the model should
support updating the threshold scheme.
In addition, Cai et al. [70] pointed out that the tag's response can be tracked, as
(Si, EK{EPCi}) are ﬁxed and sent to any reader that queries it. Also, an adversary can
obtain the ﬁxed tag's reply, and thus he/she is able to counterfeit the tag. Hence, Cai
et al. [70] proposed an enhanced protocol based on Juels et al.'s scheme to avoid tag
location tracking and counterfeiting attacks. They presented a protocol for updating
the secret key (K) and shares (S) after recovering the secret key and authenticating the
tag successfully, so the tag will respond with new values in each session. Cai et al.'s
protocol is depicted in Fig. 6.2.
The authors proposed storing a new value (c) to serve as authenticating the reader
before updating the data on the tag. This value is stored in the tag, i.e., ci=h(K ‖
Si). The tag responds to the reader query with three values: (Si, ci, and Mi), where
Mi=EK(EPCi).
During manufacturing, the manufacturer assigns the initial data (Si, ci, Mi) to the
tag. The protocol in [70] is described as follows:
1. Tag: The tag Ti sends (Si, ci, Mi) to the reader.
2. Reader: After receiving k shares and recovering the secret key, the reader calcu-
lates ci=h(K ‖ Si) to ﬁnd a match with the received ci. If there is a match, it
authenticates the tag.
3. Reader: If the reader successfully authenticates the tag Ti, the reader gen-
erates a new secret key K′, divides it into n new shares (S′i) and calculates
Mi′=EK′{EPCi}.
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Reader Ti
1−Si,ci,Mi←−−−−−−−−
2-After receiving k shares and recovering the secret key
Re-computes ci=h(K ‖ Si) to ﬁnd a match with the re-
ceived ci
3- Generates a new K′ and divides it into n shares
Generates Mi
′=EK′{EPCi}
4-Calculates:
C′i=h(K′ ‖ S′i)
A=(Si
′ ‖ Mi′) ⊕ h(0 ‖ ci)
B=Ci
′ ⊕ h(1 ‖ ci)
C=h(ci ‖ S′i ‖ Mi′ ‖ C′i)
5−A,B,C−−−−−−−→
6-Computes:
(Si
′ ‖ Mi′)=A ⊕ h(0 ‖ ci)
C′i=B ⊕ h(1 ‖ ci)
If C==h(ci ‖ S′i ‖ Mi′ ‖ C′i),
updates:
Si ← S′i
Mi ← Mi′
ci ←C′i
Figure 6.2: Cai et al.'s secret key update protocol
4. Reader: For the ith tag Ti, the reader calculates:
 C′i = h(K′ ‖ S′i)
 A = (Si′ ‖ Mi′) ⊕ h(0 ‖ ci)
 B =C′i ⊕ h(1 ‖ ci)
 C = h(ci ‖ S′i ‖ Mi′ ‖C′i)
5. Reader: The reader sends (A,B,C) to Ti.
6. Tag: After receiving (A,B,C) from the reader, Ti computes:
 (Si′ ‖ Mi′) = A ⊕ h(0 ‖ ci)
 C′i = B ⊕ h(1 ‖ ci)
If C = h(ci ‖ S′i ‖ Mi′ ‖C′i), the reader is authenticated. Then Ti updates its
values to:
 Si ← S′i
 Mi ← Mi′
 ci ←C′i
Cai et al. assumed that any place outside the manufacturing area is insecure. Cai
et al. claimed that their protocol is immune against location tracking, as the tag data
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are updated after a successful key recovery process. Thus, the tag will reply with new
data every time the reader queries it.
We found two attacks on their protocol were possible: desynchronisation attack and
location tracking. The attacks are shown below:
1. The intruder eavesdrops on a normal session between the tag and the reader.
2. The intruder captures the tag's values (Si, ci, and Mi).
3. The intruder blocks the A, B and C messages from reaching the tag, resulting
in an update of the tag's data on the reader but not on the tag. Therefore, the
reader will not authenticate this tag in future due to the mismatch between the
reader's and tag's data.
4. Since the tag does not receive any data from the reader,it will reply with the same
data (Si, ci, and Mi) for every query it receives, and these data can be used to
trace the tag's location.
5. The attacker can then replay the captured messages in another session, thus caus-
ing the tag to be updated with old values.
Therefore, Cai et al. protocol will not provide a mutual authentication between
the reader and the tag when a desynchronisation incident occurs. As a result
of such data desynchronisation, the tag will reply with the same values, thus
permitting tracking of the tag's location. In Section 6.4, we attempt to address
the weaknesses found in this work.
6.4 Enhancing the Key Distribution Model in the RFID-
Enabled Supply Chains
In order to solve the security problems found in previous works while maintaining their
merits, we propose a secure key management and recovery model as an enhancement
to the Juels et al.'s model and Cai et al.'s secret key update protocol. Our proposal is
illustrated below.
6.4.1 Design Goals
Juels et al.'s scheme does not preserve the tag's location privacy, and is prone to tag
impersonation attacks. Cai et al.'s protocol is also vulnerable to location tracking and
desynchronisation attacks. Therefore, our proposed model should avoid such vulnera-
bilities and meet the following goals:
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 Privacy: The designed scheme must achieve three important goals related to
privacy, namely:
 Tag anonymity: RFID tags should provide a mechanism for preventing the
tag information from being revealed to any malicious entity. For example,
encrypting the tag's reply will only allow an authorised entity to decrypt it,
such as a server.
 Untraceability: If the data being sent from the tag to the reader is static or
linked to data sent previously, the tag holder's location can be tracked with-
out his/her knowledge. Therefore, the RFID tag's data should be anonymous
and unlinkable.
 Forward secrecy: The proposed protocol should ensure that if an attacker
compromises the tag's memory, he/she will not be able to trace previous
communication session(s) using previously known messages.
 Security: The designed protocol should resist the following attacks:
 Replay attacks: The adversary may eavesdrop on the communication be-
tween a reader and tag, reuse the data and send it repeatedly.
 Desynchronisation incidents: The adversary may eavesdrop on the commu-
nication between a reader and tag, and block messages from reaching their
target, thus causing a data desynchronisation between the tag and server if
there is an update process.
 Tag and server impersonation attacks: The attacker may send a message
to the server that claims to come from a legitimate tag, and this message
fabrication enables the attacker to masquerade as a legitimate tag. The same
applies to the server impersonation.
 Mutual authentication: The scheme should provide a mutual entity authentica-
tion, where the communication should take place between valid tags and server,
and provide assurance to the receiver (server) about the identity of the sender
(tag) and vice versa.
 Performance: The tag's memory storage space, and the computing cost should be
appropriate to the tag's limited resources.
 Flexibility: The proposed model should allow all the distributor centres that
participate in the supply chain to change the threshold parameters according to
the new groups of products re-packaged into larger or smaller cases.
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6.4.2 System Scenario
The general structure of our proposal is as follows:
1. Manufacturer initialisation process: To dispatch the products to the next dis-
tributor, the manufacturer generates a secret key for the products, speciﬁes the
threshold, and divides it into shares. Then, the manufacturer stores one share
in each product's tag. Finally, it dispatches the tagged items to the distributor
centre.
2. Distributor key recovery process: The distributor collects the required number of
shares to recover the secret key for identifying the products. Then, it generates a
new secret key and divides it into new shares, and speciﬁes a new threshold based
on the aggregated/disaggregated products.
3. Distributor secret key update process: After specifying the new threshold to recover
the new secret key, the distributor updates the tags' stored data with the new
shares and encoded-IDs, where encoded-IDi = ID-Tagi = EKT {IDi}
4. Retailer key recovery process: The retail shop recovers the secret key by collecting
the required number of shares to identify each tagged product.
6.4.3 Assumptions
The proposed system in this chapter operates under the following assumptions:
 Passive tags are capable of computing XoR operation, generating a pseudo-random
number and calculating hash functions.
 The reader contacts the tag through a wireless channel that is susceptible to
attacks.
 The communication channel between the reader and the server is secure.
 The tags can be read by a single reader upon arrival.
 The tag's data is stored in a non-volatile memory, such as EEPROM or Flash
memory, where they can be updated.
 The number of shares should be large to prevent the attacker from obtaining the
tag's ID using the recovered secret key.
 All the operations in the tag are atomic.
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6.4.4 Threat Model
We use the Dolev-Yao adversary model [67], where the adversary has powerful resources
to control the communication channel by performing the following:
 Eavesdropping
 Modifying messages
 Blocking messages from reaching targets
 Replaying previous messages
 Injecting new messages (forgery)
 Impersonating any entity
6.4.5 Protocol Description
We propose a secure and ﬂexible key distribution and recovery model for use in the
RFID-enabled supply chains. The proposed scheme is described below:
A. Manufacturer initialisation process:
The main goal of this process is to protect tags' transmitted IDs from being revealed
to any entities except the legitimate distributors and retailers. The manufacturer
does the following:
(a) The manufacturer generates a random number (R1).
(b) The manufacturer calculates KT=h(R1), where KT is the secret key for the
products to be dispatched to the next distributor.
(c) The manufacturer speciﬁes the threshold (k, n) for recovering the (KT ) secret
key, then splits KT into n shares (Sn) using the threshold scheme discussed in
Section 6.2, and stores one share (Si) in the ith product's tag.
(d) For each tag Ti, the manufacturer computes Ci=h(KT ⊕ Si) and stores Ci in
Ti's memory for authenticity purpose.
(e) To ensure privacy of the tag's data, such as the tag's ID during transmission in
insecure environments, the manufacturer encrypts each ith tag's ID value and
stores it in the tag's memory, i.e., ID-Tagi=EKT {IDi}, where EKT represents
a symmetric key encryption using KT . The tag also stores its IDi.
(f) The manufacturer dispatches the tagged products to the next distributor.
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B. Distributor key recovery process:
In this section, we discuss the key recovery process when all the products reach the
distributor. The distributor uses the threshold scheme to recover the secret key
(KT ), decrypts the encoded-ID (ID-Tagn), and obtains the IDn values, where n is
the total number of products.
 Reader: When the distributor ensures that all the expected products have
arrived, the reader scans the products' tags.
 Tag: Each tag sends (Si, Ci, ID-Tagi) to the reader.
 Reader: The reader collects k shares, and sends the collected shares and the
tags' messages (Cn, ID-Tagn) to the server.
 Server: The server recovers the secret key (KT ) based on the received collected
shares.
 Server: The server decrypts ID-Tagi for each product's tag to retrieve the tag's
ID value.
 Server: The server re-calculates Ci=h(KT ⊕ Si) for each tagged product to
authenticate it. Then, it performs the next step.
C. Distributor secret key update process:
The main goals of updating the secret key and the threshold are to prevent location
tracking and counterfeiting attacks. If Si, Ci and ID-Tagi are ﬁxed, the attacker
will be able to trace the location of the tag and/or obtain such data to counterfeit a
legitimate tag. The secret key update process is shown in Table 6.2. For simplicity,
in Table 6.2 we refer to the server as a reader and a server.
Once the server has recovered the secret key, and obtained IDi for each product's
tag Ti as shown above, it does the following:
1 Server: The server generates a random number (R1), and sends it to the tag. The
tag then generates a random number (R2), and sends it back to the server.
2 Server: The server generates a random number (R), then, calculates K′T=h(R),
where K′T is the new secret key for the products.
3 Server: For each tag, the server computes ID-Tag2i=EK′T {IDi} for the i
th tag in
the system.
4 Server: It speciﬁes the new threshold parameters (knew, nnew) based on the num-
ber of the new group of products to be dispatched, then divides K′T into n new
shares (S′n).
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5 Server: It calculates C′i=h( K′T ⊕ S′i) for each ith tag.
6 Server: To distribute the new values of S′i and C′i securely for the ith tag, the
server acts as follows:
 Calculates M1= h(IDi ⊕ ID-Tag2i ⊕ R1 ⊕ R2 ⊕ Ci) ⊕ S′i.
 Calculates M2= h(S′i ⊕ IDi ⊕ R1 ⊕ R2) ⊕ C′i.
 Calculates M3= h(S′i ⊕ IDi ⊕ R1 ⊕ R2 ⊕ C′i).
 Sends M1, M2, M3, and ID-Tag2i to the tag via the reader.
7 Tag: When the tag receives the messages, it obtains S′i and C′i by calculating:
S′i= M1 ⊕ h(IDi ⊕ ID-Tag2i ⊕ R1 ⊕ R2 ⊕ Ci)
C′i= M2 ⊕ h(Si′ ⊕ IDi ⊕ R1 ⊕ R2)
Then, the tag authenticates the server by re-calculating M3. If there is a match,
the tag guarantees that the server has successfully recovered the secret key, de-
crypted ID-Tag2i, and obtained IDi. Subsequently, the tag updates its values
to:
Si ← S′i
ID-Tagi ← ID-Tag2i
Ci ←C′i
8 Tag: To inform the server that the tag has received the new data, it calculates
M4= H(IDi ⊕ Si ⊕ Ci ⊕ R1 ⊕ R2), where Si and Ci are the updated values, and
sends M4 to the reader.
9 Reader: The reader sends M4 to the server.
10 Server: The server then re-calculates M4. If there is a match, the server guarantees
that the tag has updated its values successfully, and sends an OK message to the
reader.
11 Once the tags are embedded with the new data and arranged in the new group,
the distributor dispatches them to the next receiver (distributor or retailer).
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Table 6.2: Distributor secret key update process
Server Tagi
1- Generates R1
R1−−→
R2←−− 1- Generates R2
2- Generates R, calculates K′T=h(R)
3- Encrypts
ID-Tag2i=EK′T {IDi}
4- Speciﬁes new threshold, and divides K′T
into new n shares
5- C′i=h( K′T ⊕ S′i)
6- Generates R2
Computes:
M1=h(IDi⊕ID-Tag2i⊕R1⊕R2⊕Ci)⊕S′i
M2= h(S′i⊕IDi⊕R1⊕R2)⊕C′i
M3= h(S′i⊕IDi⊕R1⊕R2⊕C′i)
M1,M2,M3,ID−Tag2i−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
7- Computes:
S′i=M1⊕h(IDi⊕ID-Tag2i⊕R1⊕R2⊕Ci)
C′i=M2⊕h(S′i⊕IDi⊕R1⊕R2)
Re-calculates M′3
If M′3==M3, updates its values to:
Si ← S′i
ID-Tagi← ID-Tag2i
Ci←C′i
8- Calculates:
M4=h(IDi⊕Si⊕Ci⊕R1⊕R2)
10- Recalculates M4
M4←−−
If there is no match with the received M4 message, or if the reader does not receive
M4 from the tag, the reader starts the resynchronisation process as shown below:
(a) Server: To re-distribute (S′i, C′i) securely for the ith tag, the server acts as
follows:
 Generates a new random number (R3), and sends it to the tag. The tag
generates a random number (R4), and sends it to the server.
 Computes M5= h(IDi ⊕ ID-Tag2i ⊕ R3 ⊕ R4 ⊕ Ci) ⊕ S′i.
 Computes M6= h(Si′ ⊕ IDi ⊕ R3 ⊕ R4) ⊕C′i.
 Calculates M7= h(S′i ⊕ IDi ⊕ R3 ⊕ R4 ⊕ C′i).
 Sends a resynchronization request with M5, M6, M7, and ID-Tag2i to the
tag.
(b) Tag: When the tag receives the resynchronisation request, M5, M6, M7, and
ID-Tag2i, it re-computes M5, and M6 as in step C7 above.
i. If the received values of S′i, ID-Tag2i and C′i are equal to the current
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values of Si, ID-Tagi and Ci, the tag assumes that M4 did not reach the
reader, and keeps the values the same without update.
ii. If the received values of S′i, ID-Tag2i and C′i are not equal to the current
values of Si, ID-Tagi and Ci, the tag re-computes M7, and if there is a
match, it updates its values to:
Si ← S′i
ID-Tagi ← ID-Tag2i
Ci ←C′i
(c) Tag: The tag calculates M8= H(IDi ⊕ Si ⊕ Ci ⊕ R3 ⊕ R4) and sends it to
the reader to inform the reader that it received the new values. The process is
iterated until it reaches an upper limit set by the system owner. If it reaches the
upper limit, the reader should issue an error message that requires attention.
D. Retailer key recovery process:
At this stage, the retailer wants to authenticate all the required products' tags and
retrieve their ID values. It recovers the secret key KT to obtain the ID values from
each tag.
The retailer key recovery process is summarised below:
(a) Reader: When the retail shop conﬁrms that all the expected products have
arrived, the reader scans the products' tags.
(b) Tag: Each tag sends (Si, Ci, ID-Tagi) to the reader.
(c) Reader: The reader sends the the collected shares and tags' messages (Sn, Cn,
ID-Tagn) to the server.
(d) Server: The server recovers the secret key (KT ).
(e) Server: The server re-calculates Ci for each tagged product to authenticate it.
(f) Server: The server decrypts ID-Tagi for each product's tag using the recovered
secret key (KT ) to retrieve the ID value.
6.5 Protocol Analysis
In this section, the proposed protocols are analysed informally and formally as shown
below.
6.5.1 Informal Protocol Analysis
The proposed protocol meets the following goals:
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 Tag anonymity: The aim of the proposed model is to protect the tag's ID, which is
128-bit long. The value of tag's ID is protected by encrypting it with a secret key.
This key is not openly distributed, and is not stored in the participants' database.
Also, the tag does not maintain the secret key in its memory. Moreover, it will
take up to 2128 attempts to guess the secret key value.
 Untraceability: The tag's values of Si, ID-Tagi and Ci are updated after each
successful key recovery process, so the tag's responses will be diﬀerent for every
reader query. Hence, the attacker cannot track the tag's location. Moreover, the
responses contain random numbers that are freshly generated in each session. The
resynchronisation process plays an important role in preventing location tracking,
as the reader keeps resending the new updated data until it conﬁrms that the tag
has successfully changed its data.
 Forward secrecy: In the proposed protocol, even if the attacker compromises
the tag's memory and obtains the values of (Si, ID-Tagi, Ci), he/she cannot re-
compute the previous values, as they are calculated using a secret key only known
to the legitimate parties.
 Protection against replay attacks: All the messages transmitted in the communi-
cation channel are updated with new values and include fresh random numbers.
Hence, the attacker cannot re-send the obtained messages. Our protocol uses a
challenge-response scheme. In messages M1, M2 and M3, the server sends the
tag's data, in which the server's random number R1 is included as a challenge.
The tag must therefore include the server's random number (R1) in its response
(M4). Similarly, the tag sends a challenge (R2) to the server, therefore, the server
must include the tag's challenge (R2) in its responses (M1, M2, M3). Hence, only
legitimate parties (server and tag) can send valid answers, since random numbers
are sent with secret values only known to the server and tag.
 Protection against desynchronisation incidents: The new secret update protocol
addresses the realistic scenario in which messages might not reach their intended
recipient due to accidental or malicious interference. If the reader does not receive
M4 from the tag, the reader will assume that the tag did not receive the reader's
messages, or that M4 was lost during transmission, so the reader will start the
resynchronisation process. Similarly, if the resynchronisation messages are blocked
or M8 is lost, after timeout the reader will restart the resynchronisation process
until it reaches an upper limit set by the system owner.
 Protection against server impersonation attacks: An attacker may attempt to
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impersonate the server and update the tag with incorrect values. However, the
attacker cannot calculate M1, M2 and M3, as they involve a secret value, (IDi),
that is 128-bit long and only known to the tag and the server. The tag's ID is
sent within a one-way hash function that is pre-image resistant.
 Protection against tag impersonation attacks: The attacker cannot send M4 on
behalf of the tag, as it involves three secret values unknown to the attacker (IDi,
Si, Ci), and they are not sent in clear; they are sent within a one-way hash
function.
 Mutual authentication: The proposed protocol allows the distributor's server to
access the tag and update the tag's data by sending authentication messages M3,
which conﬁrm that the server has successfully recovered the secret key and has
obtained the right value of (IDi). Similarly, the tag also sends M4, which conﬁrms
to the server that a legitimate tag has successfully changed the values of Si, IDi
and Ci, which can only be obtained by a legitimate tag equipped with a valid IDi
and Ci values.
 Flexibility: In our model, any distributor party in the supply chain can gener-
ate new secret-sharing parameters (knew,nnew). Thus, a downstream party may
choose knew≤k and nnew≤n to process a small group of tags, or choose knew≥k
and nnew≥n to process a large group of tags.
As shown in Table 6.3, Cai et al. [70] presented several issues that we have addressed.
Table 6.3: Security features comparison
Cai et al [70] Our protocol 6.4
Reader impersonation √ √
Tag impersonation √ √
Desynchronisation attack × √
Tag information privacy √ √
Untraceability × √
Replay attack × √
Forward security √ √
Mutual authentication × √
×: Means does not provide protection √: Means resists such an attack
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6.5.2 Formal Protocol Analysis
This section presents the formal analysis of the secret key update process using CasperFDR
[104] and Scyther [75] tools. The aim of this section is to prove that the data exchanged
between the tag and reader is protected.
CasperFDR Analysis of the Proposed Protocol
The intruder's capability modelled in CasperFDR scripts for the proposed protocol is
shown below:
1. An intruder can impersonate any entity in the network.
2. An intruder can read and maintain the messages transmitted by each entity in
the network.
3. An intruder can intercept, analyse messages, and/or re-send any transmitted mes-
sages.
The script is shown in Appendix B.1. In the script we assumed that the key recovery
process is already achieved, and the reader has generated the new values of KT , Si, Ci
and ID-Tag. The deﬁned variables are:
S, Ti: Agent
R1, R2: Nonce
ID, Ci, IDProductnew, Snew, Cnew: Data
h: HashFunction
InverseKeys = (h,h)
The main goals of the key update process are to ensure that the value of tag's ID
is secret and the new shared values (Snew) and (Cnew) are transmitted securely to the
tag; this is depicted as follows:
Secret(S, ID, [Ti])
Secret(S, Snew, [Ti])
Secret(S, Cnew, [Ti])
We also specify the goal predicate Agreement(S, Ti, [ID]), where both the server
and tag are agreed on the value of IDi.
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The intruder is deﬁned to be Mallory, who knows all the entities, nonces, C message
and ID-Tag value as shown below:
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Serveri, Tagi, Mallory, R11, R22, R33, CTag, IDProductNew}
The CasperFDR tool evaluated the protocol and did not ﬁnd any attack(s).
Scyther Analysis of the Proposed Protocol
Similar to CasperFDR, the intruder is modelled using the channel (dy) [67]. The threat
model is deﬁned as an intruder, who has full control over the network, such that all
messages sent by agents can be eavesdropped by the intruder. Moreover, the intruder
may intercept, analyse, modify messages, and/or send any message he/she composes to
other agents pretending to come from a legitimate agent.
Two roles are identiﬁed in the script: a server (S) and a tag (Ti) as shown in Ap-
pendix B.2. The variables deﬁned are:
fresh ID: Data;
fresh Ci: Data;
fresh IDProductnew: Data;
fresh Snew: Data;
fresh Cnew: Data;
fresh R1 : Nonce;
var R2 : Nonce;
Each role speciﬁes the goals that the protocol attempts to meet. These goals are
within the Claim section. In the protocol, there are, for example, ﬁve Claim goals
speciﬁed in the tag role as follows:
claim_Ti1(Ti, Secret, ID), which means the value of the tag's ID should remain secret.
claim_Ti2(Ti, Secret, Snew), which means the value of Snew (the new generated share
(S′i)) should remain secret.
claim_Ti3(Ti, Secret, Cnew), which means the value of Cnew (the new generated share
(C′i)) should remain secret.
claim_Ti4(Ti, Alive), which means that the protocol run is fresh and the tag Ti is
alive.
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claim_Ti5(Ti, Niagree), which means that the tag Ti agree to the values of the vari-
ables.
claim_Ti6(Ti, Nisynch), which means that the messages must be executed in the ex-
pected order as speciﬁed in the speciﬁcation.
Similarly the goals speciﬁed in the server role are:
claim_S1(S, Secret, ID);
claim_S2(S, Secret, Snew);
claim_S3(S, Secret, Snew);
claim_S4(Si, Alive);
claim_S5(S, Niagree);
claim_S6(S, Nisynch);
After running the script, Scyther did not ﬁnd any feasible attack within bounds,
which means no attack was found within the bounded state space.
6.6 Protocol Implementation and Performance Measure-
ment
In this section, we present the implementation process of the distributor secret key up-
date process (successful run), and the performance measurement taken from DemoTag
after 100 runs.
6.6.1 Implementation Process
The tag is provided with two 128-bit secret values, IDi and Ci, which are stored in the
tag's EEPROM. The reader stores four 128-bit values, namely IDi, Si, ID-Tagi and Ci.
The reader generates a random number R1 (128-bit), and sends it to the tag using
8 WriteTagData_EPC_C1G2 commands. The tag generates a random number R2
(128-bit) using the built-in PRNG, and writes it in the memory to be read by the
reader. The reader reads the tag's random number, and generates a 128-bit random
number (R) using the rngCsp method and calculates the hash of (R) to generate the
secret key for the products ( K′T ). Then, it encrypts the ID-Tag value with this secret
key using the AES library built into the .Net framework. Following that, the reader
computes C′i. Subsequently, it computes 3 messages (M1, M2, M3) using the SHA256
library imported from the Crypto-avr-lib SHA 256 library. Finally, the reader sends
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M1, M2, ID-Tag and M3 (64-byte) to the tag by sending 32WriteTagData_EPC_C1G2
commands, each write command sends 2 bytes of data.
When the tag receives the reader's messages, it extracts S′i form M1 and C′i from
M2. Then, it re-computes M3 using the extracted values to authenticate the reader. If
there is a match with the received M3, it updates its values accordingly and uses the
updated values in the calculation of M4. Finally, the tag writes (M4) in its memory
using the syscall_writeWord command ready to be read on demand.
The reader later sends ReadTagData_EPC_C1G2 command to read M4, and re-
computes M4. If there is a match with the received M4, it authenticates the tag and
conﬁrms that the tag has updated its values successfully.
6.6.2 Performance Measurement
The performance measurements for the distributor secret key update process are as
follows:
1. DemoTag memory cost: In the proposed protocol, the memory cost is:
 348 bytes are used from the 4 KB EEPROM memory for storing the tag's
data, messages (responses), and random numbers.
 32.7 KB used from the 128 KB Flash memory to store the tag's ﬁrmware.
Table 6.4: Data exchange time cost
Tag Reader
Read - 160.66 ms
Write 1.8 ms 4.73 sec
2. Data exchange time cost is shown in Table 6.4: For the tag to write R2 and M4
into its memory to be read by the reader, the average timer counter after running
the protocol 100 times is 28809.74, so, based on equation 3.1, the time cost is:
28809.7 ∗ 0.0000000625 = 0.0018sec ≡ 1.8ms (6.1)
Regarding the reader, we found that the reader needs 4.73 sec to write R1, M1,
M2, M3, ID-Tag2 into the tag's memory, and 160.66 ms to read the whole tag's
responses.
3. DemoTag computing cost: In a successful run of the proposed protocol, the tag
generates a random number, computes four messages, writes the messages in the
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memory and updates two values. Table 6.5 demonstrates that the time cost of
running the protocol on the DemoTag is around 10.66 ms.
Table 6.5: Computing operations time cost (milliseconds)
M1 M2 M3 Update R2 M4 Write
Computing
cost
1.63 1.63 1.56 0.12 0.11 3.81 1.8
Total 10.66
The related works' protocols discussed in this chapter did not provide any perfor-
mance measurements, thus we could not present a performance comparison between
our protocol and other related work.
6.7 Summary
We proposed an improved version of a key distribution and recovery model in the
RFID-enabled supply chain. We found that the Juels et al.'s model is not ﬂexible as no
party other than the manufacturer can update the secret key threshold. Moreover, the
updated secret key model proposed by Cai et al. to improve the Juels et al.'s model
is not resistant against location tracking, and desynchronisation attacks. Hence in this
chapter, we proposed the following: Firstly, our scheme distributes a secret key securely
in an RFID-enabled supply chain by using the secret-sharing approach. Secondly, it
updates the secret key after each successful key recovery, and thus eliminates the threats
associated with location tracking. Thirdly, the proposed protocol avoids replay attack
by using fresh random numbers generated by the server and tags. Fourthly, to counter
the disruptive eﬀects of desynchronisation attacks, the protocol has a resynchronisation
phase that is initiated by the reader whenever it suspects a desynchronisation with the
tag. Fifthly, the proposed scheme permits the distributor to change the threshold based
on the dispatched items. Finally, the proposed protocol attempts to accommodate the
limited resources of the low-cost RFID tags in terms of storage and computational
costs. The proposal in this chapter suits a conventional RFID deployment with the
assumption of a secure server; however, many physical servers are being migrated to
cloud solutions; so we investigate this in the next chapter.
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Secure Improved Cloud-Based
RFID Authentication Protocol
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In this chapter we study and enhance a recent proposed protocol regarding the security
and privacy of RFID tag's data that resides in the cloud. Maintaining RFID tags'
data in the cloud reduces the cost of deployment and storage, but raises more concerns
regarding the security and privacy of RFID systems. Xie et al. proposed a cloud-based
RFID protocol that mitigates such concerns. Improvements to this study will be the focus
of this chapter. Our proposed protocol is analysed using CasperFDR and Scyther. Then,
we conclude this chapter with an illustration of the implementation and performance
measurements.
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7.1 Introduction
As already discussed in Chapter 2, a traditional RFID system consists of tags, a reader
and a server. The server is responsible for maintaining the tags' data and processing
them for various purposes. The server plays an important role in authenticating the
RFID tags' data, as the communication channel between the reader and tags is vul-
nerable to interception, modiﬁcation, fabrication and replay attacks. There have been
extensive studies attempting to achieve mutual authentication between the server and
tags, such as in [66, 95, 135, 136, 122, 39, 128, 130, 117].
In [130], the authors divided the proposed RFID mutual authentication proposals
into two approaches:
 Server-based RFID mutual authentication: In this approach, the tag and reader
depend on the backend server for authentication. When the reader receives a
message from the tag, it forwards the tag's message to the server to be authenti-
cated. The server stores secret data related to the tags. The researchers in this
case made the assumption that the server is secure, and their main focus was to
secure the data transmission between tags and readers.
 Server-less RFID mutual authentication: This approach takes into account an
oine authentication, where the reader authenticates the tag oine without the
need to contact the server. This scheme is normally used for searching for a
particular tag within a group of tags, and the reader does this process without
querying the server. A server-less RFID scheme is based on tag authentication
credentials previously stored in the reader. For instance, the reader contacts the
Certiﬁcation Authority (CA) during the initialisation phase to retrieve a list of
legitimate tags data.
A new approach, where the RFID tags data can be stored in a remote server residing
in the cloud, has gained increasing attention. According to the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) [138], cloud computing can be deﬁned as a model
for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of
conﬁgurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management eﬀort
or service provider interaction. Cloud computing provides a promising solution for
handling and using data collected with powerful computing and massive storage abilities
[131].
Conﬁdentiality and privacy are generally regarded as two of the main concerns in
cloud computing. This is largely due to the fact that customers outsource their data to
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cloud servers, thus losing direct control over their data, for example, customers' data
may be altered, lost, or deleted [140]. Considering the cloud as the processor and storage
for an RFID system, the tags' data should be protected against any malicious internal
or external attacks, such as the attacks on the cloud described in [133, 134, 141]. Data
privacy is also another critical concern, as customers' data is outsourced to a third
party, meaning that a customer's sensitive data is out of his/her control, and might be
disclosed to public or business competitors [139, 140]. To sum up, if cloud conﬁdentiality
is compromised, then privacy will also be violated [140].
To tackle the aforementioned concerns, the authors in [130] proposed a new scheme
called cloud-based RFID authentication, which provides the following features:
 It aims to address the conﬁdentiality and privacy concerns regarding RFID tags'
data in the cloud, where the cloud server is regarded as untrusted.
 The reader is connected to the tag through a wireless channel, where the commu-
nication between the reader and the cloud server is assumed to be secure.
 The manufacturer stores the tags' and readers' data in an encrypted hash table
in the cloud server.
The authors in [130] claimed that their proposed protocol resists reader-to-tag im-
personation attacks, as only the legitimate reader can compute the authentication
messages. Furthermore, they also claimed that their protocol preserves tag's data
anonymity by hashing the tag's data with a random number, which ensures conﬁ-
dentiality and freshness in all protocols' runs. Xie et al.'s protocol is discussed in detail
in Section 7.2.
We examined the cloud-based RFID authentication protocol [130], and discovered
the following:
1. An attacker is able to impersonate the reader without compromising the secret
data shared with the tag, thus causing the tag to be updated with a wrong value,
and permitting tracking of the tag's location.
2. By using CasperFDR, we found that tag data anonymity is not achieved, as the
attacker can perform a man-in-the-middle attack and obtain the secret data at
the end of the protocol session.
Hence, we propose a new protocol that uses some of the notions in [130] while in-
troducing new approaches that improve the cloud-based RFID authentication protocol.
Our improved cloud-based RFID authentication protocol is shown in Section 7.4.
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Table 7.1: A summary of notation
Notation Description
R The identity of an RFID reader
T The identity of an RFID tag
S The number of authentication sessions between a reader and a tag,
with bit length L
M The last number of sessions between a reader and a tag
Nr The random number generated by a reader
Nt The random number generated by a tag
PRNG() The Pseudo Random Number Generation (PRNG) function
H( ) The secure one-way hash function with output length L, that is, H():
{0,1}∗→{0,1}L
E( ) The encryption function using a symmetric algorithm with a reader
secret key
D( ) The decryption function using a symmetric algorithm with a reader
secret key
⊕ An XoR operation
‖ A concatenation operation
7.2 Review of the Cloud-Based RFID Authentication Pro-
tocol
This section reviews the cloud-based RFID authentication protocol as proposed in [130].
The notation used in the cloud-based RFID authentication protocol is shown in Table
7.1.
The cloud-based RFID authentication protocol consists of two processes: the regis-
tration process, and the authentication process, which are summarised below:
 Registration process:
The tag is encoded with three secret values: R, T and S. The manufacturer also
stores unique initialised records, i.e., {H(R‖T‖S) and E(R‖T‖S)} to the cloud
server. The authors assumed that the registration is secure and performed in a
closed environment.
 Authentication process:
The cloud-based RFID authentication protocol is shown in Fig. 7.1 and works as
follows:
1. Tag: The tag generates H(R‖T‖S) as an authentication request and sends it
to the reader.
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2. Reader: The reader sends the index message (H(R‖T‖S)) to the cloud, and
retrieves E(R‖T‖S) from the cloud's index table. Then, the reader decrypts
D(E(R‖T‖S)), veriﬁes R and obtains T and S.
3. Reader: The reader generates a random number (Nr) as a challenge to the
tag, and sends (Nr) to the tag.
4. Tag: The tag calculates H(R‖T‖Nr) as a response and generates a random
number (Nt) as a challenge to the reader.
5. Reader: The reader veriﬁes the tag's response, and if valid, the next step is
started; otherwise, the protocol is terminated.
6. Reader: The reader tries to read the next record indexed by H(R‖T‖(S+1))
from the cloud server and checks the integrity. If there is a valid record,
this implies that the tag has been desynchronized. The reader attempts to
read the S+2nd record indexed by H(R‖T‖(S+2)), until it ﬁnds the last valid
record.
7. Reader: The reader writes E(R‖T‖M′) with the index H(R‖T‖M′) into the
cloud server, where M′=M+1.
8. Cloud: The cloud sends H(R‖T‖M′) ⊕ H(E(R‖T‖M′)) to the reader to con-
ﬁrm that the update process has been successful.
9. Reader: The reader sends the authentication messages H(R‖T‖Nt) ⊕ M′,
and H(T‖R‖M′) to the tag.
10. Tag: The tag calculates H(R‖T‖Nt) XoRed with the received H(R‖T‖Nt) ⊕
M′ to obtain M′, and then it calculates and veriﬁes H(T‖R‖M′). If successful,
this implies that M′ has not been modiﬁed by an attacker, and subsequently
synchronisation is achieved again by updating S=M′ on the tag. The validity
of M′ also means that the reader is authenticated by the tag.
7.3 Security Analysis of the Cloud-Based RFID Authenti-
cation Protocol
In this section, we show the main weaknesses found in the cloud-based RFID authenti-
cation protocol.
7.3.1 Reader Impersonation Attack
In [130], the authors claim that their proposed protocol achieves a mutual authentication
between the tag and the reader, as only the legitimate reader knows the data (R, T,
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Cloud Reader Tag
1−H(R‖T‖S)←−−−−−−−−−−
2−H(R‖T‖S)←−−−−−−−−−−
2-Find H(R ‖ T ‖ S) and
E(R ‖ T ‖ S)
2−E(R‖T‖S)−−−−−−−−−→
2-Decrypts
E(R‖T‖S), veriﬁes R
3−Nr−−−−→
4−H(R‖T‖Nr),Nt←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
5-Veriﬁes H(R‖T‖Nr)
6−H(R‖T‖(S+1))←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
6-Absence of
H(R‖T‖(S+1)) means
the last record is H(R‖T‖S)
6−E(R‖T‖S)−−−−−−−−−→
7−H(R‖T‖M′)←−−−−−−−−−−− 7-Notiﬁes Cloud to
update
7−E(R‖T‖M′)←−−−−−−−−−−−
8-The new record is up-
dated
8−H(R‖T‖M′)⊕−−−−−−−−−−−−→
H(E(R‖T‖M′))−−−−−−−−−−−→
9-Checks Cloud's
messages
9−H(R‖T‖Nt)⊕M′−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
9−H(T‖R‖M′)−−−−−−−−−−−→
10-Calculates:
H(R‖T‖Nt)
to obtain M′
10-Veriﬁes
H(T‖R‖M′)
10-If success-
ful, updates
S=M′
Figure 7.1: Cloud-based RFID authentication protocol
M). However, we found that the attacker can impersonate a legitimate reader and be
successfully authenticated by the tag without compromising the internal tag's data.
The scenario for accomplishing this attack is as follows:
 Eavesdrops one session of the protocol, blocks the reader's message from reach-
ing the tag and obtains all the exchanged messages including N and G, where
N=H(R‖T‖Nt) ⊕ M, and G=H(T‖R‖M). As a result, the tag will not update the
(S) value, hence the attacker will track the tag's location in subsequent sessions.
 The tag starts a new session with the reader, and sends H(R‖T‖S) to the reader.
 The reader sends a new random number (Nr′) to the tag.
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 The tag generates a new random number (Nt′) and sends H(R‖T‖Nr′) and Nt′ to
the reader.
 After the reader authenticates the tag, it asks the tag to update its value by
sending
N′=H(R‖T‖Nt′) ⊕ M′, and G′=H(T‖R‖M′), where M′=S+1.
 The attacker blocks N′ and G′, and calculates the following:
1. Since M′ = M + 1, the attacker changes the 2 least signiﬁcant bits (LSB) of
N to be equivalent with N′ after addition, and then assigns the result to N′′.
In other words, if for example N is 111000 and N′ is 101011, the attacker
changes N to 111010 and assigns it to N′′.
2. N′′ ⊕ N′= H(R‖T‖Nt) ⊕ M′′ ⊕ H(R‖T‖Nt′) ⊕ M′
3. (N′′ + 1) ⊕ N′= (H(R‖T‖Nt) ⊕ M′′ + 1) ⊕ H(R‖T‖Nt′) ⊕ M′. Note that
M′′+1= M′.
4. (N′′ + 1) ⊕ N′= H(R‖T‖Nt) ⊕ H(R‖T‖Nt′)
5. (N′′ + 1) ⊕ N′ ⊕ N=(H(R‖T‖Nt) ⊕ H(R‖T‖Nt′)) ⊕ H(R‖T‖Nt) ⊕ M
6. (N′′ + 1) ⊕ N′ ⊕ N=H(R‖T‖Nt′) ⊕ M
 The attacker impersonates the reader and sends H(R‖T‖Nt′) ⊕ M and the ob-
tained G, i.e., G=H(T‖R‖M) to the tag.
 The tag calculates H(R‖T‖Nt′) XoRed with the received H(R‖T‖Nt′) ⊕ M to ob-
tain M, then calculates and veriﬁes H(T‖R‖M); if successful, the tag authenticates
the attacker not the legitimate reader and updates S with the wrong value.
7.3.2 Man-in-the-Middle Attack
In Xie et al.'s protocol, the value of (M), which represents the session number, should
be kept secret. However, after analysing the protocol using CasperFDR, we found that
the attacker can obtain the secret session number (M), thus tag data anonymity is not
achieved.
We used CasperFDR to formally analyse the cloud-based RFID authentication pro-
tocol between the reader and the tag. CasperFDR was used to model communication
and security protocols and verify the authentication and secrecy requirements of the
protocol, which are the main goals of the Xie et al.'s protocol.
We prepared a CasperFDR script as shown in Appendix C.1. In the script, we
assume that the reader knows about the tag's data. The communication between the
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reader and server is secure, therefore we did not check the protocol in this area. In the
#Free variables Section, the reader (R) and tag (T) are deﬁned as Agent; the random
numbers (Nr) and (Nt) are deﬁned as Nonce; and TID (tag identiﬁer), RID (reader
identiﬁer), S, and M are deﬁned as Data.
#Free variables
T, R : Agent
Nr: Nonce
Nt: nonce
TID, RID, S, M: Data
h: HashFunction
InverseKeys=(h,h)
As mentioned in Section 7.2, the main goals of the cloud-based RFID authentication
protocol are authenticating the reader to the tag, and vice versa, and verifying that the
data, such as R, T, S and M, remain secret between the reader and tag. These goals
are shown in the script in the #Speciﬁcation Section, where data secrecy is depicted as
Secret, such as Secret(R, M, [T]), and the goal predicate authentication takes the form
of Agreement:
#Speciﬁcation
Agreement(T, R, [TID, RID])
Secret(R, M, [T])
Secret (T, S, [R])
Secret (T, TID, [R])
Secret(T, RID, [R])
After compiling the CasperFDR script and feeding the output to the veriﬁer tool
FDR, a man-in-the-middle attack was found. FDR states that the goal predicate Se-
cret(R, M, [T]) was not achieved. The attack is illustrated below:
1. T → Mallory : H(R ‖ T ‖ S)
2. Mallory → R: H(R ‖ T ‖ S)
3. R → Mallory : Nr
4. Mallory → T : Nr
5. T → Mallory : H(R‖T‖Nr), Nt
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6. Mallory → R : H(R‖T‖Nr), Nr
7. R → Mallory : N=H(R‖T‖Nr)⊕M, G=H(T‖R‖M)
The attacker performs a man-in-the-middle attack and eavesdrops on a session be-
tween the tag and the reader. The attacker impersonates the reader to obtain the
tag's messages, and then impersonates the tag to send the tag's messages to the reader.
CasperFDR shows that the attacker can replace the tag's random number (Nt) with
the reader's generated random number (Nr), and at the end of the protocol run, the
attacker can calculate M=H(R‖T‖Nr)⊕ N and obtain M, which is assumed to be secret;
thus, tag's data privacy is compromised.
As a result, in Section 7.4, we propose a new improved cloud-based RFID authenti-
cation protocol that prevents reader impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks and
takes into account other goals discussed in the next Section 7.4.1.
7.4 Improved Cloud-Based RFID Authentication Protocol
In this section, we explain the proposed protocol in detail.
7.4.1 Design Goals
The proposed protocol aims to protect the tag's data from being revealed to any entity
except a legitimate reader. The proposed protocol should meet the following goals:
 Tag data anonymity: The RFID tag should support a mechanism for concealing
the tag's data from any entity except the legitimate readers.
 Untraceability: If the data being sent from the tag to the reader is static or linked
to data sent previously, the tag holder's location can be tracked. Therefore, the
RFID tag's responses should be anonymous and unlinkable in order to prevent
such an attack.
 Forward secrecy: The proposed protocol should ensure that if an attacker compro-
mises the tag's memory, he/she will not be able to trace previous communication
session(s) using previously known messages.
 Resistance to replay attacks: An adversary may eavesdrop on the communication
between the reader and tag, re-use the data and send it repeatedly. Therefore,
the generated messages should be fresh to the protocol session.
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 Resistance to desynchronisation incidents: The proposed protocol should recover
from de-synchronisation incidents, either when an attacker blocks the exchanged
message(s), or when the messages are lost during transmission due to system
malfunction or communication error.
 Resistance to impersonation attacks: An attacker can respond to a reader query
and can claim that this response is coming from a legitimate tag, and this fabrica-
tion enables the attacker to masquerade as a legitimate tag. Similarly, an attacker
may impersonate the legitimate reader and attempt to obtain access to the tag's
data. Hence, to prevent such attacks, the tag's data should be protected during
transmission.
 Mutual authentication: The protocol should provide a mutual entity authentica-
tion, where the communication should take place between valid tag, reader and
cloud server. The readers should authenticate the cloud server before validat-
ing the tag's messages. At the end of the protocol run, the tag should receive a
message from the reader that conﬁrms the legitimacy of the reader.
 Performance: The tag's memory storage and the computing cost should be ap-
propriate to the tag's limited computing capability, and the amount of data com-
municated should be minimised.
7.4.2 Assumptions
We present an improved cloud-based RFID authentication protocol, which operates
under the following assumptions:
 The reader contacts the tag through a wireless channel that is susceptible to
attacks.
 The communication channel between the reader and the cloud server is secure.
 There are multiple readers in the system, so a tag can be read in many diﬀerent
locations.
 This scheme only supports readers that are tamper-resistant, for example, they
have a secure memory and a rigid access control mechanism.
 The tag's data are stored in a non-volatile memory, such as EEPROM or Flash
memory, where they can be updated.
 All the operations in the tag are atomic.
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 The cloud server is not trusted; it might be compromised to reveal the tag's data
to intruders or competitors, and/or internal employees.
7.4.3 Protocol Design
The main protocol features are discussed below:
 Tags are capable of computing XoR, generating a pseudo-random number and
calculating hash functions.
 The reader can compute XoR, generate a pseudo-random number, calculate hash
functions and perform symmetric encryption and decryption.
 The proposed protocol uses random numbers in an attempt to prevent location
tracking and replay attacks.
 After a successful authentication between the cloud server and tag, both parties
update their values to be used in the next transaction.
 The cloud server does not store the tag's ID and the tag's secret key; it stores the
hash of the tag's ID and the encryption of the tag's ID and tag's secret key to
provide conﬁdentiality and anonymity to the tag's data in the cloud.
 The cloud server stores both the old and the new tag's data in order to prevent
desynchronization incidents.
 Each legitimate reader contains a master key used for a symmetric encryption.
 The reader does not store any data related to the tags.
7.4.4 Threat Model
We consider that the communication between the reader and the tag is vulnerable to
both passive and active attackers. Accordingly, we used the Dolev-Yao adversary model
[67], where the adversary has powerful resources to control the communication channel
by performing the following:
 Eavesdropping
 Modifying messages
 Blocking messages from reaching targets
 Replaying previous messages
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Table 7.2: Protocol notation
Notation Description
IDi The ith tag's ID, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Ki The ith tag's secret key
MK The master key shared by all the legitimate readers, and used for a
symmetric encryption and decryption
H(IDnew) A hash of the updated ID, H:{0,1}∗←{0,1}L
H(IDold) A hash of the old ID, H:{0,1}∗←{0,1}L
x The value kept as either new or old to show whether the tag uses the
old or new values of (IDi and Ki)
R1 A pseudo-random number generated by the reader
R2 A pseudo-random number generated by the tag
EMK(M) A message M encrypted with a master key
A ← B The value of A is updated to that of B
⊕ An XoR operation
‖ A concatenation operation
j The transaction number
i The number of the tag in the system
n The number of tags in the system
 Injecting new messages (forgery)
 Impersonating any entity
7.4.5 Notation
The notation used in the proposed protocol is presented in Table 7.2:
7.4.6 Protocol Description
The scheme consists of two phases: initialisation and authentication.
 Initialisation phase:
We assume that the initialisation phase is carried out via a secure channel in a
secure environment. The initialisation process is summarised below:
1. For each tag the system operator manages, the system operator assigns a
unique H(IDnew), which serves as an index, and EMK(IDnew ‖ Knew) in the
cloud server.
2. Initially, H(IDold), and EMK(IDold ‖ Kold) in the cloud server are set to null.
3. The system operator assigns IDi and Ki in the ith tag.
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4. The system operator assigns the master key in each reader the system man-
ages.
 Authentication phase:
The authentication process is shown in Table 7.2 and is described as follows:
1. Reader: The reader starts the session by generating a random number R1 of
L bits, where L is a security parameter, and sending it to the tag.
2. Tagi: The tag performs the following:
 Generates R2 of L bits.
 Computes the following messages:
HID=H(IDi ⊕ R1 ⊕ R2), which serves as an index message
M1=H(IDi ‖ Ki ‖ R1 ‖ R2), which serves as an authentication message
 Sends HID, M1 and R2 to the reader.
3. Reader: The reader sends HID, R1 and R2 to the cloud server.
4. Cloud server: The cloud server performs the following:
 For all the stored H(IDnew) and H(IDold), it searches for H(IDx ⊕ R1 ⊕
R2) until there is a match. Marks x=new or old based on the matched
H(IDi).
 Retrieves the associated data, i.e., EMK(IDx ‖ Kx).
 Sends EMK(IDx ‖ Kx) and x to the reader.
5. Reader: The reader performs the following:
 Decrypts EMK(IDx ‖ Kx) using the master key, and obtains IDx and
Kx.
 Re-computes M1′=H(IDx ‖ Kx ‖ R1 ‖ R2). If there is a match, the
reader authenticates the tag. Furthermore, the reader conﬁrms that the
data within the server's message are correct, and authenticates the cloud
server.
If M1′==M1 and x=new, this implies that the tag's data are synchro-
nised with the server's data. The reader updates (IDnew and Knew), to
be used in the next transaction (j+1) by calculating the following:
IDj+1new ← H(IDji )
Kj+1new ← H(IDj+1new ⊕ Kji )
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Cloud Server Reader Tagi
1- Generates R1
R1−−−−−−−−−→
2- Generates R2
HID=H(IDi⊕R1⊕R2)
M1=H(IDi‖Ki‖R1‖R2)
HID,M1,R2←−−−−−−−−−
3−HID,R1,R2←−−−−−−−−−−
4- Searches for
H(IDx⊕R1⊕R2)
Marks x=new or old
Retrieves EMK(IDx‖Kx)
EMK(IDx‖Kx),x−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
5- Decrypts
EMK(IDx‖Kx)
Re-computes:
M1′=H(IDx‖Kx‖ R1‖R2)
If M1′==M1 and the x
value is new, then updates:
IDj+1new ← H(IDji )
Kj+1new ← H(IDj+1new ⊕ Kji )
Calculates H(IDj+1new) and
EMK(ID
j+1
new ‖ Kj+1new)
H(IDj+1new)←−−−−−−−−−
EMK(ID
j+1
new ‖ Kj+1new)←−−−−−−−−−
6- Writes:
H(IDnew)←H(IDj+1new)
EMK(IDnew‖Knew)←EMK(IDj+1new‖Kj+1new)
H(IDold)←H(IDjnew)
EMK(IDold‖Kold)←EMK(IDjnew‖Kjnew)
OK−−−−−−−−−→
7- Calculates:
M2=H(Kj+1new‖R1‖R2)
M2−−−−−−−−−→
8- Computes:
IDj+1i ←H(IDji )
Kj+1←H(IDj+1⊕Kj)
Re-calculates
M2′=(H(Kj+1‖R1‖R2),
then updates ID and
K
Figure 7.2: Improved cloud-based RFID mutual authentication protocol
 Calculates H(IDj+1new), and encrypts the new values, i.e., EMK(ID
j+1
new ‖
Kj+1new).
 Notiﬁes the server to update its values by sending:
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H(IDj+1new), and EMK(ID
j+1
new ‖ Kj+1new)
6. Cloud server: The cloud server performs the following:
 Writes the following data in its database:
H(IDnew) ← H(IDj+1new)
EMK(IDnew‖Knew) ← EMK(IDj+1new‖Kj+1new)
H(IDold) ← H(IDjnew)
EMK(IDold‖Kold) ← EMK(IDjnew‖Kjnew)
 Sends an OK message to notify the reader that the update process has
been successful.
7. Reader: The reader performs the following:
 If the reader received the OK message from the cloud server, the reader
notiﬁes the tag to update its data such as (IDnew, Knew) by calculating
M2=H(Kj+1new ‖ R1 ‖ R2) using the updated tag's secret key.
 Sends M2 to the tag.
8. Tagi: The tag performs the following:
 Computes IDj+1i ← H(IDji ) and Kj+1i ← H(IDj+1i ⊕ Kji ).
 Re-calculates M2′=(H(Kj+1i ‖ R1 ‖ R2), and if it is equal to the received
value of M2, then it authenticates the reader and updates IDi and Ki
to:
IDj+1i ← H(IDji )
Kj+1i ← H(IDj+1i ⊕ Kji )
If M1′==M1 and x=old, the reader still authenticates the tag, but this implies that the
tag's data has been desynchronised, thus the reader does not update the current values
of the ith tag (IDi and Ki). It sends no update to the server, and sends M2=H(K
j
new
‖ R1 ‖ R2) to the tag using the current value of the tag's secret key. Then, the tag
re-computes M2 using the current values. If there is a match with the received M2, the
tag authenticates the reader and updates its data, as shown in the previous step.
If there is no match with the received M2 using the current or updated values of
IDi and Ki, then the tag will not authenticate the reader, and will not update its data.
7.5 Protocol Analysis
In this section, we present the analysis of the proposed protocol in terms of informal,
and formal analysis using CasperFDR and Scyther.
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7.5.1 Informal Protocol Analysis
Our proposed protocol meets the following goals:
 Mutual authentication: If the reader successfully calculates the tag's responses
M1, it authenticates the tag, as only the legitimate tag knows the values of (IDi
and Ki) and thus can calculate such responses. Similarly, if the tag calculates M2
and it ﬁnds a match with the received M2, it conﬁrms that the reader has success-
fully recovered the values of (IDi and Ki). Furthermore, the reader decrypts the
server's message (EMK(IDx ‖ Kx)), and if the tag's message M1 is authenticated,
this implies that the cloud server is sending legitimate data within the message,
and hence the reader authenticates the server.
 Tag data anonymity: The tag stores two secret values, each of which is 128-bit
length: IDi and Ki, which are not revealed to any entity except the legitimate
readers. The tag's data are not sent in clear in messages HID, M1 and M2, as
they are protected using the hash function. Therefore, only the legitimate entity
can extract these values. Furthermore, if the cloud server is a malicious entity,
this will not aﬀect the tag's data privacy, as the cloud server stores the hash of
the tag's ID and the encrypted tag's data; and without the master key, the cloud
server cannot disclose the tag's data. Finally, the size of the data is 128-bit length,
which means that the attacker needs to make 2128 attempts to recover the secret
data.
 Tag location privacy (untraceability): In the proposed protocol, the tag's re-
sponses are changed in each session using the updated tag's values and fresh
random numbers (R1 and R2), thus the attacker will obtain new responses every
time he eavesdrops on a session. Even if the the tag does not update its values,
the responses will not be static due to the use of fresh random numbers R1 and
R2. However, the cloud server can track the location of the tag's holder.
 Forward secrecy: The values of IDi and Ki are updated after each run in order
to prevent forward secrecy invasion, using a hash function that is irreversible. If
an adversary compromises the tag's memory, he/she will not be able to trace the
previous communications of the tag as the obtained messages involve the use of
previous secret values IDi and Ki, which are not stored in the tag. The stored
updated values are used in the calculation of the next session, and cannot be
irreversible as a result of using a hash function.
 Resistance to replay attacks: The proposed protocol uses a challenge-response
scheme. In messages HID and M1, the tag includes the reader's and tag's fresh
112
random numbers as a challenge. The reader must therefore include R1 and R2 in
its response (M2). Therefore, only legitimate parties (reader and tag) can send
valid answers, since random numbers are sent with secret values only known to
the reader and tag.
 Resistance to desynchronisation incidents: In the proposed protocol, desynchro-
nisation incidents are avoided by storing the previous values of the tag's data
in the cloud server, hence achieving synchronisation. If the tag's data is being
desynchronised, the cloud server keeps the tag's data ﬁxed. For instance, if the
attacker blocks M2 more than once in consecutive sessions, the tag and cloud will
not update the tag's data. In the next session, the reader contacts the desynchro-
nised tag, and sends the tag's HID message to the cloud server, then the cloud
server ﬁnds a match with the tag's old data, and sends EMK(IDold ‖ Kold), as
HID matches H(IDold); thus synchronisation is still achieved.
 Resistance to tag and reader impersonation attack: To impersonate the tag, the
attacker must be able to compute a valid response (HID, M1) to a reader query.
However, it is hard to compute such responses without knowledge of IDi and Ki,
each of which is 128-bit length, and it will take up to 2128 attempts to guess
each value. Similarly, the attacker needs to be in possession of IDi and Ki to
impersonate the legitimate reader and send M2.
 Compromising the reader: The only risk that the system may encounter is com-
promising the reader, allowing the attacker to access the master key. However, in
the Assumption Section 7.4.2, we assumed that the proposed protocol only sup-
ports readers that are tamper-resistant; for example, they have a secure memory
and a rigid access control mechanism.
Table 7.3 shows how our proposed protocol provides more security and privacy features
than the cloud-based RFID authentication protocol. Based on the discovered weak-
nesses, we found that the cloud-based RFID authentication protocol is vulnerable to
reader impersonation attacks; hence mutual authentication is not achieved. Moreover,
we used CasperFDR to analyse the cloud-based RFID authentication protocol, and it
showed that an attacker can discover the secret value (M); hence the tag data anonymity
is compromised. Finally, if the tag does not update the value of (S), it will reply with
the same answer, and hence allows location tracking.
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Table 7.3: Comparison between the cloud-based RFID authentication protocol and
our proposed protocol
Cloud-based pro-
tocol [130]
Our proposed protocol
7.4
Tag data anonymity × √
Tag location privacy × √*
Resistance to replay attack
√ √
Resistance to desynchronisation
√ √
Resistance to tag impersonation
√ √
Resistance to reader impersonation × √
Mutual authentication × √
*: The cloud server can track the tag's location ×: Means does not provide protection √:
Means resists such an attack
7.5.2 Formal Protocol Analysis
To formally analyse the proposed protocol and conﬁrm that secrecy and authenticity
between the reader and tag are achieved, we used CasperFDR [104] and Scyther [75]
tools.
CasperFDR Analysis of the Proposed Protocol
We prepared a CasperFDR script as shown in Appendix C.2. In the script, we assume
that the reader knows about the tag's data. The communication between the reader
and server is secure, therefore we did not check the protocol in this area. In the #Free
variables Section, the tag (T) and reader (R) are deﬁned as Agent; the random numbers
R1 and R2 are deﬁned as Nonce; and ID (tag identiﬁer), K (tag key) are deﬁned as Data.
#Free variables
T, R : Agent
R1: Nonce
R2: nonce
ID,K : Data
h: HashFunction
InverseKeys=(h,h)
As mentioned in Section 7.4.1, the main goals of our protocol are authenticating the
reader to the tag, and vice versa, as well as verifying that the data, such as ID and K,
are secure. These goals are shown in the script in the #Speciﬁcation Section as shown
below:
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#Speciﬁcation
Agreement(T, R, [ID, K])
Secret (T, ID, [R])
Secret (T, K, [R])
In addition, in the #Intruder information Section, the intruder is deﬁned as Mallory,
who can take full control of the session; he/she can impersonate any entity in the
protocol, read messages transmitted in the network, intercept, analyse and/or modify
messages.
After compiling the CasperFDR script and feeding the output to FDR, CasperFDR
found no feasible attacks, which means that mutual authentication is achieved success-
fully between the reader and the tag, and the tag's data are protected and transferred
securely.
Scyther Analysis of the Proposed Protocol
Scyther performs a formal analysis of security protocols using a Dolev-Yao model [67]
for an unbounded number of instances. It is mainly used to verify the authenticity of
the messages exchanged between entities such as in the proposed protocol considered
here.
We conducted the analysis of our protocol with respect to three goals: secret, alive-
ness and agreement. The script is shown in Appendix C.3. Two roles are deﬁned,
namely a reader (R) and a tag (Ti). The random numbers R1 and R2 are deﬁned as
Nonce; and IDi (tag identiﬁer), Ki (tag key) are deﬁned as Data.
Both roles the reader and tag share the secret goal over the two secret values IDi
and Ki as follows:
claim_R1(R, Secret, IDi);
claim_R2(R, Secret, Ki);
claim_Ti1(Ti, Secret, IDi);
claim_Ti2(Ti, Secret, Ki);
Also both roles claim to be alive and shre the agreement goal as follows:
claim_R3(R, Alive);
claim_R4(R, Niagree);
claim_Ti3(Ti, Alive);
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claim_Ti4(Ti, Niagree);
claim_Ti5(Ti, Nisynch);
After compiling the Scyther script, it found no feasible attacks.
7.6 Protocol Implementation and Performance Measure-
ment
In this section, we present the implementation process and the performance measure-
ments taken from the DemoTag.
7.6.1 Implementation Process
The tag is provided with two 128-bit secret values: IDi and Ki, which are stored in
the tag's EEPROM. We did not implement the server side, so we assumed in the
implementation that the reader already knows IDi and Ki.
The reader starts by generating a 128-bit random number (R1) using the rngCsp
method. Then, it sends R1 to the tag by sending 8 WriteTagData_EPC_C1G2 com-
mands. When the tag receives the reader's random number, it generates a random
number R2 (128-bit) using the built-in PRNG, computes two messages, namely HID
and M1, each of which is 128-bit length. Subsequently, the tag writes the messages
(R2, HID, M1) in its memory using the syscall_writeWord command, ready to be read
on demand. The reader later sends three ReadTagData_EPC_C1G2 commands to
read R2, HID, and M1, and re-computes M1. If there is a match with the received
M1, it temporarily updates IDi and Ki, and uses them in the calculation of M2 (128
bits). Finally, the reader sends 8 WriteTagData_EPC_C1G2 commands to the tag
representing M2. The tag updates IDi and Ki and re-computes M2 to authenticate the
reader. If successful, the tag changes the values of IDi and Ki with the updated ones.
7.6.2 Performance Measurement
The performance measurements are as follows:
1. DemoTag memory cost: In the proposed protocol, the memory cost is:
 348 bytes used from 4 KB EEPROM memory for storing the tag's data,
messages (responses), and random numbers.
 32.7 KB used from 128 KB Flash memory to store the tag's ﬁrmware.
116
Table 7.4: Data exchange time cost
Tag Reader
Read - 1.23 sec
Write 1.3 ms 990 ms
2. Data exchange time cost is shown in Table 7.4: For the tag to write R2, HID
and M1 into its memory to be read by the reader, the average timer counter after
running the protocol 100 times is 20802.7, so, based on equation 3.1, the time
cost is:
20802.7 ∗ 0.0000000625 = 0.0013sec ≡ 1.3ms (7.1)
Regarding the reader, we found that the reader needs 990 ms to write the random
number R1 and M2 into the tag's memory, and 1.2 sec to read the whole tag's
response.
3. DemoTag computing cost: In a successful run of the proposed protocol, the tag
generates R2, computes three messages including data update, and writes mes-
sages in its memory. Table 7.5 demonstrates that the time cost of running the
protocol on the DemoTag is around 9.34 ms, which means that the tag can re-
spond to the reader's query in less than a second, and this demonstrates the
relative eﬃciency of the proposed protocol.
Table 7.5: Computing operations time cost (milliseconds)
R2 HID M1 M2 + Update Write
Computing cost 0.11 1.63 1.63 4.67 1.3
Total 9.34
7.7 Summary
In this chapter, we examined the cloud-based RFID authentication protocol, and found
that the protocol is prone to reader impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks.
Therefore, we proposed an improved cloud-based RFID authentication protocol that
avoids the cloud-based RFID authentication protocol security issues. The proposed
protocol has been analysed informally, and we showed that it is more immune to reader
impersonation attacks and can resist replay, desynchronisation, and tag impersonation
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attacks. Also, we illustrated that tag's data anonymity is preserved, and hence the
cloud server and attackers cannot obtain the tag's data. In addition, the communica-
tion session between the reader and the tag was formally analysed using CasperFDR
and Scyther, and found no feasible attacks. Finally, we showed that the proposed pro-
tocol imposes relatively low memory storage and computing costs on the RFID tags.
So far we have only considered security protocols where there is only one tag being read
at a time; however, we mentioned at the outset that a group of items may be presented
simultaneously for reading. Proving that a group of legitimate tags are present and
that there is no way for a fake tag to join the group is considered in the next chapter.
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Two Rounds RFID Grouping-Proof
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In this chapter, we focus on a particular RFID application called a grouping-proof,
where an entity such as a reader generates a proof of simultaneous presence of two or
more tagged items. We begin by discussing related studies and their weaknesses in terms
of security and performance. Then, we present a two rounds grouping-proof protocol that
provides immunity against active attacks on RFID protocols and improves performance.
An informal analysis is provided for the proposed protocol, followed by a formal analysis
using CasperFDR and Scyther. Finally, we describe the implementation of our protocol,
and then illustrate the performance measurements.
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8.1 Introduction
In 2004, Juels introduced a new RFID application called a yoking-proof (yoke means
joining things together) [106]. Yoking-proof can be deﬁned as proof of the simultaneous
presence of a pair of RFID tagged items in the broadcast range of an RFID reader
within a short time period. Since its introduction, the yoking-proof has evolved to
include multiple tags and is now known as the grouping-proof. In an RFID grouping-
proof, the generated record of the simultaneous presence of multiple tags is veriﬁed by
the server that processes the system tags' data.
There are two modes for verifying the existence of RFID tags; online and oine.
In the online mode, the server that veriﬁes the proof is running during the protocol
execution, while in the oine mode the server is not present during the scanning process.
Where the server is online, the solution is straightforward as each tag can authenticate
itself directly to the server. On the other hand, if the server is oine the solution is
challenging, as a fake tag may participate in the proof that is veriﬁed later, and the
tags' responses should be completed within a speciﬁed time-window [19].
A grouping-proof can be used in many systems including [142]:
 Hospitals: proving that a certain patient has been given his/her medications at
the same time.
 Manufacturing: proving that devices have been sold with their attachments.
 Access control: establishing that a group of people with legitimate RFID tokens
were present.
 Supply chains: proving that tagged products are shipped together in groups.
 Airport: associating an electronic passport with an owner or with any of his/her
luggage.
In such systems, the server, which can be an auditor or a veriﬁer, might not par-
ticipate in the scanning process. Since the server is oine during the scanning process,
unrelated tags might take part in the session. To solve this issue, a proof needs to be
generated, and at a later time, a server veriﬁes the simultaneous existence of the related
and legitimate tags along with other goals discussed in Section 8.3.1.
In a typical grouping-proof scenario where there are n RFID tags in the group
[143], the ith tag (Ti), i.e., 1 ≤ i ≤ n, sends a message (Mi) to the reader, then the
reader transfers Mi to the next tag (Ti+1) in the same group and waits for its response
(Mi+1). The reader repeats this operation n times. Finally, when the reader receives n
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Table 8.1: A summary of notation
Notation Description
S Server
R Reader
Ti The ith tag in the group, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Kx Entity x secret key
IDx The identity of entity x
MACKi(M) Keyed message authentication code for a message M
fKi A keyed pseudo-random function
rx A random number generated by entity x
TS Timestamp
sn Session number
n The number of tags in the group
responses, it creates the proof and sends it to the server to be veriﬁed later. Hence, the
number of rounds is proportional to the number of tags in the group.
In this chapter, we aim to propose a grouping-proof protocol that is secure against
active attacks on RFID protocols, and to improve the protocol's performance by pro-
viding the following features:
 Fewer rounds, to reduce time delay.
 Concurrency, where each tag does not need to wait for the Ti−1 message to re-
spond. Hence, dependency between tags is omitted. The tags only wait for the
reader's message before responding.
 Reading order independence, so the tags can be veriﬁed by the server in any order.
This approach reduces failure rates [18].
8.2 Related Work
This section reviews the literature regarding RFID yoking-proof and RFID grouping-
proof. For the rest of this section, we will use the notation summarised in Table 8.1.
8.2.1 Yoking-proof RFID Protocols
Starting with Juels' yoking-proof protocol [106], each ith tag Ti is embedded with an IDi
and a secret key Ki shared with the server. The tags are capable to generate random
number (ri) and compute an MAC function. Juels' protocol is depicted in Fig. 8.1.
When the reader generates the yoking-proof P1−2 for T1 and T2 for example, it sends
it later to the server to verify the simultaneous existence of T1 and T2.
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T1 Reader T2
Query←−−−−−
a= (ID1, r1)
a−→
Query,r1−−−−−−−→
m2=MACK2 [r1]
ID2,r2,m2←−−−−−−−−
r2←−−
m1=MACK1 [r2]
m1−−→
P1−2=(ID1, ID2, r1, r2, m1, m2)
Figure 8.1: Juels' yoking-proof protocol
In 2005, Saito et al. [144] discovered a replay attack against Juels' protocol [106].
They pointed out that the server does not provide any randomness to ensure the fresh-
ness of the reader's generated proof. Therefore, they proposed their own protocol that
combated replay attack using timestamps. The server veriﬁes the timestamp that is
included in both the tags' messages and the reader's generated proof.
However, Piramuthu [145] showed that Saito et al. protocol [144] is still vulnerable
to replay attack as the attacker can predict a timestamp for some future point in time,
and then replay it to interrogate another tag. Accordingly, Piramuthu proposed the use
of random numbers instead of timestamps to provide freshness to the tags' messages.
The server generates a random number (rS) and sends it to the reader. rS is used as
a seed to generate the tags' random numbers. Piramuthu protocol is depicted in Fig.
8.2. Piramuthu claimed that no secret data is transmitted in transit, and the data
transmitted is refreshed in every protocol run, hence his protocol achieves user privacy
and location privacy.
Server
rS ↓
T1 Reader T2
Query,rS←−−−−−−−
a= (ID1, r1)
a−→
Query,rS ,r1−−−−−−−−−→
m2=MACK2 [rS , r1]
ID2,r2,m2←−−−−−−−−
m2←−−
m1=MACK1 [m2,r1]
m1−−→
P1−2=(r1, r2, rS , m1, m2)
Figure 8.2: Piramuthu's yoking-proof protocol
According to Peris-Lopez [124], in Piramuthu's protocol, T2's random number (r2) is
122
not authenticated by T1, and this leads to a multi-session attack. This attack is shown
in Fig. 8.3. Firstly, the adversary eavesdrops on a normal communication session
between T1 and T2 to obtain the random numbers and m2 to be used later. Then,
the adversary impersonates the reader and interrogates tag Tx to generate a proof that
shows that T2 and Tx were simultaneously scanned, which is not valid.
Server
rS ↓
T1 Reader T2
Query,rS←−−−−−−−
a= (ID1, r1)
a−→
Query,rS ,r1−−−−−−−−−→
m2=MACK2 [rS , r1]
ID2,r2,m2←−−−−−−−−
Adversary Tx
Query,m2,r1−−−−−−−−−→
mx=MACKx [m2, r1]
IDx,rx,mx←−−−−−−−−
Px−2=(rx, r2, rS , mx, m2)
Figure 8.3: A multi-session attack on Piramuthu's protocol
Chien et al. [147] proposed a yoking-proof that is based on a tree structure, where
each tag is a kin to a leaf on a tree and the tag's identity is the path from the root
to the leaf, to reduce the computational cost of authenticating each tag by the veriﬁer
from O(N) to O(1). Nevertheless, Peris- Lopez et al. [146], found that the Chien et
al.'s protocol was vulnerable to replay attacks.
8.2.2 Grouping-Proof RFID Protocols
The notion of grouping-proof was introduced by Saito et al. [144]. They proposed using
a pallet tag. The pallet tag (PT) can be a large metal plate, on which the products
can be placed. They assumed that the pallet tag has more computing resources than
normal tags and shares a secret key (KPT ) with the server. The idea behind Saito
et al.'s protocol is that the pallet tag gathers the tags' messages via the reader and
generates a proof that is veriﬁed by the server later. The reader acts as middleware
between the tags, pallet tag and server. The protocol is shown in Fig. 8.4.
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Server
TS ↓
Ti Reader PT
TS←−− TS−−→
m1=MACK1 [TS]
m1−−→ m1−−→
m2−−→ m2−−→
... ...
mn−−→ mn−−→
CP=EKPT [TS, m1, m2, ... , mn]
CP←−−
Pn=(TS,CP )
Figure 8.4: Saito et al.'s grouping-proof protocol
Bolotnyy et al. [148] enhanced Juels' work and extended the yoking-proof to include
groups of more than two tags. This scheme was introduced to preserve privacy of the
tags by transmitting the output of a keyed hash function instead of transmitting the
tags' static identiﬁers. Each tag generates a fresh random number and computes ai =
fKi [ri, ai−1], where (ai−1) represents Ti−1's message. This process continues until the
reader reaches the last tag Tn. The reader forwards Tn messages (an) to the ﬁrst tag
to link the tags' chain, and create proof, i.e., m = fK1 [a1, an]. Finally, the reader sends
the server message P, i.e., Pn = (r1, r2, ... , rn, m) for veriﬁcation purposes.
Peris-Lopez et al. [146] recommended some guidelines for designing a secure RFID
grouping-proof protocol, which are discussed in detail in Section 8.3.1. Accordingly,
they proposed an RFID grouping-proof protocol shown in Fig. 8.5. The tags within
a group share a group identiﬁer IDgroup and a group secret key Kgroup to prevent
unrelated tags from participating. The tags also store an identiﬁer (IDi) and a secret
key (Ki) to be authenticated by the server. The veriﬁer computes encrypted timestamps
TS=fKS (Timestamp), where KS , is the server's secret key. The generated timestamps
will be valid for a limited time-window. However, Peris-Lopez et al.'s protocol is suitable
only if there are only two tags in the system; if there are thousands of tags in the system,
their protocol is impractical as each tag has to wait for the predecessor's tag output to
include it in its response, producing a large time delay.
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Server
TS ↓
T1 Reader T2
TS=fKS
(Timestamp)
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Generates [rT1 ,r
′
T1
]
M1group=
PRNG(IDgroup⊕rT1⊕PRNG(Kgroup)⊕PRNG(TS))
MT1=
PRNG(IDT1⊕r
′
T1
⊕PRNG(K1)⊕PRNG(TS+1))
rT1
,r′T1 ,M
1
group,MT1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
rT1
,r′T1 ,M
1
group,MT1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Checks M1group
Generates [rT2 ,r
′
T2
]
M2group=
PRNG(IDgroup⊕PRNG(Kgroup)⊕rT2⊕
PRNG(M1group))
MT2=
PRNG(IDT2⊕r
′
T2
⊕PRNG(K2)⊕
PRNG(MT1 ))
rT2
,r′T2 ,M
2
group,MT2←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
rT2
,r′T2 ,M
2
group,MT2←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Checks M2group
m1−2=
PRNG(IDT1⊕MT1⊕PRNG(MT2 )⊕PRNG(K1+1))
m1−2−−−−−→
Proof:
P1−2=(IDT1 ,IDT2 ,TS,m1−2,r
′
T1
,r′T2 )
Figure 8.5: Peris-Lopez et al.'s grouping-proof protocol
Ma et al. [116] extended Peris-Lopez et al.'s grouping-proof protocol to include more
than two tags. According to Sundaresan et al. [142], Ma et al.'s protocol is prone to
forward secrecy invasion, and it relies on an active clock tag, which can be compromised
as it participates signiﬁcantly in the protocol.
All the previous protocols are sequential, where a tag must wait for a response from
the previous tag before it can proceed.
In contrast, proposals moved to designing a concurrent grouping-proof, where each
tag sends its authenticator message independently to the reader that generates the
proof. Burmester et al. [149] proposed a grouping-proof protocol, where the main
aim is that all the tags within the group share a group ID (IDgroup) and a secret key
(Kgroup), so the tags within the group will recognise each other, and can be linked by
the reader. Burmester et al.'s protocol is depicted in Fig. 8.6. There are three phases
in this protocol: the ﬁrst phase, where the reader challenges the tags with the server
random number, and the tags respond with their group ID. In the second phase, the
reader links the tags based on received the group ID. In the third phase, the tags prove
membership in their group. The ﬁrst and second phase are concurrent, but the last
phase is sequential, where each tag has to wait for the predecessor tag's message to
respond.
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Server
rS ↓
T1 Reader T2
rS←−− rS−−→
IDgroup,sn−−−−−−−−→ IDgroup←−−−−−−
Link T1 to T2
sn←−− sn−−→
aut1‖aut2=f (Kgroup,rS‖sn)
sn+1
aut1−−−→ aut1−−−→
aut′1‖aut′2=f (Kgroup,rS‖sn)
if aut′1 6=aut1
then timeout
else cnf2=f (K2,rs‖r2)
aut′2←−−−− aut
′
2,cnf2←−−−−−−−−
if aut2 6=aut′2 then timeout
cnf1=f (K1,rS‖r1)
cnf1−−−→
Pgroup=(rS ,r1,r2,IDgroup,sn,cnf1,cnf2)
Figure 8.6: Burmester et al.'s grouping-proof protocol
Peris-Lopez et al. [146], discovered that Burmester et al.'s protocol [149] is still
vulnerable to multi-proof replay attack as shown in Fig. 8.7. To achieve this attack,
the adversary eavesdrops on the communication channel between T1 and T2 ﬁrst. Then,
the adversary impersonates T1 and the captured messages are replayed to Tx to build
a counterfeit proof that deceives the server into thinking that T1 and Tx have been
scanned simultaneously.
Another scheme was proposed by Lien et al. [18], who introduced the idea of a
reading order independence system, which can be deﬁned as veriﬁcation of the proof
regardless of the order in which the tags were scanned. This approach reduces failure
rates. In other words, if the server assumes that the tags should be scanned in a
speciﬁc order, and the received proof contains tags' messages in random order, the
server proof will not match the received proof and the grouping-proof will fail. Lien et al.
protocol's uses a pallet tag (PT) to generate the proof. Reading order independence is
achieved using the XoR operator, which is commutative. When the pallet tag receives n
responses, it generates mPT=MACKPT [rS , rPT , m1 ⊕ m2 ... ⊕ mn], where mi=MACKi
[mPT , ri], and mPT=MACKPT [ri, rPT ], and sends it to the reader. The reader generates
proof, i.e., P=(rS , r1, r2, ... , rn, mPT ), and sends it to the server.
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T1 Reader T2
rS←−− rS−−→
IDgroup,sn−−−−−−−−−−→ IDgroup←−−−−−−−
Link T1 to T2
sn←−− sn−−→
aut1‖aut2=f (Kgroup,
rS‖sn)
sn +1
aut1−−−−→ aut1−−−−→
aut′1 ‖ aut′2= f (Kgroup, rS ‖sn)
if aut′1 6=aut1
then timeout
else cnf2=f (K2;rs‖r2)
aut′2←−−−− aut
′
2,cnf2←−−−−−−−−−
Adversary Tx
rS−−→
IDgroup←−−−−−−−
Link T1 to T2
sn−−→
aut1−−−−→
aut′1 ‖ autx= f (Kgroup, rS ‖sn)
if autx 6=aut′1
then timeout
else cnfx=f (Kx, rs‖rx)
autx,cnfx←−−−−−−−−
Pgroup=(rS ,IDgroup,sn,cnf1,
cnfx)
Figure 8.7: A multi-proof attack on Burmester et al.'s protocol
Sundaresan et al. [142] proposed a grouping-proof protocol that complies with the
EPCC1Gen2 standard. They claimed that their protocol resists well-known attacks on
RFID systems, and provides forward security, which is an open research issue in RFID
grouping-proof applications. Their protocol oﬀers forward secrecy, as the messages are
computed using a freshly generated random number that is not stored in the tag. Also,
the tag stores the current value of data, which is updated after each protocol run; the
old data is not stored. Hence, the adversary will not be able to compute the previous
messages even if a tag's memory is compromised. The proposed protocol uses simple
XoR and 128-bit PRNG operations. Moreover, the reader plays an important role
in authenticating the tags, thus providing extra protection against illegitimate tags.
However, we showed in Section 8.4.1 that Sundaresan et al.'s protocol is not eﬃcient
in terms of memory, computing costs, and server scalability. Server scalability in RFID
context refers to the workload on the server to retrieve a single tag should not be
proportional to the number of deployed RFID tags (O(n)).
All the above RFID grouping-proof protocols require n rounds to generate the proof.
Moriyama [143] proposed an RFID grouping-proof that requires only two rounds. Each
tag's message is independent from the other tags' messages and the reader communi-
cates with the tags only in two rounds. This proposal uses a PRF for generating the
messages. Moriyama's protocol is shown in Fig. 8.8. Moriyama claimed that his pro-
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tocol is immune against impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks. This approach
is eﬃcient in terms of performance as the proof can be generated in two rounds and
the computing cost is reasonable for RFID tags. However, Moriyama's protocol does
not provide forward secrecy; he assumed it is an open problem. Also, the tags reply
with their IDs to any reader that queries them, thus aﬀecting tags data anonymity and
location tracking.
Reader Ti
1,TS,rR−−−−−−→
Generates ri
mi=PRF (Kgroup, (TS, rR, IDi, ri))
rR,ri,IDi,mi←−−−−−−−−−−
Waits responses from all tags
mR=(TS,rR,{IDj ,rj ,mj}j∈Zn )
2,rR,mR−−−−−−→
Checks mj for all j ∈ Zn
vi=PRF (Ki, mR)
rR,vi←−−−−
PR=(TS,rR, {IDj ,rj ,mj ,vj}j∈Zn )
Figure 8.8: Moriyama's grouping-proof protocol
A comparison between such protocols in terms of security and tag's performance is
demonstrated in Table 8.3 and Table 8.4 respectively.
To conclude, we found that all the discussed related studies have weaknesses. Hence,
in the next section, we focus on proposing a grouping-proof protocol that takes into
account the strengths of previous protocols and avoids their deﬁciencies.
8.3 Two Rounds RFID Grouping-Proof Protocol
The proposed protocol is discussed in detail in this section.
8.3.1 Design Goals
For a protocol to support the RFID grouping-proof, it should meet the following goals:
1. Forward secrecy: The proposed protocol should ensure that if an attacker compro-
mises the tag's memory, he/she will not be able to trace previous communication
session(s) using previously known messages.
2. Protection against replay attacks: An adversary may eavesdrop on the commu-
nications between reader and tag, obtain exchanged messages and resend these
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messages repeatedly. Therefore, any generated message should be fresh to the
protocol session to protect against replay attacks.
3. Protection against de-synchronisation incidents: The proposed protocol should
recover from de-synchronisation incidents, either when an attacker blocks the
exchanged message(s), or when the messages are lost during transmission due to
system malfunction or communication error.
4. Protection against location tracking: The proposed protocol should conﬁrm that
the tag's responses are not static or linkable in order to prevent attackers from
tracking the tag's location.
5. Protection against reader/tag impersonation attacks: The proposed protocol should
guarantee that the reader's and tag's secret values cannot be obtained by any at-
tacker, thus preventing an attacker from impersonating the reader or the tag.
6. Authentication: The reader and each tag in the grouping-proof should conﬁrm
their legitimacy to the server.
7. Concurrency: The tags should only depend on the reader's message to respond,
and should not wait for the Ti−1 message.
8. Reading order independence: The server veriﬁes the proof regardless of the order
in which the tags were scanned.
Peris-Lopez et al. [146] provided guidelines for designing a grouping-proof protocol.
These guidelines are as follows:
 Computing capabilities: Due to the restricted computation power of RFID tags,
the protocol should take into account this limitation. Moreover, the memory and
communication costs should also be minimised.
 Matching: Only tags that belong to a group participate in the calculation of the
proof, thus reducing the time needed for the server to verify the existence of tags.
 Dependency: A tag should include all messages received from its predecessor tags
in its response to prove simultaneity.
 Identiﬁcation: This is related to tag anonymity and tag location privacy as dis-
cussed earlier.
 Veriﬁcation: Using an encrypted timestamp to avoid predictable timestamps and
hence avoid replay attacks.
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1- Timestamp(t) 2- t, Group msg
3- Group msg
3-Server msg4- Proof=Server-msgs
Figure 8.9: System scenario
 Forward secrecy: Peris-Lopez et al. pointed out that forward secrecy in grouping
proofs is an open problem, as there are multiple tags, an untrusted reader and
oine veriﬁer involved in the process, which makes the updating process complex.
However, in this study we have attempted to solve this problem.
In this chapter we take into account these goals and guidelines as they are eﬃcient
in terms of security and performance, with the exception of the dependency guideline.
The dependency guideline is impractical as it will encounter a heavy computational
demand when thousands of tags participate in the grouping-proof.
8.3.2 System Scenario
The proposed system scenario is shown in Fig. 8.9, and summarised as follows:
1. The server sends an encrypted timestamp t to the reader (before the grouping-
proof begins).
2. The reader acts as a ﬁlter that separates the tags belonging to the group from the
tags that do not belong to the group. It computes a Group message to link the
tags in the group. Then, it broadcasts the Group message to the tags.
3. The ith tag, i.e., 1 ≤ i ≤ n, veriﬁes the Group message. If it succeeds, it sends two
messages: the Group message to prove it belongs to the group, and the Server
message to be authenticated by the server.
4. When the reader receives n responses within a pre-deﬁned time window, it veriﬁes
the Group message for each tag, and generates the Proof containing all the re-
ceived Server messages. Then, it sends the Proof to the server for later validation
of the grouping-proof.
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8.3.3 Assumptions
We present an RFID grouping-proof protocol, which operates under the following as-
sumptions:
 We consider an active adversary, who has complete control over all communica-
tions in the protocol.
 The tag can compute XoR, generate a random number, and calculate hash func-
tions.
 The reader contacts the tag through a wireless channel that is susceptible to
attacks, while the communication channel between the reader and the server is
secure.
 The server is oine during the scanning process.
 All the operations in the tag are atomic.
 The groups are pre-deﬁned and static.
8.3.4 Threat Model
Complying with the previous proposed protocols in this thesis, we assume the Dolv-Yao
model. Moreover, for grouping-proof, adversarial attacks target the following:
 RFID tags: The adversary can impersonate the reader to collect the tag's re-
sponses and forge a grouping-proof.
 RFID reader: The adversary attempts to impersonate the tags to make the reader
generates an invalid proof.
 The communication channel: The adversary controls the communication channel
by performing the following:
 Eavesdropping
 Modifying messages
 Blocking messages from reaching targets
 Replaying previous messages
 Injecting new messages (forgery)
 Impersonating any entity
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Table 8.2: Protocol notation
Notation Description
IDG The shared group unique identity
TSG The shared group secret value
IDi The ith tag's unique identity
TSi The ith tag's secret value
KSR The reader's private key for signing the proof
KPR The reader's public key
KS The server's secret key
rx A random number generated by entity x
H(Z) The result of generating a hash of data Z, where H: {0,1}∗ → {0,1}l
EKx(M) A message M encrypted with the secret key of entity x
SignKx(Z) A signature on data Z, signed using entity x's private key
TS The server's timestamp
t A timestamp encrypted by the server's secret key
⊕ An XoR operation
‖ A concatenation operation
n The number of tags in the group
8.3.5 Notation
The notation used in the proposed protocol is shown in Table 8.2:
8.3.6 Protocol Description
The proposed protocol is divided into two phases, the setup phase and the grouping-
proof phase.
 Setup phase: The manufacturer's server assigns the initial values to the tags, the
reader and the server. For a speciﬁc group (G), each tag stores (IDG, IDi, TSG,
TSi), the reader stores (KSR, KPR), and the server stores (IDG, IDi, TSG, TSi,
KS , KPR) for all ith tags belonging to group G.
 Grouping-proof phase: a protocol is shown in Table 8.10 and works as follows:
1. Server: The server (S) computes encrypted timestamps t=EKS (TS). Each
timestamp is valid for a limited time-window, within which the reader should
respond. The server stores the encrypted timestamps and time-window. The
server computes an index session message with the reader as SK=H(IDG ‖
TSG ‖ t), where t is the current encrypted timestamp, and K= TSG ⊕ H(IDG
‖ t) to inform the tags of the current value of TSG in case a desynchronisa-
tion incident occurs. The server sends t, SK and K to the reader. Moreover,
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the server sends a list of the hashed tags' identiﬁers to identify missing tags.
Round 1:
2. Reader: The reader generates a random number rR, i.e., rR ∈ {0,1}L, where
L is the security parameter.
3. Reader: The reader computes two messages to link the tag chain: the ﬁrst
message is MRG=H(SK ‖ rR), and the second message is K′ = K ⊕ rR.
4. Reader: The reader broadcasts rR, t, MRG and K
′.
5. Tag: The ith tag Ti generates a random number ri, i.e., ri ∈ {0,1}L.
6. Tag: Ti re-computes MRG to check that it belongs to the group. If it succeeds,
Ti performs the next step. If it fails, this implies either:
(a) Ti has been desynchronised in the previous session(s) resulting in failure
to update the value of TSG. In this case, it needs to obtain the current
value of TSG from message (K′ ). If succeeds, Ti performs the next step.
(b) Ti does not belong to the group if it fails to re-compute message (K′),
therefore it aborts the session.
7. Tag: Ti calculates:
Mi= H(IDi ‖ ri ‖ rR ‖ TSi ‖ t) to be included in the grouping-proof and
veriﬁed by the server.
8. Tag: Ti calculates:
MiG= H(SK ‖ ri ‖ rR ‖ H(IDi)) to prove to the reader that it belongs to the
group.
9. Tag: Ti updates TS
j+1
i ← H(TSji ), where j is the current session, and
TSj+1G ← H(TSjG) to be used in the next session j+1.
10. Tag: Ti sends ri, Mi and MiG to the reader.
These steps are performed for each ith tag in the group until the reader
receives n responses.
Round 2:
11. Reader: When the reader receives n responses within a pre-deﬁned time
window, for every received ri , the reader checks that MiG= h(SK ‖ ri ‖ rR
‖ h(IDi)), to conﬁrm that only tags belonging to the group are included in
the proof.
133
Server Reader Ti
1- Generates t
SK=H(IDG‖TSG‖t)
K= TSG⊕H(IDG‖t)
t,SK,K−−−−−→
2- Generates rR
3- Computes:
MRG=H(SK‖rR)
K′=K⊕rR
4−rR,MRG ,K′,t−−−−−−−−−−−→
5- Generates ri
6- Re-computes:
MRG=H(H(IDG‖TSG‖t)‖rR)
and/or TSG=K
′⊕H(IDG‖t)⊕rR
7- Mi= H(IDi‖ri‖rR‖TSi‖t)
8- MiG=H(SK‖ri‖rR‖H(IDi))
9- Updates:
TSj+1i ← H(TSji )
TSj+1G ← H(TSjG)
10−ri,Mi,MiG←−−−−−−−−−−
11- Waits for n responses
Re-computes MnG
12- Generates Proof=
(SignKSR (t,
rR,r1...rn,SK,M1⊕...⊕Mn),rR,r1...rn,M1⊕...⊕Mn)
Proof←−−−−
13- Veriﬁes reader and
checks:
Proof′=M1⊕...⊕Mn
14- Updates:
TSj+1i ←H(TSji )
TSj+1G ←H(TSjG)
Figure 8.10: The proposed grouping-proof protocol
12. Reader: For each tag belonging to the group, the reader generates Proof
containing the received messages (Mi ... Mn), i.e. Proof= (SignKSR(t, rR, r1
... rn, SK, M1 ⊕...⊕ Mn), rR, r1 ... rn, M1 ⊕...⊕ Mn), and then sends it to
the server.
13. Server: Later, the server veriﬁes the reader's signature, checks the times-
tamp, and retrieves tags' data based on the value of index SK. Then, it
computes the expected grouping-proof (Proof′ = M1⊕...⊕Mn) regardless of
the order the tags were scanned, and compares the result of Proof′ with
the received value of (M1⊕...⊕Mn) in Proof. If there is a match, the server
believes that all the tags in the grouping-proof are present and legitimate.
14. Server: The server updates:
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TSj+1i ← H(TSji ) for all the legitimate tags in the group, and updates
TSj+1G ← H(TSjG).
8.4 Protocol Analysis
In this section we present the analysis of the proposed protocol in terms of informal,
and formal analysis using CasperFDR and Scyther.
8.4.1 Informal Protocol Analysis
If the reader did not receive messages from a tag, whether the tag was not present,
or time period has expired before receiving the tag's messages, the following process is
performed:
 Missing tag(s): If the reader does not receive a response from the 4th tag for
example, it informs the server about the missing tag by including the missing
tag's H(ID4) value, which was not retrieved from the hashed identiﬁers list during
the protocol running, within Proof. The reader generates Proof= (SignKSR(t, rR,
rn−1, SK, Mn−1, H(ID4)), then, sends Proof to the server. The server retrieves the
missing tag data based on SK and H(ID4) values, and calculates Proof′ without
taking into account the 4th tag. The server should also alert the system about
the missing tag.
The proposed protocol attempts to meet the goals discussed in Section 8.3.1 as
follows:
1. Forward secrecy: The values of TSi and TSG are updated after each run in order
to prevent forward secrecy invasion using a hash function that is irreversible. If
an adversary compromises the tag Ti memory, he/she will not be able to trace the
previous communications of the tag as (Mi)j−1 and (MiG)
j−1 involve the use of
previous secret values TSi and TSG, which are not stored in the tag. The stored
updated values of TSi and TSG are used in the calculation of the next session and
cannot be irreversible as a result of using a hash function. Hence, the attacker
cannot re-compute the previous messages.
2. Protection against replay attacks: The inclusion of random numbers in the mes-
sages is vital to conﬁrm that the messages are intended for a speciﬁc reader or
tag, which originally generate rR and ri respectively. Moreover, since rR and ri
are fresh random numbers, it is impossible for the attacker to predict them in
the next session. Replaying the reader's message will not pose a threat to the
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protocol, as the server will detect such attacks; the server will not accept proofs
that were generated with expired timestamps.
Regarding the tag's message Mi, it contains a timestamp that is encrypted by
the server to avoid predictable timestamps and is valid for a limited time during
the session. Hence, the attacker cannot re-send the previous Mi message as the
timestamp will not be valid.
3. Protection against desynchronisation incidents: There are two scenarios, where a
desynchronisation of data might occur, but the proposed protocol tackles these
incidents as follows:
 If an attacker blocks the ith tag messages (ri, Mi, MiG), the reader will detect
that there is a missing tag, and perform Missing tag step.
 If an attacker blocks the reader's messages from reaching the ith tag Ti, the
server will update TSG while Ti's TSG value will remain the same, thus
causing a desynchronisation in the next session. However, our protocol can
prevent this attack as the server computes an additional message (K) that
contains the current updated value of TSG, and can only be obtained by the
legitimate tag belonging to the group (based on IDG).
4. Tag location tracking: The tags' messages involve fresh random numbers, times-
tamps, and/or updated TSi and TSG values, which means that the responses
are not static. Hence, an attacker will not be able to track the tag's location.
Moreover, even if the ith tag does not update its values, the tag's messages are
randomised with the inclusion of random numbers (rR, ri) and timestamp.
5. Protection against tag impersonation attack: The adversary needs to be in pos-
session of 128-bit secret values, such as IDi, IDG, TSi, and TSG, which are not
sent in clear, in order to impersonate or clone Ti. Moreover, it will take up to
2128 attempts to guess each secret value.
6. Protection against reader impersonation attack: The attacker has to have a valid
digital signature private key to impersonate a legitimate reader. Moreover, even
if the attacker replays previous messages to the tags and impersonates the reader,
the server will detect such an attack.
7. Authentication: The reader veriﬁes the existence of each tag in the group based
on MnG messages, and the server veriﬁes the legitimacy of each tag in the group
based on Mni messages.
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8. Matching: The reader veriﬁes that only the tags that belong to the group partic-
ipate in the proof.
9. Veriﬁcation: To prevent replay attacks on the server side, an encrypted timestamp
is generated by the server and sent to the tags, so an attacker cannot predict future
timestamps as the actual timestamp is encrypted by the server.
10. Concurrency: Reducing time delay by allowing all the tags to compute their
messages without waiting for the other tags' responses; they send their responses
when they receive the reader's messages.
11. Reading order independence: The reader generates the proof using an XoR oper-
ator, so all tags' responses can be veriﬁed in random order regardless of the order
in which the tags were scanned.
Inspired by [146], Table 8.3 demonstrates a comparison between our protocol and
the other yoking/grouping-proof protocols in terms of security. As shown in Table 8.3,
the proposed protocol protects the system from diﬀerent attacks, and provides forward
secrecy. Sundaresan et al.'s protocol [142] provides similar protection but it has major
issues in terms of performance as shown in Table 8.4. In Sundaresan et al.'s protocol the
number of rounds is proportional to the number of tags, the tags need to compute twelve
PRNG functions, and the server needs to perform O(n), computational operations to
authenticate the tags in the group, which implies that their protocol is large in terms
of tag's computing cost and server scalability respectively, making their protocol heavy
to implement.
Inspired by [116] and [146], Table 8.4 illustrates the performance of the proposed
protocols compared with the other grouping-proof only. We took into account the
performance of the RFID tags not the reader. Our protocol is eﬃcient for the following
reasons: Firstly, our protocol enhances performance by engaging the tags in one round
only and the whole protocol is executed in two rounds as in Moriyama's protocol [143].
However, Moriyama's protocol does not provide forward secrecy; they assumed it is an
open problem. Also, any attacker can impersonate the reader, as the reader does not
provide any proof of its identiﬁcation to the tag, and obtained the tag's ID, hence tag's
privacy is not achieved. Secondly, our protocol provides concurrency and reading order
independence features that reduce time delay and failure rates respectively. Thirdly,
the performance of our protocol is appropriate for RFID tags, as it does not require
mass memory storage; it stores four values each of which is 128-bit length, and requires
average communication cost as each tag only sends three messages to the reader (384
bits). Fourthly, regarding the server indexing scalability, the server retrieves the tags'
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Table 8.3: Security comparison of yoking/grouping-proof protocol
Juels
[106]
Saito
[144]
Piramuthu
[145]
Chien
[147]
Bolotny
[148]
Burmester
[149]
Ma
[116]
Sundaresan
[142]
Lien
[18]
Peris-
Lopez
[146]
Moriyama
[143]
Our pro-
tocol 8.3
Forward
secrecy
invasion
× × × × × × × X × × × X
Replay
attack
× × × × × X X X X X X X
Tag imper-
sonation
× × × X X × X X X X X X
Reader im-
personation
× × X × X × X X X X × X
Traceability × X X X X X X X × X × X
X: Means resists such an attack
×: Means does not protect against such an attack
Table 8.4: Tag's performance comparison of grouping-proof protocols
Chien
[147]
Bolotny
[148]
Burmester
[149]
Ma
[116]
Sundaresan
[142]
Lien
[18]
Moriyama
[143]
Our proto-
col 8.3
# Rounds n n n n n n 2 2
# Messages 5 3 3 5 4 4 4 3
# Hashing - 2 2 - - 1 - 6*
# PRNG 3 - - 12 12 1 3 1
# stored data 2 3 4 4 9 2 3 4
Server retrieving cost O(1) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(n) O(1) O(1) O(1)
Order independent × × × × × X × X
Concurrency × × X × × X X X
*The ith tag might compute 7 hash functions in case it has been de-synchronised
-: Means not applicable, ×: Means does not provide such feature, X: Means provides this
feature
data based on the value of SK, hence the retrieval computing cost for identifying a tag
in the server is O(1).
8.4.2 Formal Protocol Analysis
This section presents the formal analysis of the proposed protocol using CasperFDR
[104] and Scyther [75] tools. The aim of this section is to prove that the data exchanged
between the tag and reader is secure, not to prove the authenticity of the generated
proof.
CasperFDR Analysis of the Proposed Protocol
The script is shown in Appendix D.1. The variables deﬁned in the script are :
#Free variables
R, Ti: Agent
S: Server
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rR, ri: Nonce
IDG, IDi, SK,: Data
h: HashFunction
t: TimeStamp
InverseKeys = (h,h)
The security speciﬁcations for which CasperFDR evaluated the communication
channel between the reader and a tag is as shown below:
1. Agreement (R, Ti, [SK]), which means that the tag (Ti) is authenticated to the
reader (R), and both parties agree on the data value SK.
2. Secret (S, IDG, [Ti]), and Secret (S, IDi, [Ti]), which means that the value of
IDG and IDi should be secret between the server (S) and the tag (Ti).
The intruder is deﬁned to be Mallory, who knows all the entities and the exchanged
random numbers as shown below:
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Server1, Reader, Tagi, Mallory, Rr, Ri, Rm}
The CasperFDR tool evaluated the protocol and did not ﬁnd any attacks.
Scyther Analysis of the Proposed Protocol
Three roles are identiﬁed in the script shown in Appendix D.2: a server, a reader and
a tag. The deﬁned variables are:
fresh Time: Timestamp;
fresh IDi: Data;
fresh TSi: Data;
fresh IDG: Data;
fresh TSG: Data;
fresh SK: Data;
var ri, rR: Nonce;
Each role speciﬁes the goals that the protocol attempts to meet. These goals are
within the Claim section. In the protocol, there are, for example, seven Claim goals
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speciﬁed in the tag role as follows:
claim_Ti1(Ti, Secret, IDG);
claim_Ti2(Ti, Secret, TSG);
claim_Ti3(Ti, Secret, IDi);
claim_Ti4(Ti, Secret, TSi);
claim_Ti6(Ti, Alive);
claim_Ti7(Ti, Niagree);
claim_Ti8(Ti, Nisynch);
After running the script, Scyther did not ﬁnd any feasible attacks within bounds,
which means no attack was found within the bounded state space.
8.5 Protocol Implementation and Performance Measure-
ment
In this section, we present the performance measurements of the proposed protocol.
8.5.1 Implementation Process
The tag is provided with four 128-bit secret values namely IDi, TSi, IDG, and TSG,
which are stored in the tag's EEPROM. Similarly, the reader acts as the server and
stores the same values as the tag.
The reader starts by generating a 128-bit random number (rR) using the rngCsp
method and a 64-bit timestamp (t) using the DateTime.Ticks property in .Net Frame-
work. Then, it computes (MRG) and K, and sends rR, t, M
R
G and K to the tag by
sending 28 WriteTagData_EPC_C1G2 commands. When the tag receives the reader's
messages, it generates a random number ri (128-bit) using the built-in PRNG, and
re-computes MRG. If there is a match, it computes the two messages, namely Mi and
MiG, each of which is 128-bit length. Subsequently, the tag writes (ri, Mi and M
i
G)
in its memory using the syscall_writeWord commands ready to be read on demand.
The reader later sends three ReadTagData_EPC_C1G2 commands to read (ri, Mi and
MiG), and re-computes M
i
G . If there is a match with the received M
i
G, it generates the
Proof using RSA provided by .NET Framework.
8.5.2 Performance Measurement
The performance measurements are as follows:
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1. DemoTag memory cost: In the proposed protocol, the memory cost is:
 348 bytes used from the 4 KB EEPROM memory for storing the tag's data,
messages (responses), and random numbers.
 33.6 KB used from the 128 KB Flash memory to store the tag's ﬁrmware.
Table 8.5: Data exchange time cost
Tag Reader
Read - 418.36 ms
Write 1.4 ms 2.23 sec
2. Data exchange time cost is shown in Table 8.5: For the tag to write (ri, Mi and
MiG) into its memory to be read by the reader, the average timer counter after
running the protocol 100 times is 22548, so, based on equation 3.1, the time cost
is:
22548 ∗ 0.0000000625 = 0.0014sec ≡ 1.4ms (8.1)
Regarding the reader, we found that the reader needs 2.23 sec to write (rR, t, MRG
and K) into the tag's memory, and 418.36 ms to read the whole tag's responses.
3. DemoTag computing cost: In a successful run of the proposed protocol, the tag
generates a random number, computes three messages, updates two values and
writes the messages in the memory. Table 8.6 shows that the time cost of running
the protocol on the DemoTag is around 9.71 ms.
Table 8.6: Computing operations time cost (milliseconds)
R2 MRG Mi M
i
G Update Write
Computing cost 0.11 1.65 1.71 1.71 3.13 1.4
Total 9.71
All the other proposed grouping-proof protocols discussed in this chapter did not
present any performance measurements; hence, we could not provide a perfor-
mance comparison with such protocols.
141
8.6 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed another ﬁeld in authenticating a group of RFID tags,
where the server is oine during the reading process; this is known as an oine RFID
grouping-proof. The challenges in designing a grouping-proof protocol reside in the
absence of the server. Based on the main goals in designing a secure RFID grouping-
proof, we designed a grouping-proof protocol that tackles these challenges with a low
probability of delay in the responses, as the tags respond in two rounds, and do not
need to wait for their predecessor tags' messages, and with a low probability of failure,
as the server veriﬁes the proof regardless of the order in which the tags were scanned.
Our solution also improves existing related work by protecting the system from active
attacks and providing forward secrecy, which is assumed to be an open problem. We
then informally analysed the proposed protocol and this analysis was subsequently
extended to formal analysis by CasperFDR and Scyther. Finally, we implemented the
proposed protocol in order to measure the performance of the tag's limited memory
and computing resources, and the results showed that the protocol can be implemented
with a relatively low memory and computing costs.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future Work
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In this chapter we conclude the thesis by summarising our contributions and dis-
cussing potential future work.
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9.1 Summary and Conclusions
The focus of this thesis directed towards the security and privacy concerns relating
to the use of passive RFID tags. Providing a lightweight mutual authentication for
RFID tags in diﬀerent schemes is a very active research area, which has resulted in the
publication of hundreds of RFID authentication protocols. Many of these RFID mutual
authentication protocols claim to be secure in the presence of a malicious agent, who is
assumed to have complete control over the communications network. Unfortunately, we
found that some of the protocols that have been suggested, do not succeed in their stated
goals. Hence, in this thesis, we focused on proposing mutual authentication protocols
that provide adequate levels of security and privacy for several RFID schemes, and avoid
the weaknesses found in related work. We formally analysed some of the protocols'
main goals such as providing protection against data leakage, replay and impersonation
attacks, and preserving the privacy of the transmitted data.
The ﬁve main contributions are listed below:
 One way to avoid replay attacks, forward secrecy invasion and tracking the lo-
cation of the tag's holder is to update the tag's data on the server and the tag
after each successful session. However, updating a tag's data comes with a cost.
If the receiver does not receive a response, it will not update the data, resulting in
a data desynchronisation in the next session, as the sender has already updated
its data. We discovered that data desynchronisation attacks can be applied to
one of the widely cited RFID mutual authentication protocols [39, 89]. Although
the Song protocol updates the data after a successful authentication session and
the server stores the old and new tag's data, it is vulnerable to data desynchro-
nisation, as the server updates the data even if the received data matches the
old values. Therefore, an adversary can easily cause synchronisation failure by
intercepting and blocking messages during transmission in two or more consec-
utive sessions, resulting in mismatched values. Hence, we proposed a modiﬁed
data update process that mitigates the data desynchronisation incidents. This
contribution is discussed in Chapter 4 and published in [66]. We also found that
this attack can be applied in other proposals such as [103, 102].
 Besides reviewing the Song protocol, we reviewed other proposals in the ﬁeld of
RFID mutual authentication protocols. We found that attacks on RFID mutual
authentication proposals are still ongoing, and these weaknesses in other's proto-
cols formed a benchmark for us to propose a new RFID mutual authentication
protocol that improves upon such weaknesses. The wireless communication chan-
nel between reader and tag may allow an attacker to perform active attacks, such
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as replay, impersonation, DoS, location tracking, forward secrecy invasion, and
compromising a tag's privacy. The proposed RFID mutual authentication proto-
col attempted to provide immunity against such attacks and has been formally
analysed to conﬁrm that it achieves the desired protection. The performance of
our protocol has been measured to prove its eﬃciency. This contribution is shown
in Chapter 5 and published in [150].
 In RFID-enabled supply chains, hundreds or even thousands of tagged items need
to be tracked and identiﬁed remotely. Normally, in supply chain practice, there
is a lack of trust between the parties involved, as the products' owner may not
know the next owner. Moreover, for the RFID reader to identify each passively
tagged item, the wireless channel between the reader and tags is vulnerable to
active attacks. One solution to such issues is to encrypt the data with a secret
key. However, the question remains of how to distribute the secret key securely
between such parties, and protect the tagged items' data in transit. To this end,
we proposed using Shamir's [127] secret-sharing approach (threshold scheme),
where the secret key is divided into shares that, individually, do not provide any
useful information about the secret. Each tag stores one share in its memory.
In our proposal, the tag's ID is encrypted with a secret key, which is not stored
in the tag. To extract the tag's ID, the reader must collect suﬃcient shares
to decrypt the tag's encoded-ID. Moreover, to allow the next owner to change
the threshold scheme, we proposed a secret key update protocol incorporating a
resynchronisation capability to counter the disruptive eﬀects of location tracking,
replay attacks and desynchronisation incidents. This contribution is illustrated in
Chapter 6 and published in [126].
 So far in this thesis, the discussed proposals suit a conventional RFID deployment
with the assumption of a secure server. However, many physical servers are being
migrated to cloud solutions, so we investigated this aspect in Chapter 7. Cloud
computing represents a new era in information technology that presents substan-
tial beneﬁts to sectors and organisations. Processing and storing RFID tags data
in the cloud provides a promising solution with powerful computing and massive
storage ability. Nevertheless, conﬁdentiality and privacy are regarded as two of
the main concerns in cloud computing. Cloud-based RFID has gained relatively
little attention in the literature. Hence, we attempted to review the current work.
We found that the ﬁrst proposal to protect tags' data from an untrusted cloud
provider is vulnerable to reader-to-tag impersonation attacks, and man-in-the-
middle attacks. Hence, we proposed an enhanced version of their protocol that
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takes into account such vulnerabilities. The proposed protocol was formally anal-
ysed to provide an indicative results about its security, and implemented to show
its eﬃciency. This contribution is published in [77].
 To this point we had only considered security protocols, where there is only one
tag being read at a time. However, there are other applications that require a
group of items to be presented for reading. Reading all the tags in a group should
be done within a speciﬁc time period and there must be no way for an illegitimate
tag to join the group. These issues are addressed under the research heading
of grouping proofs, which are considered in Chapter 8. The grouping-proof is
normally generated by the reader to conﬁrm the legitimacy and the simultaneous
presence of the tagged items in the group. The challenge in designing such proofs
is that the server that authenticates the proof is not present during the scanning
process, and this could allow a fake tag to participate in the group, which means
the proof should be completed within a time window. Furthermore, the wireless
communication between the reader and the tags is prone to active attacks. Hence,
we proposed an RFID grouping-proof that involves only two rounds to generate
the proof, and provides immunity against the attacks found in the literature.
The proposed protocol has been formally analysed and implemented to prove its
secrecy and eﬃciency respectively. This contribution is published in [151].
9.2 Reﬂection on Citations
During my PhD six papers were submitted: four to international conferences [66, 126,
152, 151], one to a workshop [77] and one to a journal [150]. Some of these published
papers have been cited in scientiﬁc papers as shown below.
Our proposals [66, 126, 77] were cited in [45, 92, 91]. Based on the data desynchro-
nisation, reader impersonation, man-in-the-middle attacks, and location tracking that
we found in the Song protocol [89], Cai et al. key update protocol [70], and in the
cloud-based RFID protocol [130], [45, 92, 91] designed their own protocol taking into
account the attacks we found.
In [125, 45], the authors criticised the assumptions we made in designing our pro-
tocols in [126, 77]. For example, in [126], we assumed that the attacker cannot obtain
enough shares from the tags in transit to recover the secret key in the RFID-enabled
supply chain; while in [125], the authors assumed that the attacker can obtain such
shares. They therefore proposed using dummy tags that contain a random (bogus)
secret share when the tags are transferred between the supply chain parties. In [77],
we assumed that the communication channel between the reader and cloud server is
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secure in RFID cloud-based systems; in [45], the authors contradicted our assumption
and assumed that the channel between the cloud and a mobile reader is not secure.
Hence, their protocol attempted to protect the data in transit between tag-reader and
mobile reader-cloud server. These assumptions will be taken into account in proposing
future protocols that will extend and enhance our current proposals.
9.3 Future Work
There is potential for further research into topics discussed in the thesis as follows:
 Deploying the Universal Composable (UC) Framework for analysis purposes:
In this thesis, we analysed the proposed protocols using formal analysis tools
such as CasperFDR and Scyther. Both tools work under the assumption of per-
fect cryptography and use the Dolev-Yao model [67] as the threat model. Some
issues have been found in CasperFDR, such as state space explosion, where the
state space grows exponentially with the number of runs, and exploration be-
comes infeasible. For instance, when the number of protocols run, the amount
of data used, or the number of speciﬁcation goals are high, the memory may
run oﬀ and the FDR checker will stop working. In Scyther, similar issues have
arisen, especially with heavy protocols that require many runs of the protocol in
parallel. Moreover, these tools do not provide checking with regard to privacy,
such as untraceability and forward secrecy. Finally, the data desynchronisation
attack that was discussed in Section 4.2, is a post-protocol process (not within
the communication channel) that cannot be checked by CasperFDR and Scyther.
Another method for formally analysing the security protocols is called a Universal
Composable Framework (UC) [153]. In the UC framework, there is an ideal
process that conducts the protocol's tasks in a secure way, where all the parties
send their inputs to a trusted third entity that processes the inputs, and then
sends back the outputs to these parties. An adversary S is restricted to corrupting
some of the parties and blocking messages. This can be regarded as the security
requirements of the protocol. In the real-life protocol, the parties carry out the
protocol execution and generate the outputs. Then, the UC framework compares
a real-life execution of a protocol with the ideal process. If running the protocol in
the real-life model amounts to emulating the ideal process for that task, then the
protocol is considered as secure. The UC framework includes deﬁnitions of some
common cryptographic tasks, such as authenticated and secure communication,
key-exchange, public-key encryption, signature, commitment, oblivious transfer,
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zero-knowledge, secret sharing, and general function evaluation.
 Studying a wider range of physical attacks:
The proposals in this thesis consider active attacks. However, physical attacks
such as side channel attacks, power analysis, and traﬃc analysis were not taken
into account. A study on these attacks and taking them into consideration when
designing a secure RFID system will form part of future work.
 Server scalability:
Most of the proposed RFID protocols focused on the tag's performance and ig-
nored the server scalability performance. When a server receives a tag's message
it searches the whole database to ﬁnd a match with the received message, and this
could exhaust the server's computing capability. More speciﬁcally, performing an
exhaustive search to identify individual tags is diﬃcult when the number of tags
is large. Some of the techniques that already are deployed include binary search
[154], and hash tables [100]. Utilising such techniques in RFID protocols will be
a related part of future work.
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Appendix A
Mutual Authentication Protocol for
Low-Cost RFID Tags Formal
Analysis Scripts
A.1 CasperFDR Script
-- Remove the reader entity to avoid state space explosion
#Free variables
T : Agent
S : Server
R1, R2 : Nonce
ID, K : Data
h: HashFunction
InverseKeys= (h,h)
#Protocol description
0. -> S : T
1. S -> T : R1
2a. T -> S : R2,h(R2 (+) ID)
2b. T -> S : h(K, R1, R2)
4. S -> T : h(ID, K, R1, R2)
#Processes
RESPONDER(T, S, R2, K, ID)
SERVER (S, T, R1, K, ID)
#Actual variables
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Tag, Mallory : Agent
ServerDB : Server
Rr1, Rr2, R3 : Nonce
IDentityT, KeyTag : Data
#Specification
Aliveness(S, T)
Secret(T, K, [S])
Secret(T, ID, [S])
Agreement(T, S, [ID,K])
#System
RESPONDER(Tag,ServerDB,Rr2,KeyTag,IDentityT)
SERVER(ServerDB, Tag, Rr1, KeyTag, IDentityT)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge ={Tag,ServerDB,Mallory,Rr1, Rr2, R3}
A.2 Scyther Script
usertype Data;
hashfunction H1;
const XOR: Function;
protocol MutualAuth (S, R, Ti){
role S{
fresh IDi: Data;
fresh Ki: Data;
var R1, R2: Nonce;
recv_3(R , S, R2, H1(Ki, R1, R2), H1(XOR(IDi, R2)));
send_4(S, R, H1(IDi, Ki, R1, R2));
claim_S1(S, Secret, IDi);
claim_S2(S, Secret, Ki);
claim_S3(S, Niagree);
claim_S4(S, Alive);
}
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role R{
fresh R1: Nonce;
var X: Ticket;
var Y: Ticket;
var Z: Ticket;
var R2: Nonce;
send_1(R, Ti, R1);
recv_2(Ti, R, R2, X, Y);
send_3(R, S, R2, X, Y);
recv_4(S, R , Z);
send_5(R, Ti, Z);
}
role Ti{
var R1: Nonce;
fresh R2: Nonce;
fresh IDi: Data;
fresh Ki: Data;
recv_1(R, Ti, R1);
send_2(Ti, R, R2, H1(Ki, R1, R2), H1(XOR(IDi, R2)));
recv_5(R, Ti, H1(IDi, Ki, R1, R2));
claim_Ti1(Ti, Secret, IDi);
claim_Ti2(Ti, Secret, Ki);
claim_Ti3(Ti, Alive);
claim_Ti4(Ti, Niagree);
claim_Ti5(Ti, Nisynch);
}
}
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Appendix B
Key Update Process in the Key
Distribution Model Formal Analysis
Scripts
B.1 CasperFDR Script
-- Secret key update protocol in CasperFDR
-- We assumed that the new values of (S, Tag-ID and C) are generated
by the reader
-- We remove the reader entity
#Free variables
S, Ti: Agent
R1, R2: Nonce
ID, Ci, IDProductnew, Snew, Cnew: Data
h: HashFunction
InverseKeys = (h,h)
#Protocol description
1. S -> Ti : R1
2. Ti -> S : R2
3b. S -> Ti : IDProductnew, h(ID (+) IDProductnew (+) R1 (+) R2 (+)
Ci) (+) Snew
3c. S -> Ti : h(Snew (+) ID (+) R1 (+) R2) (+) Cnew
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3d. S -> Ti : h(Snew (+) ID (+) R1 (+) R2 (+) Cnew)
4. Ti -> S : h(ID (+) Snew (+) Cnew (+) R1 (+) R2)
#Processes
Serveri(S, Ti, R1, ID, IDProductnew, Ci, Snew, Cnew)
Tagii(Ti, S, R2, ID, Ci)
#Actual variables
Serveri, Tagi, Mallory: Agent
R11, R22, R33: Nonce
IDi, CTag, IDProductnew, SNew, CNew: Data
#Specification
Agreement (S, Ti, [ID])
Secret (S, ID, [Ti])
Secret (S, Snew, [Ti])
Secret (S, Cnew, [Ti])
#System
Serveri(Serveri, Tagi, R11, IDi, IDProductnew, CTag, SNew, CNew)
Tagii(Tagi, Serveri, R22, IDi, CTag)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Serveri, Tagi, Mallory, R11, R22, R33,
CTag, IDProductnew}
B.2 Syther Script
-- Secret key update protocol in Scyther
-- We assumed that the S, ID-case and C values are already generated
by the reader
usertype Data;
hashfunction H1;
const XOR: Function;
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protocol key-update (S, Ti){
role S{
fresh ID: Data;
fresh Ci: Data;
fresh IDProductnew: Data;
fresh Snew: Data;
fresh Cnew: Data;
fresh R1 : Nonce;
var R2 : Nonce;
send_1(S, Ti, R1);
recv_2(Ti, S, R2);
send_3(S, Ti, IDProductnew,XOR(H1(ID, IDProductnew, R1, R2, Ci),Snew),
XOR(H1(Snew, ID, R1, R2) ,Cnew), H1(XOR(Snew, ID, R1, R2, Cnew)));
recv_2(Ti, S, H1(XOR(ID, Snew, Cnew, R1, R2)));
claim_S1(S, Secret, ID);
claim_S2(S, Secret, Snew);
claim_S3(S, Secret, Cnew);
claim_S4(S, Alive);
claim_S5(S, Niagree);
claim_S6(S, Nisynch);
}
role Ti{
fresh R2: Nonce;
var R1: Nonce;
fresh ID: Data;
fresh Ci: Data;
var Snew: Data;
var Cnew: Data;
var IDProductnew: Data;
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recv_1(S, Ti, R1);
send_2(Ti, S, R2);
recv_3(S, Ti, IDProductnew,XOR(H1(ID, IDProductnew, R1, R2, Ci),Snew),
XOR(H1(Snew, ID, R1, R2) ,Cnew), H1(XOR(Snew, ID, R1, R2, Cnew)));
send_2(Ti, S, H1(XOR(ID, Snew, Cnew, R1, R2)));
claim_Ti1(Ti, Secret, ID);
claim_Ti2(Ti, Secret, Snew);
claim_Ti3(Ti, Secret, Cnew);
claim_Ti4(Ti, Alive);
claim_Ti5(Ti, Niagree);
claim_Ti6(Ti, Nisynch);
}
}
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Appendix C
Improved Cloud-Based RFID
Protocol Formal Analysis Scripts
C.1 CasperFDR Script (Xie protocol)
--The cloud-based RFID authentication protocol
--We assume that the reader already knows the tag's data
#Free variables
T, R : Agent
Nr: Nonce
Nt: nonce
TID, RID, S, M: Data
h: HashFunction
InverseKeys=(h,h)
#Protocol description
0. -> T : R
1. T -> R : h(RID, TID, S)
2. R -> T : Nr
3. T -> R : h(RID, TID, Nr), Nt
4a. R -> T : h(RID, TID, Nt) (+) M
4b. R -> T : h(TID, RID, M)
#Processes
TAGG(T, R, TID, RID, S, Nt)
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Reader(R, T, TID, RID, S, M, Nr)
#Actual variables
T1, R1, Mallory : Agent
Nr1: Nonce
Nt1, NM: nonce
TID1, RID1, S1, M1: Data
#Specification
Agreement(T, R, [TID, RID])
Secret(R, M, [T])
Secret (T, S, [R])
Secret (T, TID, [R])
Secret(T, RID, [R])
#System
TAGG(T1, R1, TID1, RID1, S1, Nt1)
Reader(R1, T1, TID1, RID1, S1, M1, Nr1)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {T1, R1, Mallory, Nr1, Nt1, NM}
C.2 CasperFDR Script (Our protocol)
--The improved cloud-based protocol in CasperFDR
--We assume that the reader already knows the tag's data
#Free variables
T, R : Agent
R1: Nonce
R2: nonce
ID, K: Data
h: HashFunction
InverseKeys=(h,h)
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#Protocol description
0. -> R : T
1. R -> T : R1
2a. T -> R : R2, h(ID (+) R1 (+) R2)
2b. T -> R : h(ID, K, R1, R2), R2
4. R -> T : h(h(ID), h(h(ID) (+) K), R1, R2)
#Processes
TAGG(T, R, ID, R2, K)
Reader(R, T, ID, R1, K)
#Actual variables
T1, R11, Mallory : Agent
Nr1, NM1: Nonce
Nt1: nonce
ID1, K1: Data
#Specification
Agreement(T, R, [ID, K])
Secret(T, ID, [R])
Secret (T, K, [R])
#System
TAGG(T1, R11, ID1, Nt1, K1)
Reader(R11, T1, ID1, Nr1, K1)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {T1, R11, Nr1, Nt1, NM1, Mallory}
C.3 Scyther Script
-- Improved cloud-based protocol in Scyther
usertype Data;
hashfunction H1;
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const XOR: Function;
protocol cloud-RFID (R, Ti){
role R{
fresh R1 : Nonce;
var R2 : Nonce;
fresh Ki: Data;
fresh IDi: Data;
send_1(R, Ti, R1);
recv_2(Ti, R, H1(XOR(IDi, R1, R2)), H1(IDi, Ki, R1, R2), R2);
send_3(R, Ti, H1(H1(XOR(H1(IDi), Ki)), R1, R2));
claim_R1(R, Secret, IDi);
claim_R2(R, Secret, Ki);
claim_R3(R, Alive);
claim_R4(R, Niagree);
claim_R5(R, Nisynch);
}
role Ti{
fresh R2: Nonce;
var R1: Nonce;
fresh IDi: Data;
fresh Ki: Data;
recv_1(R, Ti, R1);
send_2(Ti, R, H1(XOR(IDi, R1, R2)), H1(IDi, Ki, R1, R2), R2);
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recv_3(R, Ti, H1(H1(XOR(H1(IDi), Ki)), R1, R2));
claim_Ti1(Ti, Secret, IDi);
claim_Ti2(Ti, Secret, Ki);
claim_Ti3(Ti, Alive);
claim_Ti4(Ti, Niagree);
claim_Ti5(Ti, Nisynch);
}
}
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Appendix D
RFID Grouping-Proof Formal
Analysis Scripts
D.1 CasperFDR Script
-- Group Proof PROTOCOL in CasperFDR
-- We omitted some data for simplicity and reducing
memory space in the compiling process
#Free variables
R, Ti: Agent
S: Server
rR, ri: Nonce
IDG, IDi, SK: Data
h: HashFunction
KRS: Key
t: TimeStamp
InverseKeys = (h,h), (KRS, KRS)
#Protocol description
1. S -> R: t, SK, h(IDi)
2. R -> Ti : t, rR, h(SK, rR)
3a. Ti -> R : ri , h(SK, ri, rR, h(IDi))
3b. Ti -> R: h(IDi, ri, rR, t) % Mi
5. R -> S : {ri, rR, t, SK, Mi % h(IDi, ri, rR, t)}{KRS}
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#Processes
Reader1(R, Ti, S, rR, KRS)
Tagii(Ti, R, S, ri, IDG, IDi)
ServerDB(S, R, Ti, IDi, IDG, SK, KRS)
#Actual variables
Reader, Tagi, Mallory: Agent
Server1: Server
Rr, Ri: Nonce
IDGroup, IDTag1, SK1: Data
KRSkey: Key
InverseKeys = (KRSkey, KRSkey)
#Specification
Agreement (R, Ti, [SK])
Secret (S, IDi, [Ti])
Secret (R, SK, [Ti])
#System
Reader1(Reader, Tagi, Server1, Rr, KRSkey)
Tagii(Tagi, Reader, Server1, Ri, IDGroup, IDTag1)
ServerDB(Server1, Reader, Tagi, IDTag1, IDGroup, SK1,KRSkey)
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Server1, Reader, Tagi, Mallory, Rr, Ri}
D.2 Syther Script
--RFID Grouping-proof protocol in Scyther
usertype Timestamp;
usertype Data;
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secret k: Function;
hashfunction H1;
protocol GroupProof (S, R, Ti){
role S{
fresh Time: Timestamp;
fresh IDi: Data;
fresh TSi: Data;
fresh IDG: Data;
fresh TSG: Data;
fresh SK: Data;
var ri, rR: Nonce;
send_!T1(S, S, Time);
send_1(S, R, Time);
recv_6(R, S, {rR, ri, Time, SK, H1(IDi, ri, rR, TSi,
Time)}k(R, S));
claim_S3(S, Secret, IDi);
claim_S4(S, Secret, TSi);
claim_S4(S, Secret, SK);
claim_S5(S, Niagree);
}
role R{
var Time: Timestamp;
var X: Ticket;
fresh IDG: Data;
fresh IDi: Data;
fresh TSG: Data;
fresh rR : Nonce;
var ri : Nonce;
var SK: Data;
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recv_1(S, R, Time);
send_2(R, Ti, Time, rR, H(SK, rR);
recv_3(Ti, R, Ti, R, ri, H1(SK, TSG, ri, rR, H(IDi)),
, X);
send_6(R, S, {rR, ri, Time, SK, X}k(R, S));
claim_R1(R, Secret, SK);
claim_R2(R, Niagree);
claim_R3(R, Nisynch);
}
role Ti{
var Time: Timestamp;
fresh ri: Nonce;
var rR: Nonce;
fresh TSG: Data;
fresh IDG: Data;
fresh IDi: Data;
fresh TSi: Data;
var SK: Data;
recv_2(R, Ti, Time, rR, H1(SK,rR);
send_3(Ti, R, ri, H1(SK, TSG, ri, rR, H(IDi)),
H1(IDi, ri, rR, TSi, Time));
claim_Ti1(Ti, Secret, IDG);
claim_Ti2(Ti, Secret, TSG);
claim_Ti3(Ti, Secret, IDi);
claim_Ti4(Ti, Secret, TSi);
claim_Ti6(Ti, Alive);
claim_Ti7(Ti, Niagree);
claim_Ti8(Ti, Nisynch);
}}
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